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A ‘Conservation Agreement’ (CA) is a voluntary conservation tool implemented in many 
jurisdictions to conserve features on land. Its very nature as a private law instrument 
imposing obligations running with the land, even when it changes hands, makes a CA 
different from a simple private agreement and other conservation techniques which 
operate on the basis of command and control regulation. This conservation technique is in 
place in Australia, the UK and USA, but not in Thailand, where the laws relating to land 
conservation are mostly reliant on command and control regulation.    
This thesis explores the potential for legal development of CAs in Thailand. It employs a 
doctrinal research approach and comparative analysis of law to uncover whether a legal 
framework for the establishment of CAs should be made and if so, what provisions should 
be proposed to make them operate alongside existing laws relating to nature conservation. 
The concepts of environmental regulation and voluntary environmental agreements are 
reviewed as underlying ideas behind the laws in place in Thailand and the comparator 
jurisdictions. They uncover the room for implementing CAs to work alongside command 
and control measures. A doctrinal research method is used to illustrate the application of 
the relevant laws in Thailand and the comparator jurisdictions, as well as to identify the 
room for the establishment of CAs in Thailand. The use of a comparative technique by 
comparing and analysing strengths and weaknesses of CA-enabling laws implemented in 
Australia, the UK and USA uncovers standard legal features of CA-enabling laws and 
identifies their strengths and weaknesses. These findings are subsequently employed to 
develop a possible legal model for Thailand. 
After the comparative study has been conducted, this thesis develops and proposes a legal 
proposal for Thailand. The thesis also identifies strengths and weaknesses of the proposal 
and suggests some limitations of the legal proposal and room for further study.   
This thesis provides two original contributions to academia. The first is the examination 
of how the application of CA-enabling laws can be analysed from regulatory and legal 
perspectives. The second is the creation of a legal proposal for the implementation of CAs 






Chapter 1 Introduction  
 
1. Research background 
It is widely accepted that human beings are now in the age of the Anthropocene, a 
geologic period where human activities overwhelmingly cause significant change to 
the environment on Earth.1 Human activities carried out on land are one of the major 
causes of such change. Land clearing for agriculture, for instance, not only poses a 
major threat of biodiversity loss2 but also causes land degradation3 and contamination.  
The latter affects both human health and the well-being of nature as illustrated in the 
popular literature, for example ‘Silent Spring’ published in 1962.4 Arguably, 
environmental problems from human activities took place not only because of humans’ 
need and greed,5 but also the influence of the legal recognition of property rights,6 
specifically ownership.7 The endorsement of ownership on land can be seen as a legal 
factor endorsing the exercise of rights over the land, which contributes to the 
overexploitation of natural features on land, which in turn causes environmental 
degradation.8 
One of the tools that can be used to deal with the problems arising from unregulated 
activities or overuse of natural resources on land is the use of law to control or 
intervene in human activities on land.9 Nonetheless, current legal regimes employed 
                                                     
1 Erle C Ellis, Anthropocene: A Very Short Introduction (OUP 2018) 1; Robin Attfield, Environmental 
Ethics: A Very Short Introduction (OUP 2018) 2. 
2 Neil Gunningham, Peter Grabosky and Darren Sinclair, Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental 
Policy (OUP 1998) 271. See also the work arguing that human-made activities nowadays are a major 
cause of the sixth mass extinction in Elizabeth Kolbert, The Sixth Extinction: An Unnatural History 
(Henry Holt and Company 2014). 
The evidence of the significance of biodiversity loss at the global level can be observed from the 
introduction of the Convention on Biological Diversity at the Earth Summit in 1992. 
3 Ben Boer, ‘Land Degradation’ in Emma Lees and Jorge E Viñuales (eds), The Oxford Handbook of 
Comparative Environmental Law (OUP 2019) 440. 
4 See Rachel Carson, Silent Spring (Houghton Mifflin 1962) which mainly explains how the use of 
pesticides in the USA caused various significant harm to nature.  
5 Ian Gough, Heat, Greed and Human Need: Climate Change, Capitalism and Sustainable Wellbeing 
(Edward Elgar 2017). 
6 David Grinlinton, ‘The Functions of Rights of Property in Environmental law’ in Douglas Fisher (ed), 
Research Handbook on Fundamental Concepts of Environmental Law (Edward Elgar 2016) 391. 
7 See Gerry Bates, Environmental Law in Australia (8th edn, LexisNexis Butterworths Australia 2013) 
paras 3.2-3.4. 
8 Christopher Rodgers, ‘Nature’s Place? Property Rights, Property Rules and Environmental 
Stewardship’ (2009) 68(3) Cambridge Law Journal 550, 561; James L Huffman, ‘Land Ownership and 
Environmental Regulation’ (1999) 25 Ecology Law Quarterly 591, 594. 
9 Gunningham, Grabosky and Sinclair (n 2) 279; Garrett Hardin, ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’ (1968) 
Science 162 (3859) 1243, 1245; Garrett Hardin, ‘Extensions of “The Tragedy of the Commons”’ (1998) 





in several jurisdictions, including Thailand,10 are suffering from various legal 
problems. They include the absence of, or weakness in, legal provisions preventing or 
controlling land degradation and promoting sustainable land use.11 In addition, the 
laws in several jurisdictions are heavily reliant on direct regulation (command-and-
control (C&C) regulation),12 which has some limitations. For instance, it merely 
imposes a minimum requirement of the duty not to cause significant harm to the 
environment but fails to encourage landowners to perform practices beyond a 
minimum legal standard.13 In Thailand, several government reports and policies have 
highlighted the need to reform the existing environmental laws due to their 
insufficiency or obsolescence in dealing with environmental problems.14 
Apart from that, the established legal measures regarding the recognition of property 
rights on land and land-use regulation are insufficient to facilitate the establishment of 
a voluntary legal tool to ensure the long-term conservation of natural features on 
land.15 Several methods could be used to refine and strengthen the current regime; and 
one among these is the use of conservation agreements (CAs) as an alternative and 
subsidiary tool of formal regulation.16 It appears that this regulatory style conforms to 
the global trend, whereby the use of more varied regulatory techniques, rather than a 
single one, is supported.17 The search for more diverse methods is not just a fashion 
but a realisation that the best results will come from a varied ‘toolkit’.  This thesis 
                                                     
See how the law can be used to intervene in human activities in chapter 2.  
10 See Surasak Boonrueang, ‘Terrestrial Biodiversity Conservation Law in Thailand:  A Preliminary 
Illustration of Applicable Laws and Their Limitations’ (2019) 12 Naresuan Law Journal 23, 39. 
11 Boer (n 3) 439. 
12 In short, C&C regulation involves the government’s intervention, mostly by exercising legal power, 
to require individuals and a private sector to do or not to do specific activities under prescribed 
conditions. In the case that regulated persons are failing to fulfil such requirements, they might be 
sanctioned with specific measures by public authorities. 
13 See the limitations of C&C regulation in Gunningham, Grabosky and Sinclair (n 2) 45; Cass R 
Sunstein, ‘Paradoxes of the Regulatory State’ (1990) 57 University of Chicago Law Review 407, 420. 
14 See Office of the Natural Resources and Environmental Policy and Planning (ONEP), ‘National 
Policy and Plans for the Enhancement and Conservation of National Environmental Quality 2560-2578 
BE)’(ONEP 2018) 131-33; Commission of the National Reform, ‘The National Reform Plan: Book 4 
(Natural Resources and the Environment)’ (2018) 13-16 (published in the Royal Gazette Book 134, Part 
24ก on 6 April 2018). 
15 See the limits of the existing regime as will be examined in section 1.2 of chapter 6. 
16 Cyrille de Klemm and Clare Shine, Biological Diversity Conservation and the Law: Legal 
Mechanisms for Conserving Species and Ecosystems (Environmental Policy and Law Paper No 29, 
IUCN 1993) 134.  
17 See this justification in more detail in section 4.1 below.  
See also Colin T Reid and Walters Nsoh, The Privatisation of Biodiversity?: New Approaches to 
Conservation Law (Edward Elgar 2016) 2; Lee Godden, Jacqueline Peel and Jan McDonald, 
Environmental Law (2nd edn, OUP 2019) Ch 4; Hardin, ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’ (n 9) 1245; 





proposes that one of the voluntary choices worth examing is the use of CAs to impose 
burdens on the agreeing and bound landowners to conserve some natural features on 
privately-owned land.18 However, as will be identified and argued in this chapter, 
chapter 4 and chapter 6,19 the existing Thai laws seem insufficient to accommodate the 
creation of this conservation tool, and a new legal framework should be made. It is the 
primary purpose of this thesis to examine the room to develop such a new legal 
framework. This argument will be the basis for the examination of various theoretical 
and legal considerations throughout this thesis.20 
 
2. Research objectives, questions and hypothesis 
As indicated in the research title, this study involves investigating the development of 
a legal scheme enabling the implementation of CAs by a comparative technique, and 
the primary objectives are:  
1) To explore the potential values and applicability of voluntary agreements and 
CAs implemented elsewhere;  
2) To analyse the room to develop a legal proposal for the establishment of this 
conservation technique in Thailand; and  
3) To propose the legal provisions that could be made for the country.  
This thesis sets the overarching research question to fulfil the above research 
objectives as follows:   
Whether a legal framework for the establishment of conservation agreements 
should be made for the conservation of natural features on land, and if it should 
be, what provisions should be made for the establishment of CAs to work 
alongside existing laws for nature conservation on land? 
                                                     
18 The term ‘privately-owned land’ in the context of Thailand is the parcels of land where individuals 
are entitled to hold ownership or possessory rights under various laws. See a comprehensive 
examination in this point in sub-section 2.1.4.2 (privately-owned land) of chapter 4. 
19 See the comprehensive discussions relating to the current gaps in the Thai law in establishing CAs at 
section 1.2 of chapter 6. 
20 See the justifications for the selection of this tool in section 4.1 and the preliminary definition and in 





The above question will fulfil the research objectives by employing a comparative 
study of the selected CA enabling laws in the comparator jurisdictions.21 The findings 
drawn from such a comparative study will be used to analyse whether and how to 
develop the legal proposal for Thailand.   
As this study will be divided into various chapters, it is necessary to identify the 
subsequent research questions to be investigated in each chapter, as well as justify how 
they are interconnected to the overarching one. The sub-research questions are set in 
the following order: 
1) What are the relevant fundamental concepts and tools for environmental 
regulation? How are they relevant to the understanding of the existing rules of 
land-use control and nature conservation on land in Thailand and the 
comparator jurisdictions? These questions will be examined in chapter 2 
(regulation: fundamental concepts and available tools for environmental 
regulation).  
2) What are the relevant fundamental concepts and ideas behind the use of 
voluntary agreements as a form of environmental regulation? How are they 
relevant to the understanding of the nature of CAs and helpful in developing a 
proposed legal model for Thailand? These questions will be examined in 
chapter 3 (fundamental concepts of voluntary environmental agreements).  
3) What are the key existing problems and gaps, motivations for reform, and legal 
principles, which are relevant to or support the creation of CAs in the Thai 
context? This question will be addressed in chapter 4 (land rights, land-use 
regulation and nature conservation in Thailand). 
4) What are the design choices that can be drawn from the selected CA-enabling 
laws22 implemented in the comparator jurisdictions? What are their strengths 
and weaknesses when considered from the legal and regulatory perspectives? 
These questions will be examined in chapter 5 (the comparison of the selected 
CA-enabling laws). 
                                                     
21 See the justification for the selection of a research approach and the jurisdictions for this comparative 
study in sections 4.2 and 4.3 below.  
22 The words ‘CA-enabling law(s)’ will be used throughout this thesis by referring to the statute(s) which 
allow(s) a particular body to make a CA with qualified persons. This type of law can be a stand-alone 
statute enacted to fulfil this objective or another having specific legal provisions entitling to make a CA. 
This term is developed from the definition of conservation easement-enabling statutes in place in the 
USA (Nancy McLaughlin and Jeffrey Pidot, ‘Conservation Easement Enabling Statutes: Perspectives 





5) Whether or not a CA scheme should actually be introduced?  What is the scope 
for introducing a law establishing CAs in Thailand? What are the strengths 
and weaknesses of the proposed legal proposal? These questions will be 
examined in chapter 6 (the legal proposal for CA-enabling law provisions for 
Thailand). 
6) What are the key findings of this research? What are its limitations and issues 
for further study? These questions will be examined in chapter 7 (conclusions 
of research findings). 
The questions set above will be uncovered by starting from an understanding of the 
underlying concepts of regulation lying behind the existing laws of Thailand and the 
comparator jurisdictions. Then, the research will narrow down to the ideas of voluntary 
agreements, which are a general form of CAs. The findings drawn from these sets of 
questions will be employed as the basis for understanding and analysing the existing 
laws in Thailand and the application of CAs in the comparator jurisdictions.  
It is to be noted that this research has no intention to radically abolish the existing legal 
measures regarding land-use control and nature conservation on land and replace them 
with a new legal proposal, but instead proposes to study the potential in the 
implementation of CAs to operate as a supplementary tool of those conventional legal 
measures.23 The legal proposal this research seeks to develop will become a legal 
model enabling further study to consider how this legal proposal can be implemented 
in practice.  
This thesis sets the hypothesis for the overarching research question that it is possible 
to establish a legal model for the creation of CAs to work alongside the existing legal 
measures. The provisions constituting such a legal framework can be developed by 
conducting a comparative analysis of the legal features of CA-enabling law 
implemented in the comparator jurisdictions and formulating the legal proposal for 
Thailand. However, this thesis by itself cannot make a conclusive recommendation 
that such a model should be introduced.  Further studies, including of the socio-
economic and ecological consequences, would be needed to move from a general idea 
to work out the precise details of a fully worked up proposal and assess its value in 
specific contexts.   
                                                     






3. Study scope 
The scope of this research can be determined in two aspects, comprising the research 
methodology proposed to be used and the subject matters to be examined.  
Regarding the research methodology, doctrinal analysis, coupled with comparative 
study, will be used to identify some legal gaps under Thai laws and examine the 
application of CA-enabling laws in the comparator jurisdictions.24 Based on these legal 
research techniques, this research focuses the subject matter to be examined in two 
areas, namely the regulatory dimension and legal dimension, as will be justified below.  
Regarding the regulatory dimension, this research will focus the study at the concepts 
of regulation and available tools for regulation as well as the underlying concepts of 
voluntary agreements in the early chapters. These two main ideas will be used to shed 
light on the regulatory background behind the established Thai laws, which have 
primarily developed from the laws of the western countries, and on the application of 
CA-enabling laws in the comparator jurisdictions. The examination of regulation is 
based on academic work from the western perspective, specifically from experience in 
regulating private actors in the USA and European countries.   
Regarding the legal aspect, this thesis will mainly study the application of relevant 
laws in Thailand to explore the room for the introduction of a new legal tool to support 
the implementation of the existing ones. The areas to be examined are threefold, 
comprising the legal concepts of property rights on land, land-use regulation and 
nature conservation. These three aspects of the law are crucial for this study since they 
are relevant to the identification of the legal gaps of the existing regime and the 
opportunities to introduce a new legal tool. Apart from that, this thesis will primarily 
conduct a comparative study by examining the laws in place in the comparing 
jurisdictions, namely Australia, the UK and the USA. The justification for this 
selection and the scope of the laws to be examined will be discussed in section 4.3 
below. 
This thesis accepts that a wide range of voluntary techniques can be employed to serve 
a similar aim as the use of CAs. However, due to the limited space of this thesis, it will 
                                                     
24 See the justification for the selections of the research methodology and comparator jurisdictions in 





not examine the potential of the introduction of other voluntary and market-based 
schemes, nor their potential to assist the conservation of natural features on land in 
Thailand.25  
 
4. Justification for the selections of the legal tools, research methodology and 
jurisdictions for the study 
As mentioned earlier, the primary aim of this study is to develop a proposal for the 
establishment of CAs in the Thai legal system; this study adopts a legal doctrinal and 
comparative study to fulfil this task. The justification for the selection of a regulatory 
tool, research methodology and jurisdictions for the study is explained as follows.  
 
4.1 Justification for the study of voluntary approach and conservation 
agreements (CAs)  
This section justifies why this research proposes to develop a voluntary legal tool to 
work with the existing legal regime. In the first place, the use of voluntary tools in 
combination with direct regulation looks desirable to deal with environmental 
problems rather than the use of stand-alone C&C regulation.26 From a governmental 
policy side, many pieces of literature argue that the introduction of new land-use 
regulatory control to restrict activities on land is politically difficult as it directly 
interferes with the use of property.27 This is the same in Thailand where the national 
environmental policy, and some scholars, support the enactment of legal measures 
based on voluntary approaches and economic instruments for the management of 
natural resources and nature conservation.28  
                                                     
25 See the justification for the selection to study the implementation of CAs in section 4.1 below.  
26 See Gunningham, Grabosky and Sinclair (n 2) 15-17; Beckett G Cantley, ‘Environmental 
Preservation and the Fifth Amendment: The Use and Limits of Conservation Easements by Regulatory 
Taking and Eminent Domain’ (2014) 20 Hastings West-Northwest Journal of Environmental Law and 
Policy 215, 216; Ian Hannam and Ben Boer, Legal and Institutional Frameworks for Sustainable Soils: 
A Preliminary Report (Environmental Policy and Law Paper No 45, IUCN 2002) 43. 
27 Cantley (n 26) 102. 
28 Boonrueang (n 10) 39; Policy 3 of the Thai National Policy and Plans for the Enhancement and 
Conservation of National Environmental Quality 2560-2578 BE (2018-2038) (ONEP (n 14) 131-33 
(this document obligates relevant governmental bodies to implement a specific action plan, including 
setting the plan to propose a draft bill, conforming to the National Policy and Plans by virtue of the 





Some may argue that the improvement of the existing relevant laws should be more 
desirable than the introduction of a new legal tool. This includes the enactment of a 
new statutory provision imposing on landowners duties of conserving biodiversity on 
their land or requiring a development permit before carrying out any land clearing. 
However, this thesis maintains that the introduction of a new legal vehicle on a 
voluntary basis is attractive for two reasons.  
In the first place, the use of a voluntary tool is attractive where a government seeks to 
restrict the exercise of property rights on privately-owned land or require landowners 
to carry out positive obligations. In some jurisdictions, the use of legal regulation to 
restrict the use of property is unwelcome. For instance, in the USA, the restriction of 
the use of land can be subject to the takings clauses under the Constitution, which 
requires the government to pay just compensation for such restriction.29 For this 
reason, the introduction of burdens on land with a voluntary tool becomes an 
alternative choice for governments.30  
Another point to be noted is why this thesis sees a CA an appropriate voluntary choice. 
The merits of CAs can be justified on many grounds.31 One among others is that a CA 
is the most suitable choice that can be used to impose obligations running with the 
land32 (i.e. automatically binding on successors in title to the landowner who initially 
entered the agreement) for the conservation of natural features on privately-owned 
land.33 The evidence for this justification is apparent from the implementation of this 
legal tool in several jurisdictions.34 CAs are distinct from a simple contract since this 
regulatory tool imposes a burden running with the land which binds a land title 
                                                     
29 Jessica Owley, ‘The Emergence of Exacted Conservation Easements’ (2006) 84 Nebraska Law 
Review 1043, 1098; Cantley (n 26) 216. 
30 See other reasons for the use of voluntary agreements in part 4 of chapter 3. 
31 For example, Hodge and Adams support the use of CAs as they could be used to support conservation 
organisations to participate in land use and management in rural land conservation (Ian D Hodge and 
William M Adams, ‘Property Institutions for Rural Land Conservation: Towards a Postneoliberal 
Agenda’ (2014) 36 Journal of Rural Studies 453, 461). 
See other merits in part 6 below.  
32 The words ‘run with the land’ is clearly explained by the Victoria Law Reform Commission 
(Australia) as the situation where ‘the benefit and burden of a property right passing to successors in 
title to land, so that it continues to apply to the new owner or occupier’ (Victoria Law Reform 
Commission, Easements and Covenants (Final Report No 22, 2011) 8). 
33 See the examples of the range of voluntary tools that can be used to conserve natural features on land 
in Sristi Kamal, Małgorzata Grodzińska-Jurczak and Gregory Brown, ‘Conservation on Private Land: 
A Review of Global Strategies with a Proposed Classification System’ (2015) 58 Journal of 
Environmental Planning and Management 576, 581-82; Ian Bowles and others, ‘Economic Incentives 
and Legal Tools for Private Sector Conservation’ (1998) 8 Duke Environmental Law & Policy Forum 
209, 211-220; Barbara Lausche, Guidelines for Protected Areas Legislation (IUCN Environmental 
Policy and Law Paper No 81, 2011) paras 25 and 55. 





successor.35 This legal instrument entails the creation of a new property right on land 
by agreement of the qualified parties. The examination in section 1.2 of chapter 4 will 
illustrate how CAs could be used to deal with environmental problems in Thailand.   
This thesis does not go so far as to argue that this legal tool is the optimal legal 
mechanism for dealing with land conservation but sees the attraction and possibilities 
in developing and establishing this legal vehicle in Thailand. Regarding the experience 
of other jurisdictions, this legal tool has been used in many jurisdictions for decades,36 
and Thailand could learn from those jurisdictions and develop this legal tool in a way 
compatible with its own legal system.   
Regarding the possibility to develop this legal tool based on the legal models of other 
jurisdictions, although this legal tool has never been used in the country, Thai people 
are familiar with some private legal tools similar to a CA, including servitudes created 
by private-law agreements. This implies that there is room to develop this legal tool in 
the country. Apart from that, a CA is the legal tool that can be used as a basis for 
supporting other market-based instruments, for instance, biodiversity offsetting.37 The 
development of this legal tool could invite the use of other mixed tools dealing with 
environmental challenges in the coming future.  
 
4.2 Justification for the selection of research approach  
The approach employed for the examination of the development of the CA framework 
for Thailand is entirely based on desk-based analysis emphasising two legal 
techniques. They are doctrinal analysis coupled with comparative analysis of law as 
will be explained below. Doctrinal legal analysis is essential for this study because it 
can be used to find the existence of specific legal rules in a particular area and analyse 
how they can be applied for a specific circumstance.38 This technique helps to identify 
the application and limitations of the existing laws in Thailand as well as assisting in 
considering whether the proposed legal provisions for CA establishment can be 
implemented in the country.  
                                                     
35 See this explanation in the context of management agreements implemented in the UK in Colin T 
Reid, Nature Conservation Law (3rd edn, W Green 2009) para 1.3.17. 
36 For example, see the development of the use of CAs in Australia, the UK and USA in part 1 of chapter 5. 
37 Reid and Nsoh (n 17) 178.  
38 Paul Chynoweth, ‘Chapter 3: Legal Research’ in Andrew Knight and Les Ruddock (eds), Advanced 





A comparative study, alongside a doctrinal analysis of laws, also plays a vital role in 
determining and analysing critical features for the legal comparison in chapter 5 as 
well as identifying key strengths and weaknesses of each legal model. This research 
approach involves the comparison of the differences and similarities of the laws in 
different jurisdictions.39 Although there might be some unexpected results arising from 
legal transplants from different social, political and economic contexts,40 this thesis 
argues that a comparative study is suitable for the examination in this topic for two 
main reasons. First, it enables a researcher to compare the differences in legal models 
by comparing foreign laws to modernise and improve the law in a different 
jurisdiction.41 Second, making use of comparative study is also helpful for the 
development of a new legal scheme for one jurisdiction by considering the legal 
structures, features and experience in implementing and enforcing similar legal 
measures in other jurisdictions. The justification for the selection of the comparators 
will be addressed below.  
 
4.3 Justification for the selection of comparator jurisdictions 
As mentioned in 4.1, CAs have never been used in Thailand, so exploring the concept 
and design issues needed to develop this tool requires studying where it has been 
implemented. This research mainly compares and analyses the strengths and 
weaknesses of key elements of a CA implemented in the CA-enabling laws of three 
jurisdictions, comprising those of Australia, the UK, and the USA. The primary 
objective of this comparison is to understand the similarities and differences of CAs 
in these jurisdictions. It is also helpful for the analysis seeking to extract strengths and 
weaknesses drawn from these three jurisdictions to develop possible legal elements for 
Thailand.  
                                                     
39 Geoffrey Samuel, An Introduction to Comparative Law Theory and Method (Hart Publishing 2014) 
53-57; Michaels Ralf, ‘The Functional Method of Comparative Law’ in Mathias Reimann and Reinhard 
Zimmermann (eds), Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (OUP 2006) 342. 
40 Ugo Mattei, ‘Chapter 25: Comparative Law and Critical Legal Studies’ in Mathias Reimann and 
Reinhard Zimmermann (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (OUP 2012) 827-833. 
41 Esin Örücü, ‘Methodology of Comparative Law’ in Jan M Smith (ed), Elgar Encyclopedia of 





Admittedly, those jurisdictions are not the only ones that could be studied,42 but there 
are good reasons for choosing them. In the first place, Australia, the UK and the USA 
have enacted statutes to implement CAs43 for nature conservation on privately-owned 
land over a certain period, and some of these jurisdictions are developing, or have 
recently introduced, a new model of CAs.44 This selection enables the research to 
observe their legal models and consider the challenging issues, as well as limitations 
of this tool from these three countries. Second, there is a multitude of academic papers 
in English examining the use of this voluntary tool in these three countries. The 
sufficiency of academic papers is vital for this comparative study in analysing the use 
of this tool.  
Apart from the above justification, the UK is interesting for this study for many 
grounds. First, there is substantial work by the Law Commission studying the 
possibility of one variation of this tool, conservation covenants, in England and 
Wales.45 Their study lays down the limitations of existing laws and explores the 
possibility of developing conservation covenants in England. Currently, the 
Environment Bill addressing the provisions of making conservation covenants is in the 
legislative process.46 This means that this thesis can study the work of the Law 
Commission and the Environment Bill as part of this comparative study. Also, all 
jurisdictions in the UK have long experience in employing management agreements, 
as a specific form of CAs, as a subsidiary tool to the formal obligations under the 
                                                     
42 Some may suggest that a comparative study with the legal models in place in developing countries 
might be more desirable because of the similarities of socio-economic conditions. This thesis accepts 
that the comparison with legal models of developing States looks appealing, but it should be undertaken 
only where the information to be compared is sufficient. However, the quest for information about the 
laws relating to CAs in developing States found that although some provide examples of conservation 
through private law, these do not specifically focus on CAs. The information relating to private land 
conservation in Costa Rica, for instance, is not in legal documents, but instead policy reports or articles. 
The difficulty in searching for a primary source (CA-enabling laws) from a reliable source means that 
the comparison of laws from the jurisdictions without proper access to primary sources might be at risk 
of comparing laws based on inaccurate or outdated information. 
43 CAs in those countries might be called with different names, including conservation covenants, 
management agreements and conservation burdens in some areas of the UK, conservation easements in 
the USA, and private land conservation agreements in New South Wales, Australia.  
44 In the UK, there is an attempt to introduce a legal model of CAs to England; meanwhile, a law on 
biodiversity conservation in New South Wales, Australia, recently introduced a new and comprehensive 
legal model of this tool in 2016 and coming into effect in 2017.  
45 Law Commission, Conservation Covenants (Law Com No 349 2014).   
46 See Environment Bill introduced to the House of Commons on 30 January 2020 (HC Bill 9) at 
<https://services.parliament.uk/bills/2019-20/environment.html> accessed 14 May 2020. This Chapter 
will use the ‘Environment Bill’ to refer to the Environment Bill 2019-2020, in which conservation 
covenant provisions are incorporated. See also DEFRA, ‘A Green Future: Our 25 Year Plan to Improve 





statutes made to promote for nature conservation.47 The implementation of this tool 
was also influenced by EU law and policy, where incentive mechanisms have been 
encouraged for good farming practices.48 For these reasons, the application of 
management agreements under specific statutes, for example, under the Natural 
Environment and Rural Communities Act 2006 in England, will be investigated in this 
comparative study as representative of the application of CAs in the UK.  
The USA is also attractive for several reasons. Firstly, conservation easements - one 
form of CAs - have been heavily used as a land protection mechanism for more than 
the past four decades.49 The US legal model is also the oldest,50 most well-established 
system of CAs compared with the legal models of other jurisdictions.51 The success of 
CA implementation in the USA attracts several people to support the US legal model 
being applied in other counties.52 This means that this research can benefit from the 
US experience to help develop a legal model for Thailand. Secondly, the USA provides 
a model law for implementing a CA,53 and each state could adopt and implement the 
legal model of this tool adjusted for its own legal conditions. The US model law is also 
appealing since it offers broader options for the legal provisions for state-level 
implementation.54 Thus, there is room to learn the strengths, weaknesses and 
                                                     
47 Andrea Ross and Jeremy Rowan-Robinson, ‘Behind Closed Doors: The Use of Agreements in the 
UK to Protect the Environment’ (1999) 1 Environmental Law Review 82, 88. 
48 The primary source of policy schemes originates from the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
introduced in 1962. The CAP has been made legally binding on EU member states by the 
implementation of various EU Directives (see European Commission, ‘The Common Agricultural 
Policy at a Glance’ <https://ec.europa.eu/info/food-farming-fisheries/key-policies/common-
agricultural-policy/cap-glance_en#legalfoundations> accessed 14 May 2020). 
49 Federico Cheever and Nancy A McLaughlin, ‘An Introduction to Conservation Easements in the 
United States: A Simple Concept and a Complicated Mosaic of Law’ (2015) 1 Journal of Law, Property, 
and Society 107, 109. 
50 Law Commission (n 45) para 3.31. 
51 The USA provides a very comprehensive and updated database regarding the use of conservation 
easements, one of the form of CAs, nationwide (NCED, ‘National Conservation Easement Database’ 
<www.conservationeasement.us/> accessed 14 May 2020). 
52 Gerald Korngold, ‘Globalizing Conservation Easements: Private Law Approaches for International 
Environmental Protection’ (2011) 25 Wisconsin International Law Journal 585, 588. 
53 See the Uniform Conservation Easement Act (UCEA) in Uniform Law Commission, ‘Conservation 
Easement Act’ <www.uniformlaws.org/viewdocument/final-act-with-comments-
16?CommunityKey=4297dc67-1a90-4e43-b704-7b277c4a11bd&tab=librarydocuments> accessed 14 
May 2020.  
54 For example, the US model law divides the possible objectives of CAs that each state can adopt into 
five groups. They include retaining or protecting natural, scenic, or open-space values of real property, 
assuring its availability for agricultural, forest, recreational, or open-space use, protecting natural 
resources, maintaining or enhancing air or water quality, or preserving the historical, architectural, 





limitations in the implementation of this tool from the experience of various states in 
the USA.55  
The models of CA-enabling laws in Australia are attractive as CAs are endorsed in 
both the federal and state-level legislation. This research will focus the examination 
on the CA-enabling laws at both levels, specifically CAs in New South Wales (NSW) 
and Western Australia (WA). They are worth examining as they have recently 
introduced several pieces of nature conservation-related legislation to replace those 
that have been in operation for a long time.56 This makes NSW and WA examples of 
the jurisdictions introducing CAs for particular purposes in the conservation of natural 
features (biodiversity). Also, the NSW regime provides particularly detailed and 
established public agencies for administering CAs concluded between eligible 
landowners and the NSW government. WA is attractive as a representative of a 
jurisdiction providing concise provisions when compared with those of NSW, as well 
as having some interesting legal features.57 Additionally, environmental policies in 
Australia, both of the Commonwealth and States or Territories, embrace the use of 
voluntary legal tools coupled with direct regulation for biodiversity conservation.58 
Hence, this research could learn not only how Australia created the legal model of 
CAs, but also study how the varied experience across this country has led to NSW 
establishing its own version of this tool for biodiversity conservation.59  
Another point that should be addressed here is about the reason in excluding the choice 
of comparing with civil law countries. As will be articulated in chapter 4, the Thai 
                                                     
55 This study has no intention to study CA-related laws of all states in the USA. It intends to select some 
outstanding legal issues of CA-related laws from different states, where those examples can help reflect 
the strengths and weaknesses of the American model.   
56 Two pieces of legislation were enacted in these two states, namely the Biodiversity Conservation Act 
2016 (NSW) and Biodiversity Conservation Act 2016 (WA). 
57 For example, the CA-enabling law of WA is the only one imposing a criminal penalty for the breach 
of CA obligations.  
58 This can be seen from the attempt to set the Principle of Ecologically Sustainable Development (ESD) 
as a policy goal in 1991, the enactment of the Environmental Protection and Biodiversity Conservation 
Act 1999 (EPBCA 1999) of the Federal Government and the introduction of the law on biodiversity 
conservation in many states and territories (see Godden, Peel and McDonald (n 17) 60-64; Eloise Scotford, 
Environmental Principles and the Evolution of Environmental Law (Hart Publishing 2017) 103). 
59 As mentioned, the NSW and WA models are the latest CA models which has been recognised by 
legislation.  This means that the CA models of these states can be expected to reflect lessons learnt from 
their own previous legal models as well as from those of other states or territories. Hence, this research 






legal system is civil-law based,60 and it might be questioned why the legal models of 
civil law countries are not chosen for this comparison. The justifications for this are 
twofold. The first reason is that the origins and development of CAs lie in the common 
law countries, specifically those jurisdictions identified above. Although some civil-
law based countries recently adopted a CA as a legal tool for land conservation, lack 
of experience in implementing CA-enabling law could hinder Thailand to develop a 
proposed model from these countries.61 France, for example, recently introduced a CA 
as a conservation technique in 2016 under the label ‘environmental real obligation’ 
(obligation réelles environnementales) as part of the Biodiversity Act 2016.62 The 
second reason is the nature of the objects to be compared. Although the traditional 
rules under the common law system have been formulated and employed a case-law 
system, the primary source of its modern environmental laws in common law countries 
is a statutory source,63 and the objects to be compared are statutory provisions.64 For 
this reason, the comparative study of CA-enabling laws of the common law-based 
jurisdictions to develop the legal proposal for the civil law-based jurisdiction may not 
be problematic as CAs in those jurisdictions are created to fulfil the same function.65 
 
                                                     
60 As observed by Pongsapan, the promulgation of the Thai Civil and Commercial Code 1925 was 
entirely drafted based on English translation of foreign laws, specifically the German Civil Code (Munin 
Pongsapan, ‘Remedies for Breach of Contract in Thai Law’ in Mindy Chen-Wishart, Alexander Loke, 
and Burton Ong (eds), Studies in the Contract Laws of Asia: Remedies for Breach of Contract (OUP 
2016) 371). 
61 See the recent study about the possibility to introduce a CA in European countries in Inga Racinska 
and Siim Vahtrus, ‘The Use of Conservation Easements in the European Union’ (Report to NABU 
Federal Association 2018). 
62 Chapter II of Title III of Book I of the Environment Code Article L. 132-3. 
See also Julie Babin, ‘Real Environmental Obligations (ORE): Where are we now?’ 
<www.accesstoland.eu/IMG/pdf/ore_fncen___tdl_en-2.pdf> accessed 14 May 2020. 
63 Bates (n 7) para 2.48. 
In the UK, the definition of environmental law in the Environment Bill, which refers to any legislative 
provisions mainly concerned with ‘environmental matters’, indicates that a statutory provision is a 
primary source of environmental law. See the meaning of environmental law in the Environment Bill, 
cl 40. 
64 Elizabeth Fisher, Environmental Law: A Very Short Introduction (OUP 2017) 23. 
65 As will be seen in chapters 4 and 5 regarding the legal principles relevant to the creation of CAs, 
although developed from different legal systems (common-law and civil-law systems) the majority of 
the legal mechanisms regarding the creation of property rights on land, land-use regulation and nature 
conservation of Thailand and the comparator jurisdictions are similar, except for the legal concepts of 
covenants and land tenures (ownership). Hence, this thesis sees that there is no significant difference 
that makes this comparative study and legal transplantation impossible. This study considers the 
differences in the legal mechanisms, concepts and socio-economic diversity among the comparators 
countries and Thailand a little challenging for the design choices rather than an obstacle in conducting 





5. Research originality and contributions 
This research will generate three original contributions, viz. contributions to an 
analysis of theoretical aspects of a voluntary approach for nature conservation in 
Thailand, to a comparative study of CA-related laws implemented in the compared 
countries and to the reform of land-use and biodiversity conservation laws in Thailand.  
Regarding the contribution to an analysis of theoretical aspects of a voluntary approach 
in Thailand, although CAs are far from new in the western world, and there are plenty 
of papers examining voluntary agreements and CAs, only a handful of papers analyse 
the theoretical aspect and application of CAs comprehensively.66 This study will 
generate conclusions on how CAs and general voluntary agreements are similar or 
different from one another. Then, this thesis will use this finding for an analysis of 
how CAs can work alongside C&C-based instruments where they are developed for 
the implementation in Thailand.   
Regarding the merit of a comparative study of the legal models of the compared 
countries, although some work has already investigated the application of CAs in some 
respects,67 the recent legislative reform in some comparator jurisdictions68 has brought 
changes worthy of re-examination. This research will create new comprehensive work 
comparing the features, strengths and weaknesses of CAs used in the UK, USA and 
Australia. This outcome will provide an example to other research or academic papers 
seeking to develop CA models for other countries.  
Additionally, the outcome of this study will help to point towards which legal 
provisions the policy- or law-makers should consider for the development of a CA 
legal model in the case that the establishment of CAs is possible. The conclusion drawn 
from this research study will also provide a new knowledge body for Thai academics 
and policy-makers regarding the use of a combined regulatory approach (between 
                                                     
66 For example, the work of Colin T Reid and Walters Nsoh, namely ‘The Privatisation of Biodiversity? 
New Approaches to Conservation Law’, studied the features and examples of the application of this tool 
in various jurisdictions (see Reid and Nsoh (n 17)). However, as their study aims at illustrating how 
CAs could take part as a new legal approach for biodiversity conservation and suggesting how law-
makers should design this tool, this book does not exhaustively explore a theoretical concept of 
regulation and suggest how to make this tool compatible with the mainstream C&C regulation. Also, 
that study leaves room enabling this research to examine further the implementation of this voluntary 
tool in a specific country. 
67 For example, the work of Professor Colin T Reid and Walters Nsoh (Reid and Nsoh (n 17)) and the 
Law Commission (Law Commission (n 45). 





C&C and voluntary approaches) from a perspective of land-use regulation and 
biodiversity conservation.  
 
6. Conservation agreements at a glance   
As this thesis primarily entails the examination of CAs, it is essential to consider at the 
beginning what a CA is, and how it functions.69 One of the reasons for this overview 
is that although far from new,70 CAs remain unknown in many quarters. The 
investigation of what this legal tool looks like and how it works should be preliminarily 
explained to enable a reader to understand how each chapter is linked to the 
development of this legal instrument.  
Although there is no well-accepted definition of CAs due to the differences in their 
terms, legal development and functions,71 it is necessary to set the scene here by 
identifying what this thesis perceives as the common features of this legal tool. One of 
the definitions widely cited by several scholars72 is the definition given by the Law 
Commission of England and Wales seeking to develop a legal framework of 
conservation covenants73 for implementation in England and Wales. The Law 
Commission defines conservation covenants as follows;  
‘A conservation covenant is an agreement made between a landowner and a 
conservation body which ensures the conservation of natural or heritage 
features on the land. It is a private and voluntary arrangement made in the 
public interest, which continues to be effective even after the land changes 
hands’.74 
                                                     
69 See the full examination about the application of this legal tool in chapter 5.  
70 Reid and Nsoh (n 17) 201. 
71 See the differences on these matters in parts 1 and 2 of chapter 5.  
72 Examples of the academic work employing the Law Commission’s definition can be observed from 
Reid and Nsoh (n 17) 179; Bonnie Holligan, ‘Narratives of Capital versus Narratives of Community: 
Conservation Covenants and the Private Regulation of Land Use’ (2018) 30 Journal of Environmental 
Law 55, 57; Christopher Rodgers, ‘Towards a Taxonomy for Public and Common Property’ (2019) 78 
Cambridge Law Journal 124, 141-42; Judith-Anne MacKenzie and Mary Phillips, Textbook on Land 
Law (15th edn, OUP 2014) 581. 
73 ‘Conservation covenant’ is one of various terms equivalent to ‘conservation agreement (CA)’ 
employed in this thesis. 





The word ‘agreement’ indicates a voluntary basis75 itself, which means that the 
conservation duties emerge from voluntary agreement rather than legal regulation.76 
The parties to this type of agreement commonly are landowners77 and qualified 
conservation bodies.78 CAs are different from other types of voluntary environmental 
agreements in that they are commonly created to serve a specific aim for the 
conservation of specified features on land. The definition above also emphasises its 
noticeable character as a private law instrument seeking to achieve public interest.79 
CAs impose either positive or negative obligations on landowners to prohibit them 
doing certain activities on land or require them to do affirmative actions thereon. The 
obligations may include the commitment not to change land-use patterns, e.g. from 
woodland to residential areas, or to plant and maintain native vegetation on the land. 
Additionally, CAs are distinguished from a private contract created to serve a similar 
purpose in that they impose burdens running with the land, and such burdens bind 
future landowners. CAs can be created to last in perpetuity to ensure long-term 
conservation.80 
As will be seen in sub-section 2.1.3 of chapter 4 and section 1.2 of chapter 6, although 
some private law instruments are in place in Thailand and can create obligations on 
landowners to do certain tasks, they have some limitations. These include limitations 
in creating a positive obligation to run with the land in perpetuity. The presence of this 
                                                     
75 The word ‘voluntary’ is one of the most controversial terms as there are different views on to what 
extent the level of intention constituting ‘voluntary agreement’ should be. In the context of CA, some 
consider that CAs are created voluntarily irrespective whether they are imposed by regulation so long 
as landowners have a choice to decide whether to enter into a CA or not. Another might oppose that the 
nature of an agreement is reliant on the free will of the parties, and the word ‘voluntary’ should mean 
that an agreement is created with no threat of regulation. Hence, CAs created by the fear that an 
individual will be prosecuted or not be granted permission for their action should be treated as an 
involuntary agreement (see the different views in Jerold S Kayden, ‘Zoning for Dollars: New Rules for 
an Old Game? Comments on the Municipal Art Society and Nollan Cases’ (1991) 39 Journal of Urban 
and Contemporary Law 3, 35-36; and Richard A Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of 
Eminent Domain (Harvard University Press 1985) 4). 
76 Reid and Nsoh (n 17) 178. 
77 Although landowners play a primary role in entering into CAs with qualified holder, some CA-
enabling laws also entitle other persons, for instance, a land tenant, to do the same task. This point will 
be examined and discussed in part 5 of chapter 5. 
78 See the points of who can be the qualified conservation body (qualified holders) and who can enter 
into a CA with the qualified bodies in parts 4 and 5 of chapter 5. 
79 Reid and Nsoh (n 17) 178. 
However, as argued by Holligan, the nature of CAs as a private-law instrument engenders some concerns. 
These include the question of whether and to what extent CAs can be used to deliver the public 
environmental and social benefits and provide environmental justice (Holligan (n 72) 56 and 80). 





limitation in the Thai legal system emphasises the need to develop a new legal tool 
which can fulfil this task in the public interest, and CAs can do this task.   
Apart from the key features explained above, some other features can be added on to 
enable CAs to be implemented efficiently. For instance, landowners may receive a 
certain type of financial incentive in exchange for the agreement being under CA 
burdens.81 CAs can be used to serve several roles, including for the protection or 
conservation of an area with significant conservation value;82 for the establishment of 
private protected areas;83 and as a legal basis for delivering other innovative schemes, 
e.g. biodiversity offsetting or payments for ecosystem services.84 
 
7. Research outline 
This thesis is divided into seven chapters, which include this introductory chapter 
explaining the research background, research questions, and the justification for the 
research approach and scope of this study as well as mapping the outline for the 
following chapters.  
Chapter 2, entails an explanation and summary of the theoretical concepts of tools for 
environmental regulation. This chapter will support the underlying ideas behind the 
legal measures of the existing regime of the Thai laws and explores the range of 
available regulatory tools that can be used to deal with environmental problems in a 
broad aspect. The notions examined in this chapter also demonstrate how the existing 
legal tools examined in chapters 4 and 5 operate, and how a new voluntary tool (CA) 
may interact with the conventional direct regulation already established. 
Similarly, chapter 3, entitled ‘fundamental concepts and ideas of voluntary 
environmental agreements’, will explain the fundamental concept of voluntary 
agreements and their potential as a tool for environmental regulation. It will examine 
                                                     
81 Sayed Iftekhar, John Tisdell and Louise Gilfedder, ‘Privately-owned Lands for Biodiversity Conservation: 
Review of Conservation Covenanting Programs in Tasmania, Australia’ (2014) 169 Biological Conservation 
176.  
82 Department of Environment, Climate Change and Water NSW (DECCW), ‘Conservation 
Partnerships: A Guide for Landholders’ (NSW 2010) 9.  
83 Mathew J Hardy and others, ‘Exploring the Permanence of Conservation Covenants’ (2017) 10 
Conservation Letters 221.  
84 Colin T Reid, ‘Employing Property Rights for Nature Conservation’ in Christine Godt (ed), 
Regulatory Property Rights: The Transforming of Notion of Property in Transnational Business 
Regulation (Brill Academic Publishers 2016) 176; Law Commission, Conservation Covenants: A 





the origin and purposes of implementing this regulatory technique to deal with 
environmental matters in various aspects. This chapter will help to develop an 
understanding of a wide range of choice of voluntary instruments and explain their 
strengths and weaknesses. Above all, the investigation in those points will help this 
thesis set the scene from a theoretical perspective on how a CA, a voluntary 
environmental agreement primarily used for the conservation purposes of features on 
land, can be viewed from a regulatory perspective.85 
Chapter 4, entitled ‘land rights, land-use regulation and nature conservation in 
Thailand’ acts as a background chapter enabling this thesis to set the scene for a default 
legal regime in Thailand. It will explain what the factual issues are in relation to 
environmental problems caused by activities on land. This is crucial in identifying 
what specific issues should be tackled by a new proposed legal framework. Then, a 
summary of the existing relevant legal measures, including the regime of the property 
rights on land and land-use control, will be provided. This chapter will become a 
backdrop in determining in chapter 6 what limitations of the existing regime trigger 
the introduction of a new statutory framework.  
Chapter 5 is the central part of this study, mainly examining the implementation of 
CA-enabling laws in the comparator jurisdictions. The main points to be examined are 
divided into thirteen parts; for instance, the purposes for which a CA can be created 
and the actors eligible to enter into this type of agreement. This chapter will examine 
the standard features of CAs, and the differences and similarities on each specific 
matter under the selected law in each jurisdiction. Then this thesis will examine the 
strengths, weaknesses and legal implications of those relevant matters. This 
examination aims to gain information helpful for the development of the proposal for 
Thailand in chapter 6.  
After the comparative analysis has been made, chapter 6 will primarily analyse 
possible CA-enabling law provisions for Thailand. This chapter will be in three 
specific parts. The first part will justify the opportunity for introducing new statutory 
provisions to fill such limitations. Then it will establish the limitations of the existing 
regime in creating the obligation on landowners to conserve natural features on land. 
                                                     
85 The reason why this thesis considers the application of VEAs from a theoretical perspective stems 
from the fact that while there is a handful of academic papers examining CAs from a regulatory 
perspective, there are a myriad pieces of work studying how VEAs operate by considering from 





The second part will develop the possible legal provisions compatible with the existing 
regime. The last one will identify the overall strengths and weaknesses of the legal 
proposal developed in part 2. 
Chapter 7 will summarise the research findings examined in chapters 1 to 6 and 
illustrate how they are linked together and answer the overarching research question. 
As this thesis does not claim to present a complete study ready for the implementation 
in practice, this chapter will also identify what its limitations are. After that, it will 






Chapter 2 Regulation: fundamental concepts and available tools for 
environmental regulation  
 
Introduction 
One of the mainstays of the law entails the use of legal coercion to intervene in human 
activities.86 The prohibition on clearing native vegetation is illustrative the attempts to 
use a certain level of legal coercion to influence human activities. This chapter acts as 
a theoretical background highlighting some points interrelated to the understanding of 
how the legal measures being examined in the later chapters, specifically chapters 4 
and 5, are viewed from a regulatory perspective. The main task of this chapter is to 
examine two questions set as the sub-research questions in chapter 1. The first 
examines ‘what are the relevant fundamental concepts and tools for environmental 
regulation?’ And the second which is developed from the first will consider ‘how are 
they relevant to the understanding of the existing rules of land-use control and nature 
conservation on land in Thailand and the comparator jurisdictions?’  
This thesis argues that the examination of these questions is crucial in helping 
understand why the law is used to regulate a particular activity and which regulatory 
option is suitable to be implemented for such an activity. Understanding these points 
is fundamental to the development of a new legal tool to work alongside the established 
ones.  
This chapter is divided into two parts, starting from the summarisation of the 
theoretical concepts of regulation. The second part illustrates available tools and 
techniques for regulation, specifically, those relating to environmental regulation.
87
 
These two parts will help this thesis justify how the theoretical concepts of 
environmental regulation are related to the application of laws in Thailand and 
comparator jurisdictions, as well as providing a backdrop to the voluntary 
environmental agreements to be examined in chapter 3. 
                                                     
86 Ekow N Yankah, ‘The Force of Law: The Role of Coercion in Legal Norms’ (2008) 42 University of 
Richmond Law Review 1195, 1196 and 1209. 
87 Environmental regulation is used in this thesis to refer to intervention in activities for the management 
of environmental-related issues, for example, to deal with climate change, to eradicate air pollution or 





It is important to note that this chapter is not an exhaustive study of the concepts of 
regulation, but rather illustrates how the concepts of regulation are interconnected with 
the legal measures to be examined in the following chapters. Thus, those not relevant 
to the understanding of such an interconnection are excluded from the examination in 
this chapter.  
 
1. Theoretical concepts of regulation 
The understanding of the theoretical concepts of regulation in this part mainly 
examines the questions of what the term ‘regulation’ in this thesis means; what the aim 
of regulation is; and what the range of reasons for regulation can be.  
 
1.1 Meaning and scope of regulation  
The definition and scope of the term ‘regulation’ are concepts that remain unsettled 
and unclear.88 The use of the term ‘regulation’ in different contexts, disciplines or 
purposes is the reason for such uncertainty.89 This thesis considers regulation in two 
respects. In the first place, regulation can be regarded from its nature as the control of, 
intervention in or influence over human behaviour.90 Such control, intervention or 
influence may entail the use of a set of rules or standards91 to alter human behaviour 
to achieve specific purposes or outcomes.92 The use of a criminal offence to punish a 
person failing to separate household waste exemplifies regulation by a state to 
intervene in waste management.   
                                                     
88 Carol Harlow and Richard Rawlings, Law and Administration (3rd edn, CUP 2009) 238.  
Kotzé argues that ‘regulation’ and ‘governance’ can be used as interchangeable terms, and the latter is 
the fashionable one being used in the context of environmental governance (Louis J Kotzé, Global 
Environmental Governance: Law and Regulation for the 21st Century (Edward Elgar 2012) 82-83). 
89 Bronwen Morgan and Karen Yeung, An Introduction to Law and Regulation: Text and Materials 
(Law in Context) (CUP 2007) 3-4; Yves Dezalay, ‘Between the State, Law, and the Market: the Social 
and Professional Stakes in the Construction and Definition of a Regulatory Arena’ in William Bratton 
and others (eds), International Regulatory Competition and Coordination (OUP 1996) 59-60. 
90 Arie Freiberg, ‘Re-stocking the Regulatory Tool-kit’ (Regulation in an Age of Crisis Conference, 
Dublin, June 2010) 22. 
91 A standard is a form of uniform requirement on a category of activity to achieve a specific regulatory 
goal (Gunningham, Grabosky and Sinclair (n 2) 41; Christopher Hood, Henry Rothstein, and Robert 
Baldwin, The Government of Risk: Understanding Risk Regulation Regimes (OUP 2001) 23). 






Another way to characterise the word ‘regulation’ is to consider whether it is backed 
by legal coercion or not. Regulation can be either a means of intervention in behaviour 
backed by the law or running without legal coercion.93 The first view sees regulation 
in a narrow sense, which is closely related to law. It generally provides the standard of 
conduct backed by legal pressure.94 Governments can promulgate requirements to 
direct people to do a particular thing or impose a duty to prevent undesired outcomes.95  
For instance, the law may require factories to conduct wastewater treatment before 
discharge. The latter view, on the other hand, sees regulation with a broader meaning, 
which includes all forms of social control seeking to intervene in human activities 
regardless of who are the regulators96 and whether the power is conferred by the law 
or not.97 It can be seen as including written laws, non-binding rules or other kinds of 
social norms.98  
As observed above, the scope and meanings of regulation are varied, and the study 
would be unclear without introducing the meaning of this word proposed for use in 
this study. Although this chapter will illustrate a wide range of forms of a social 
intervention seeking to intervene in human activities, the regulatory tools focused in 
the latter chapters will mainly involve those created by legal authorisation (legal tools). 
This is because the central issue of the study relates to the examination of the existing 
laws in Thailand and the comparator jurisdictions to develop the legal options to 
conserve features on land. 
 
1.2 Aim of regulation 
There have been theoretical discussions of whose interests are served by regulation.99 
For instance, the question might be that ‘whose interests are served where governments 
collect a sugar tax on soft drinks from its manufacturers?’100 There are a number of 
                                                     
93 Morgan and Yeung (n 89) 3-4. 
94 ibid 3. 
95 Robert Baldwin, Martin Cave, and Martin Lodge, Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy, and 
Practice (2nd edn, OUP 2012) 2; Chris Hilson, Regulating Pollution (Hart Publishing 2000) 1. 
96 ‘Regulator’ in this thesis refers to a player who implements and enforces a set of standards or rules 
against those who are regulated (regulatees). 
97 Morgan and Yeung (n 89) 3-4. 
98 Stuart Bell and others, Environmental Law (9th edn, OUP 2017) 222. 
99 Anthony Ogus, Regulation: Legal Form and Economic Theory (OUP 1994) 3-4. 
100 The collection of a sugar tax can be seen in the case of the UK government, who has collected this 
type of tax intending to tackle childhood obesity. See the information and questions for this tax levy in 





different regulatory theories explaining this point. This chapter examines two of these 
based on interest-based accounts.101 The first notion views regulation as an 
intervention for the public interest (public interest theories) and the second considers 
regulation as serving non-public interests (group interest theories and private interest 
theories).  
Public interest theories argue that regulation is the means to tackle market 
imperfections,102  and the aim of regulation is to achieve specific results for the benefit 
of the public. Hence, legal regimes designed by governments are expected to serve the 
interest of everyone.103 Morgan and Yeung observe that this group of theories guides 
legislators to design and implement the law to achieve the public interest.104  Numerous 
provisions found in domestic laws can support this notion, for instance, criminal 
offences against homicide and theft are designed to protect society’s peacefulness.   
Nevertheless, some scholars disagree with the previous view and believe that 
regulation is truly based on the interests of a benefitting group.105 They argue that the 
purpose of regulation is not for achieving public interests, but it is for allocating 
benefits among particular interest groups.106 Regulation is a result of the compromise 
between different groups on a specific issue.  Some others argue for private interest 
theories. This approach points out that the development of regulation is a response to 
private interests rather than those of the public, for instance, to serve the benefit of 
business groups. Persons who stand to gain or to lose from the implementation of a 
certain social intervention usually participate in regulation-making processes to protect 
and maximise their profits.107 The evidence supporting this notion is that there are 
some circumstances where a regulator runs the rule for the benefit of particular firms 
or individuals rather than to serve public benefits. For instance, rules and regulation 
                                                     
<www.gov.uk/government/news/soft-drinks-industry-levy-comes-into-effect> accessed 14 May 2020; 
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<www.lshtm.ac.uk/research/research-action/features/uk-sugar-tax-will-it-work> accessed 14 May 
2020. 
101 Baldwin, Cave, and Lodge (n 95) 40. 
102 Robert Baldwin, Colin Scott and Christopher Hood, A Reader on Regulation (OUP 1998) 9. 
103 Barry Mitnick, The Political Economy of Regulation (Columbia University Press 1980) 91. 
104 Morgan and Yeung (n 89) 17-18 and 42. 
105 George Stigler, ‘The Theory of Economic Regulation’ (1971) 2 Bell Journal of Economics and 
Management Science 3. 
106 John Francis, The Politics of Regulation: A Comparative Perspective (Comparative Politics) (Wiley-
Blackwell 1993) 8. 





governing stock markets mainly aim to facilitate business persons investing in the 
stock exchange rather than to serve for the benefit of all.  
Many academic works observe that those theories have both strengths and weaknesses, 
and relying on a single concept of regulation may not be useful.108  This chapter will 
not examine in-depth which one outweighs another. Nonetheless, it is desirable for 
regulation to seek to  achieve benefits for all. Hence, the enactment of law authorising 
the creation of a conservation agreement to conserve some features on the land should 
consider whether and to what extent the implementation of CA-enabling law should 
serve the benefit of all.109 In practice, of course, there is a tension between different 
views of what is in the public interest (e.g.  economic development versus 
environmental protection) and between different private interests, and the CA-
enabling laws examined in chapter 5 try to balance these.110 
 
1.3 Reasons for regulation 
Regardless of whether regulation seeks to serve the public or private interest, some 
reasons remain a ground for behavioural intervention. This section examines the 
reasons for regulation in three aspects based on economic, social and environmental 
grounds. Such grounds may exist in combination to justify a single regulatory 
scheme.111 For example, if a government bans the import of specific agricultural 
products, the rationale of this policy might be varied. They might include the needs to 
prevent the decrease in the prices of goods produced domestically (economic ground) 
as well as to enable the continuation of viable agricultural employment in rural areas 
(social stability ground).  
1.3.1 Economic grounds 
One of the vital reasons for regulation arises from an economic ground. Several 
academic writings maintain that market failure112 is one, among other reasons, 
                                                     
108 ibid 21-23. 
109 Morgan and Yeung (n 89) 17-8, 42 and 75-76. 
See the discussion in this point in part 2 of chapter 5 and section 2.2 of chapter 6. 
110 See sub-section 11.4.2 of chapter 5. 
111 Bell and others (n 98) 226. 
112 In brief, market failure is the situation where the free market cannot work properly and causes 
negative results due to the inability to reflect full social costs or benefits of goods or services (see 





constituting economic justification for regulation.113 The examples of circumstances 
engendering this failure include information deficits, negative externalities, and free-
riders, as summarised below.114  
Information deficit takes place in many instances,115 including the situation where the 
producer has more relevant information than the consumer, and this makes the 
consumer unable to make a reasonable decision about the quality of goods or 
services.116 Hence, intervention by improving information flow should be made.117 In 
the arena of environmental regulation, information deficits may arise where a regulator 
has insufficient information regarding activities to be regulated, but the persons who 
are about to be regulated do.118 This could lead to mismanagement in selecting a means 
of regulation. Assume that a government seeks to encourage the conservation of 
natural heritage on privately-owned land in a particular local area, but has insufficient 
information about the features in place on a particular piece of land. Thus, the 
government may impose a prohibition not to clear the land to conserve native wildlife 
on that area despite that fact that there is no native vegetation thereon. 
Negative externalities or spillovers are another economic rationale for regulation. This 
type of market imperfection may arise where a person who produces goods or services 
does not bear all the costs from a production process or those expected to arise from 
goods or services. This leaves some adverse effects, e.g. pollution costs, distributed to 
others, such as the public. This constitutes a negative externality where the public or 
other persons bear the cost.119 In Thailand, environmental impacts resulting from rice 
monoculture, for instance, the extraction of water resource from rivers and biodiversity 
loss from planting rice across a vast area, can be regarded as an externality. Regulation 
to internalise these costs is essential as it re-allocates externalities to producers or 
consumers, not to third parties or society.120 The use of chemical fertilisers can be 
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114 The causes of market failure being summarised below are those relevant to the regulation of land use 
and conservation of features on land.  
115 Baldwin, Cave, and Lodge (n 95) 18; Stephen Breyer, Regulation and Its Reform (Harvard University 
Press 1982) 26-28. 
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117 ibid 51 and 121. 
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Strategy and Regulatory Policy Making’ (2004) 89 Minnesota Law Review 277, 278-280. 
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regarded as a negative externality where the fertilisers are carried by surface run-off 
into rivers contributing to water pollution.121 
Another situation constituting market failure is where there is a free-rider taking 
advantages from public goods.122 Public goods generally refer to resources or services 
the consumption of which can be shared by everyone.123 They are non-excludable and 
non-rivalrous in nature.124 Hence, one cannot exclude others, even if they fail to pay 
for utilising such resources or services, from accessing and using or enjoying them, as 
it is impossible or too expensive to do so. Examples of public goods are freshwater in 
rivers, air and public order. The existence of unregulated public goods is flawed in the 
sense that someone capable of accessing and exploiting such resources might take 
advantage by utilising them and then others may be unable to use those resources 
properly as they become scarce. Therefore, regulation is necessary to allocate access 
to and utilisation of such goods.  
It should be noted that the above grounds for regulation are mere examples of market 
failure, and other justifications can also be classified as falling within the general 
category of market failure.125  
1.3.2 Social grounds 
Apart from the economic grounds examined above, some scholars argue that 
regulation can be justified on other grounds, including social-related reasons.126 Social 
grounds for regulation are defined here as the grounds for intervention aiming at 
justifying fairness or justice to society. This thesis summarises the regulation based on 
social grounds in three illustrations, namely distributive justice, paternalism and 
community value. 
The rationale for distributive justice is the first ground being summarised here. It is 
essential in filling the regulatory gap where a proper free-market system is insufficient 
to serve the basic needs of all in society. Consequently, governments may see it as 
                                                     
121 The dissolving of nitrates in chemical fertilisers can cause water pollution, called ‘eutrophication’. 
See the explanation of eutrophication in sub-section 1.2.1 of chapter 4. 
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General Theories of Regulation (Edward Elgar 1996) 230. 
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legitimate to regulate certain actions when unfairness arises in society.127 For instance, 
if the income gap between the wealthy and the poor remains high, governments may 
allow the poor to access affordable medical care for treatment when they are ill. This 
notion is justifiable as it appears that the free market systems may occasionally fail to 
allocate fairness for all. 
Paternalistic grounds for regulation, on the other hand, entail the intervention by 
governments to protect welfare, good, happiness, needs, interests or values from harm 
by restraining firms or individuals from doing some activities.128 The word 
‘paternalism’ indicates its very nature of the regulation of individuals similar to parents 
who take care of their children. An example of social rationale backed by this reason 
is the requirement by the law obliging vehicle passengers to fasten a seatbelt in order 
to protect them if an accident takes place. Ogus observes that paternalism is different 
from other behavioural controls for safeguarding social peace in the sense that it aims 
to protect the safety of a person who is regulated rather than to do so for others in 
society.129  
Regarding social solidarity, some scholars argue that social grounds for regulation 
might originate from the intention to protect communities as a whole130 or to secure 
inclusiveness in particular society.131 In this sense, the law as a tool for regulation can 
be created to restrict human activities to manage harm and safety for everyone living 
in a society132 or encourage activities that help make social solidarity. For example, 
governments may require all working people to pay tax for maintaining public parks 
in the areas where those persons live. Also, regulation can be implemented to serve the 
interest for the next generation or for the benefit of society that has yet to come,133 
even if there is no primary benefit for a current generation.  
The use of land in Thailand and other jurisdictions could be regulated on social 
grounds as explained above in many ways. These include the potential for 
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governments to grant the right to farm on publicly-owned land to poor farmers to 
eliminate inequality, but also requiring them to plant various native trees. This example 
could illustrate regulation on the basis of distributive justice for the poor while 
conserving land for the common benefit of their communities. 
1.3.3 Environmental grounds 
Although most scholars have highlighted economic and social grounds as the 
underlying rationales for regulation, it could be argued here that an environmental 
rationale for regulation also exists. Some may see environmental grounds for 
regulation as unnecessary since the economic and social rationales for regulation are 
in place and seem to be sufficient to protect the environment.134 Others may argue that 
economic grounds may be unable to explain regulation in certain circumstances. Non-
economic reasons, for instance, the protection of the intrinsic value of an ecological 
system should be regarded as a justification for regulation.135 As observed by Gillespie, 
the grounds for regulation might relate to environmental protection for the sake of 
humans’ interests. From this perspective, a regulator may regulate human activities for 
protecting the natural environment as it provides enormous direct and indirect benefits 
to humans. Regarding direct benefits, governments may impose particular legal duties 
on individuals to protect nature because it is the source of food, shelter, clothes and 
medicines. An example of the existence of this factor is the law prohibiting 
deforestation,136 one of the major environmental problems in Thailand.  Also, 
regulation may arise to protect intangible benefits in the form of aesthetic benefits from 
nature. It is evident that some legislation was introduced to intervene in human 
activities to maintain nature because beautiful things should be conserved, not 
destroyed by humans.137 Environmental justification can be backed by principles 
developed and accepted internationally. For instance, direct regulation in the UK has 
been influenced by the Polluter-Pays and the Precautionary Principles.138  
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2. Available tools or techniques for environmental regulation  
Apart from the search for the meaning of regulation, the quest for a well-accepted 
explanation on how to classify a range of regulatory tools or techniques is another 
challenging task. The findings from the review of the literature demonstrate the 
differences in describing and grouping tools and techniques for regulation, each 
serving the specific aim of each piece of work. This part summarises and categorises 
the features of regulatory tools to connect the concept of regulation with other legal 
considerations examined in this thesis. This chapter accepts that the explanation in this 
part is not the only way of describing the elements, and they might be characterised in 
other studies by different people in different ways.    
 
2.1 Issues used for the characterisation of tools and techniques for environmental 
regulation 
A typology of tools and techniques for regulation can be categorised into three aspects. 
The first explains those through the lens of regulatory styles. The second considers 
who plays a vital role in creating and implementing regulation. The third summarises 
key sanctions or incentives generally used to support tools or techniques for regulation. 
2.1.1 Styles of regulation  
Even though there are many academic works describing how regulatory tools are 
categorised,139 this chapter considers the style of regulation from the roles of 
governments in creating and enforcing a specific set of rule to influence social 
behaviour.140 Admittedly, this chapter does not aim at laying down a new model in 
categorising regulation, but rather intends to connect the styles of regulation described 
below with tools or techniques of regulation explained in the next section. The 
regulatory styles that governments are involved in can be categorised into various 
types. However, this thesis exclusively considers command and control and self-
regulation because they are interrelated to the legal tools this thesis is seeking to 
develop in Thailand.141 
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2.1.1.1 Command and control 
Command and control (C&C) is a conventional form of social control where a state 
stipulates a particular aim and condition for compliance to direct individuals to do or 
not to do some tasks. Regulation based on C&C might entail the prohibition of theft, 
backed up with criminal offences. In some literature, C&C is called direct 
regulation.142 A noticeable trait of C&C is its aim to influence human activities by 
stipulating what can be done and what is illegal (set minimum acceptable levels of 
behaviours), and imposing standards backed by criminal sanctions.143 C&C can be 
divided into two essential parts. The Command part entails the prohibitions of certain 
forms of conduct or demand some positive actions.144 The Control one signifies the 
negative sanctions that may result from non-compliance.145 Environmental law of 
some jurisdictions, for example, Australia and the UK, is reliant on this type of 
regulatory style.146 
The strengths of C&C are varied. For instance, it can impose standards and sanctions 
to direct behaviour.147 The obligations imposed on regulated parties are usually clear 
and based on public accountability and transparency.148 Also, this approach helps 
regulators ensure that they can monitor and enforce the rules provided.149 The negative 
consequences of using this technique are apparent in many respects. For instance, it 
may create unnecessary rules and complexity of the law150 and gives rise to a set of 
centrally formulated standards.151 Ackermann observes that monitoring costs remain 
comparatively high, particularly for environmental protection.152 Apart from that, it 
might be inappropriate for the intervention in some activities. For example, setting 
standards for compliance might work well in controlling point-source pollution, but 
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not so well for the non-point sources, particularly pollution arising from agricultural 
run-off or deforestation.153 
2.1.1.2 Self-regulation 
Self-regulation is one of the regulatory styles being examined by various scholars.154 
Although it remains unclear who is referred to by the word self,155 and what the role 
of states in this type of regulation is,156 self-regulation is defined here as the format of 
social control by a group of professionals to control activities run by institutions in 
their group. It is the form of institutional control delegated by the state to achieve 
certain public policy tasks by private actors.157 Self-regulation is different from C&C 
explained above where governments play a vital role in control the activity of firms.158 
For example, the duty that the law imposes requiring a person seeking to operate a 
particular business to request permission, licence or approval for running such business 
from a competent authority can be seen as a direct regulation. But the rules drafted by 
a group of merchants producing unique brand goods (e.g. coffee beans) to control the 
process of production to guarantee the quality of products can be seen as self-
regulation. However, it does not mean that self-regulation is beyond control by a 
state.159 Many scholars maintain that this format of regulation can be separated 
exhaustively into several sub-forms,160 which include total self-regulation (or 
voluntary self-regulation) and mandated self-regulation.161 Total self-regulation can be 
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made where an industry or profession makes codes of practice or enforcement 
mechanisms for administering itself without any active involvement by states.162 
Mandated self-regulation may happen when governments oblige a group of industry 
or profession to control itself, but allow such entities to elaborate the means or detail 
of control and enforcement subject to the approval or oversight by governments. This 
sub-type of self-regulation is distinguished from total self-regulation in that it does not 
arise from the free will of firms or individuals but instead from the threats of being 
regulated by a stricter regulatory measure.163 This means that, in some circumstances, 
mandated self-regulation may share similar features with direct regulation.164  
Theoretically, the benefits of implementing self-regulation are prevalent. For example, 
it offers governments low monitoring costs as they do not need to check rule 
compliance, and the group of governed people can persuade firms to comply with self-
regulated rules. Additionally, persons who are regulated usually understand the detail 
of those requirements as it involves the process of their work.165 However, it might be 
a danger where self-regulation is employed to serve the benefit of business bodies 
rather than that of society.166 Also, in establishing the regulatory scheme, there may be 
a challenge in ensuring that the rules and compliance serve the interests of all, not just 
the self-regulating group.167   
2.1.2 Key players in the process of implementation and enforcement 
One of the noticeable points drawn from the styles of regulation in the previous sub-
section is that regulation requires a player initiating or implementing a specific set of 
regulatory rules or standards (regulator). While the crucial player acting as the 
regulator in C&C regulation is a state,168 those acting as regulator in self-regulation 
                                                     
162 Black (n 156) 27. 
163 Chan (n 160).  
164 Several scholars argue that in reality C&C regulation can be worked in conjunction with self-regulation 
in many circumstances, allowing for innovative approaches of pollution control. For instance, regulatory 
agencies may allow industrial companies not to comply with some legal obligations if they can achieve 
comparable emission reductions by the schemes voluntarily operated by the companies (see Bettina Lange, 
‘Chapter 38: Command and Control Standards and Cross-Jurisdictional Harmonization’ in Lees and 
Viñuales (n 3) 857-858; Harrington and Morgenstern (n 142)). 
165 Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate 
(OUP 1992) 110-113. 
166 Bell and others (n 98) 257. 
167 Ogus (n 99) 15. 
168 Gunningham, Grabosky and Sinclair (n 2) 93; Neil Gunningham and Cameron Holley, ‘Next-
Generation Environmental Regulation: Law, Regulation, and Governance’ (2016) 12 Annual Review 





are varied subject to its specific sub-form, subject to different views of various 
scholars.169 Although it is too definitive to generalise that a governmental body is a 
crucial regulator,170 governmental bodies are a crucial player in implementing a 
specific type of regulation. This claim is evident from some reflection by the 
commentators in Australia who see the domination of governmental authorities in 
environmental regulation.171 However, in some regulatory styles, viz. self-regulation, 
firms or individuals may increase their roles in implementing or even enforcing the 
schemes of regulation, but the extent of roles of governments and individuals may be 
different depending upon the techniques chosen for use in a particular circumstance. 
Also, policy-makers may design the level of the role of a regulator differently reliant 
on the appropriateness of each circumstance.  
The understanding of the roles of governmental bodies and non-governmental actors 
examined above is worth emphasising here because it indicates the levels of 
government intervention and participation by non-governmental players in 
environmental governance. The different models of holders, being examined in part 4 
of chapter 5, will illustrate how such different roles result in different strengths and 
weaknesses of CA-enabling laws.172   
2.1.3 Legal sanctions and incentives 
It is obvious that sanctions and incentives are overwhelmingly used to support the 
enforcement of the majority of regulatory tools or techniques. For example, direct 
regulation usually uses criminal offences to punish a person failing to comply with 
standards or rules173 to make sure that a regulatee will not breach such standards or 
rules. At the same time, this sanction can help regulatory tools achieve their outcomes. 
However, some regulatory tools, including conservation agreements, may give 
incentives to a concerned person to encourage them to comply with the obligations 
agreed. In this regard, the use of incentives may replace that of sanctions to make 
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regulation flexible for compliance. There are fundamental sanctions and incentives for 
regulation, namely legal sanctions and economic incentives that should be examined.   
2.1.3.1 Legal sanctions  
In general, the legal tools employed to coerce individuals or firms might be divided 
into three kinds. They are criminal and administrative sanctions as well as civil law 
remedies. These types of sanctions can be found under domestic laws globally. For 
instance nature conservation law in Thailand, as will be seen in chapter 4, utilises all 
three of these these kinds of legal sanctions. Various CA-enabling laws, being 
examined in chapter 5, employ a range of legal sanctions. They are different in nature 
and purpose use as illustrated below.  
A criminal sanction can be seen as a legal measure designed for punishing any person 
who contravenes a criminal prohibition via the criminal procedure.174 It usually 
appears in the forms of criminal penalties, viz. imprisonment and fines, and various 
forms of supervised or unsupervised orders such as probation. The reason for using a 
criminal sanction can be varied, ranging from deterrence, denunciation, rehabilitation 
and incapacitation and protection of the community.175 Criminal sanctions are usually 
imposed as a sanction of last resort, when all other sanctions fail, or to secure 
compliance with administrative measures.176 Some literature places this option at the 
upper level of the regulatory pyramid,177 which means that it should be used last.178  
The tools considered as civil law remedies are varied, including compensation, 
injunction and a civil penalty.179 In the common law system, it can be any sanctions 
handed down by courts with non-criminal proceedings.180 The example of a recent 
civil law remedy introduced to England is civil penalties or administrative financial 
penalties.181 They are primarily financial sanctions aiming to punish offenders or deter 
the decision to commit a crime rather than to compensate parties who are damaged but 
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the process to enforce this legal tool is not a criminal procedure.182 Other forms of civil 
law remedy may include injunctions or monetary compensation aiming to repair the 
damage to injured persons at the expense of those who must be responsible for.183 
Compensation, as a civil tool, plays a vital role in recognising the right of property-
right holders to claim reparation from those who cause the damage to them. The 
enforcement of civil and criminal sanctions are distinguished because the standard of 
proof as to whether defendants are liable or not in a civil case is the balance of 
probabilities; meanwhile, that of a criminal case is the proof beyond reasonable 
doubt.184  
Sanctions applied through administrative law are one of the legal sanctions that a 
regulator and enforcing authorities can use for operating regulatory tools. Many 
statutes impose specific duties on individuals or firms in relation to certain activities. 
This may involve requiring a permit or licence and compliance with conditions stated 
by the laws. Once licensees or permit holders fail to comply with the conditions, 
administrative sanctions may be enforced to them. They may range from imposing an 
administrative notice or revocation or suspension of licences or permits where the 
breach of legal or regulatory requirements takes place.185 The use of administrative 
sanctions can be distinguished from that of criminal sanctions and civil law remedies 
in that while the two latter sanctions are commonly enforced by the courts, the 
administrative one can be enforced by administrative agencies.186 Due to this 
character, some commentators argue that it looks more desirable than the use of 
criminal sanctions in that it is less costly,187 less strict and more informal than criminal 
proceedings.188 
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2.1.3.2 Economic incentives (or disincentives) 
Although some works consider economic tools for regulation as a means of regulation 
rather than as the way of giving incentives or disincentives,189 this thesis views 
economic instruments for regulation as both a regulatory style and an incentive 
mechanism used to fulfil social intervention. As a part of a regulatory style,190 
economic incentives (or disincentives) can fall under state regulation, self-regulation 
or co-regulation but not a stand-alone regulatory style.191 Nonetheless, there is no 
single agreed classification regarding the variety of forms of economic instruments.192 
This is because most of them are usually employed by either governments or 
individuals to regulate economic activities in a market or society.  
As an incentive instrument for regulation, economic incentives usually assist a 
regulator to implement regulation tools by using financial rewards, for example, giving 
money or tax relief to taxpayers. The function of an economic incentive can generate 
either negative or positive effects on parties involved. For example, firms may be 
guided by obtaining a subsidy when they act in the desired way and paying a charge 
when they act in an undesired way.193 A central mechanism of this tool works by using 
economic benefits to encourage or direct people to change behaviour through a price 
signal or property systems. The establishment of economic controls may involve 
creating property rights, market creation, fiscal instruments and charge systems, 
liability instruments, performance bonds and deposit-refund systems.194 The key 
features of these economic instruments will be explained in the next section.  
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2.2 Ranges of tools and techniques for environmental regulation  
There are many regulatory tools that can be used to deal with environmental issues as 
part of or alongside C&C regulation.  An overview of the range of tools that can be 
used to deal with environmental problems is useful and shows how CAs, as a sub-form 
of voluntary agreements, can be one of the choices for this task. The summary moves 
from those based on C&C regulation with a high level of intrusion to those with less 
legal coercion. Admittedly, some regulatory tools have been used with different 
names, and the features of some tools may be modified to respond to a specific 
purpose. For example, imposing the duty to report on firms can be part of the 
conditions in issuing a licence by regulators or part of self-regulation by a group of 
firms. Therefore, the categorisation of the following tools is merely indicative rather 
than final. It examines some notable tools or techniques illustrating how the regulatory 
styles examined in sub-section 2.1.1 can be implemented through the use of sanctions 
or incentives spelt out in sub-section 2.1.3.  
2.2.1 Banning/prohibiting 
Bans or prohibitions, along with imposing a criminal penalty provide one the most 
intrusive tools based on C&C regulation. This type of regulatory option commonly 
entails imposing a legal prohibition on individuals or firms to refrain from doing a 
particular activity. It is based on hierarchical regulation that usually states a certain 
prohibition without allowing any discretion to interpret what to do or not to do.195 Also, 
it is usually backed by criminal sanctions for violation. For instance, if the government 
bans the use of Paraquat, a dangerous herbicide used in the agricultural sector, with no 
exceptions under a specific law, this means that no one can use it, and a violation will 
be subject to be punished by criminal penalties.  
2.2.2 Licensing 
Licensing is a regulatory technique that a regulator (mainly governmental authorities) 
uses to impose conditions on carrying out a particular activity.196 This type of 
regulatory technique commonly provides a general prohibition to prohibit individuals 
or firms from doing some activities, unless a licence, permit or approval is granted. 
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This technique looks appealing in that it does not prohibit or ban a specific activity, 
but such an activity is allowable where individuals or firms agree to act within certain 
parameters.197 Licensing ordinarily requires a regulatory body to develop requirements 
or standards for applying and issuing a licence with specific sanctions for non-
compliance.198 These penalties include cancellation, suspension, disqualification or 
variation of conditions, and the imposition of criminal sanctions for breach or failure 
to obtain a licence.199 For example, if a fishing licence is required for fishing in a river, 
taking fish from the river is prohibited unless a fishing licence is granted. In most 
cases, a person who is granted a licence is obligated to comply with particular 
conditions specified in the licence.200   
2.2.3 Taxes and charges 
Taxes and charges are an economic instrument generally based on C&C regulation. 
They share a common regulatory concept in taking money from an individual to 
persuade them to change behaviour.201 Also, they play a crucial role in discouraging 
people from harming nature, e.g. discharging wastewater into a river, by imposing a 
duty to pay when such activities arise.  Taxes and charges can be implemented to 
correct misallocations arising from externalities by imposing a duty to pay for 
activities that cause harm to society, e.g. activities generating waste,202 as well as to 
help bridge the gap between social costs and private benefits,203 which have been 
externalised. Specifically speaking, taxes are able to help promote a new activity by 
giving firms financial incentives to change behaviour. Some commentators argue that 
taxes are capable of reaching small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and 
individuals that are difficult and costly to regulate by other means.204 However, 
taxation may result in undesirable side-effects; for example, an unscrupulous operator 
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fly-tipping to avoid a Landfill Tax. At the same time, tax evasion prevention might be 
challenging to manage.205  
2.2.4 Civil liability  
Civil liability is a legal concept that has been developed in private law for a long time. 
Under the umbrella of the law of torts, it can be used as a last resort to award 
compensation to injured persons when damage arises. Although there is debate over 
whether it should be considered as an economic instrument or not,206 its function can 
influence the behaviour of a person likely to cause harm and take responsibility for 
damage arising from their activities.207  This legal tool imposes legal responsibilities 
by requiring any person who causes or is in a position to be responsible for the damage 
to, among others, private property and human health to pay compensation or to repair 
such loss. Although there is a low cost to the state in creating a system and no cost for 
monitoring,208 civil liability retains some limits. For instance, it might be challenging 
to prove a clear causal link between the polluter’s behaviour and the damage that has 
arisen.209 In terms of its effectiveness, there is nothing to guarantee that the person 
liable will be able to pay for the damage caused. Lastly, it is difficult to use a civil 
liability regime to compensate for the loss of natural value due to the difficulty in 
calculating damage or loss, specifically, where environmental goods have no market 
value.210 
2.2.5 Certification  
Certification is a system of formal or authoritative recognition that persons or 
organisations have attained specific qualifications, met specified standards, or adopted 
certain processes. Certification may be awarded by state or non-state agencies or 
bodies.211 For example, a competent agency may grant certification to a company 
producing refrigerators to certify low energy consumption products. This certification 
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helps consumers to decide which model of refrigerators are economical ones. It can be 
seen that a non-certified refrigerator is not excluded from a market but may attract less 
attention from buyers. Certification can be observed as a form of regulation or indirect 
regulation or overlap between both regulatory styles subject to specific conditions of 
each certification scheme.212 It means that it can be part of C&C regulation, where a 
governmental body initiates a certificate to encourage firms to perform duty beyond a 
legal requirement, or self-regulation, where a group of firms, for example, initiates this 
type of scheme. Another certification scheme can be observed from awarding 
certificates of ISO 14001 by a non-governmental body as will be examined in the next 
chapter.213 
2.2.6 Information disclosure 
The disclosure of information is vital in various aspects, specifically, where a regulator 
seeks to deal with information asymmetry.214 Governments may require a producer of 
goods or services to disclose specific pieces of information about the quality or 
particular characteristics of products or services to the consumer,215 for instance, the 
amount of fat in a piece of hamburger. This information can help buyers decide 
whether they should buy such products.  
Another example of information disclosure is product labelling. It involves imposing 
a duty on producers to disclose information and is a regulatory tool that is usually used 
when the products potentially cause harm to consumers.216 This technique is 
sometimes used voluntarily to prevent an information imbalance between producers 
and consumers.217 It can generate benefits to the public because people can use the 
information revealed on a product label to decide whether they will buy the product or 
not. Product labelling, nevertheless, may have limitations as making labelling means 
an increase in production costs. It appears that the producers may not bear that 
increasing cost, but prefer to include it in the market price of products. At the same 
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time, the governments have to be responsible for the cost of monitoring compliance (if 
this technique is a mandatory requirement).218  
2.2.7 Reporting 
Making a report is widely employed as an obligation between the parties where one 
seeks to monitor or see the progress of compliance of another under a specific scheme 
or agreement. As mentioned at the beginning paragraph of this section, reporting can 
be a part of C&C regulation, where a regulator issues a licence coupled with a duty to 
report on the licensee, or an obligation under a voluntary agreement, as well as under 
the suggestion of a code of conduct. Such multifunctional roles exemplify the 
adaptable and flexible role of this regulatory option. As part of C&C regulation, 
providing a report may be one of the obligations that regulatees must do to fulfil the 
conditions of a licence they obtain or as an indicator of compliance to the public.219  
Also, reporting might be a duty imposed by an agreement between a government and 
a sector of firms as part of mandated self-regulation summarised in sub-section 2.1.1.2 
above. 
2.2.8 Property rights 
The meaning of property rights is described in different ways. Some scholars view 
property rights from an economic view as the rights of an owner over property which 
includes the rights to use property and to exclude others from it.220 This chapter 
considers property rights in the sense of ‘regulatory property rights’ summarised by 
Godt. Property rights are employed here as new emerging rights, able to be enforced 
against anyone and transferable.221 The very nature of this type of regulatory tool is 
that they are generally created to serve some certain regulatory goals.222 This concept 
recognises that legal regulation may create new objects of property that fall outside the 
traditional domain of corporeal things.223 Property rights usually establish a specific 
entitlement to individuals or firms to enjoy a particular benefit, for example, to 
acknowledge someone’s entitlement to use natural resources or to protect the interest 
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of individuals who create innovative intellectual property.224 However, this approach 
has some limitations and negative consequences. For example, it is less applicable to 
situations where the resource is mobile or short-lived. Also, it can be used for political 
agendas, e.g. conferring the rights for the benefit of specific groups, which is corruption. 
Additionally, granting a new property right might affect other existing rights.225  
2.2.9 Tradable permits and market creation 
Based on the notion of property rights mentioned above,226 tradable permits and 
market creation can be applied by conferring certain rights to firms or individuals to 
allow them to carry out activities that governments seek to control or support instead 
of control by issuing licences or permits.227 This group of regulatory tools is a 
combination of free-market environmentalism228 and C&C regulation.229 The key 
mechanism of this tool involves the creation of economic value in a particular 
otherwise unregulated public good (e.g. water, air and atmosphere). Then, it makes 
such public goods tradable under the condition that any person who desires to benefit 
from such public goods must comply with the market rules. This concept has been 
applied to some specific activities. For example, the market of carbon credit trading 
under the EU regime required firms obliged to limit carbon emission but enables them 
to meet their obligations by buying a carbon credit from those who have over-achieved 
and thus hold a credit.230 This market is used to address global warming and climate 
change issues. The creation of a new market is advantageous in that a new right created 
under a new market can be transferable.231  
2.2.10 Subsidies and grants   
Subsidies and grants are economic instruments that share a common regulatory 
concept. For instance, they commonly involve granting a financial incentive to an 
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individual to support or alter the practices of individuals or firms in a specific manner 
to stimulate or promote a service or activity.232 The form of using this tool may be 
varied. For instance, capital works grants, project-based grants, recurrent funding 
grants or service agreement grants.233 Also, this tool can be implemented in the form 
of a grant or tax launched to change the behaviour of people by encouraging doing 
eco-friendly practices.234 In the European Union countries, Agri-environment schemes 
under the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) are the source of funding. They provide 
payment to encourage farmers to carry out eco-friendly practices on their farms that 
go beyond legal obligations. In exchange, this type of scheme pays the participating 
farmers for the provision of environmental services.235  
2.2.11 Voluntary environmental agreements 
Although in many cases voluntary environmental agreements are used by governments 
to encourage firms or individuals to do some tasks, the very nature of this legal option 
is based on self-regulation.236 The application of this tool can be a stand-alone scheme 
or as a subsidiary tool for achieving the goal stipulated by the law.237 The features and 
aims of an agreement can be varied and range from those created under private law of 
contract to those required by statutes (regulatory contracts).238 For example, an 
agreement can be used to encourage landowners to conserve natural features on 
privately-owned land as under the label ‘CAs’, which will be extensively examined in 
the later chapters. Apart from that, as the agreements are an important regulatory tool 
for this research, details regarding the definition, characteristics, strengths and 
weaknesses in implementing this tool will be illustrated in-depth in the next chapter. 
 
Conclusion  
As argued in the beginning paragraph of this chapter, the examination of the theoretical 
concepts and tools for regulation will help understand the existing laws in Thailand 
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and the comparator jurisdictions. This chapter has highlighted various points 
illustrating how the theoretical concepts and tools for regulation function as the 
backbone of legal measures and rules. Although some points in this chapter remain 
unsettled and overlap with each other, the study has noted some conclusions worth 
summarising here.  
The findings here establish that the law is one of the regulatory tools imposed by 
governments to intervene in or influence social behaviour. The law is a crucial tool the 
governments can use to regulate activities for the public interest. Also, the use of law 
for regulating human activities may stem from various grounds, ranging from 
economic, social and environmental justification.  
Regarding regulatory styles and available regulatory options, regulation might fall 
under the regulatory styles of C&C regulation or self-regulation, which reflect 
different levels of government involvement and intervention. While some must be 
implemented in legal form, many others may not. Those implemented through the use 
of legal coercion can be strengthened by various types of sanctions, including the use 
of criminal, administrative and civil penalties. The range of tools and techniques for 
regulation reflects the complexity of the regulatory landscape. It indicates that any one 
particular activity might be the subject of intervention by the use of a single regulatory 
tool or by a combination of different ones adopting different styles of regulation. The 
complexity of available tools for regulation is also influenced by the variety of styles, 
sanctions and incentives available under a domestic legal regime. This reflection also 
illustrates that a C&C-based legal tool might be introduced alongside a contract-based 
instrument to achieve desired objectives.239  
This summary shows that there is a wide range of means available to try to shape 
people’s behaviour, with varying degrees of coercion and flexibility. In seeking to 
deliver effective conservation, the limitations faced by the strict and rigid options that 
underpin standard C & C approaches240 suggest that there is room to look beyond such 
approaches at other mechanisms that can encourage conservation in a more positive 
way. 
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Chapter 3 Fundamental concepts of voluntary environmental agreements (VEAs) 
 
Introduction 
The preliminary observation in chapter 1 illustrates that conservation agreements 
(CAs) are a private law vehicle implemented to serve the public interest. Chapter 1 
also indicates that they operate voluntarily similar to a simple private contract, and are 
an outcome of statutory intervention. These characteristics beg the questions as to how 
CAs can be observed from theoretical and regulatory perspectives, and why the 
fundamental concepts and ideas of voluntary environmental agreements (VEAs) 
should be investigated as part of this thesis.  
Although a handful of work examines CAs from a theoretical perspective,241 this thesis 
argues that there is room to observe CAs through the examination of VEAs with two 
supporting reasons. First, CAs fall under a sub-form of voluntary environmental 
agreements, as will be seen from the examination in the next part. Second, a myriad of 
papers has studied VEAs from a theoretical perspective, which means that the study 
on what VEAs mean, how they function, and what the strengths and weaknesses of 
VEAs are, would help understand the function of CAs.  
After VEAs were preliminarily investigated and discussed in section 2.2 of chapter 2, 
this chapter examines the foundations of VEAs and how they can be implemented as 
a regulatory tool to deal with environmental issues. It illustrates several vital points 
concerning the use of VEAs. They include a definition, essential characteristics, roles, 
typologies of voluntary environmental agreements, the reasons for and the limitations 
of their use and examples of them.    
Similar to the aim of chapter 2, this chapter is not a comprehensive study about the 
concepts of VEAs, but rather provides some crucial points illustrating how the 
concepts behind VEAs are interconnected with those of CAs to be investigated in the 
following chapters. Those not relevant to the understanding of such an interconnection 
are excluded from the examination in this chapter. 
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1. Definition, essential characteristics and roles of VEAs  
Although many parts in chapters 1 and 2 provided some aspects of the definition, 
essential characteristics, and roles of VEAs, it is worth having a comprehensive 
examination in this chapter to show how VEAs are defined or characterised by 
scholars. An examination of these points will help in understanding common features 
of CAs as a sub-set of VEAs, as will be explored below. 
 
1.1 Definition 
One of the most critical issues to be examined in this chapter is the definition of a 
‘voluntary environmental agreement’. Although this tool has been used widely for 
decades, there are no settled definitions and characteristics of VEAs.242 This is because 
the term has been used in different contexts and various areas of environmental 
protection policy.243 For instance, many writers use the term voluntary agreements 
while others make use of negotiated agreements or voluntary commitments in their 
work.244 This thesis views this term in a broad meaning. It refers to any kinds of 
commitments and consensus voluntarily agreed between public bodies and private 
actors245 as well as the commitments between individual firms and their associations 
to achieve certain environmental objectives whether these are formal or informal in 
form.246 This definition covers instruments that are used with various names but share 
a similar principle based on a voluntary basis, whether they are individual 
commitments or sector-wide deals. This includes management agreements 
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implemented in the UK, gentlemen’s agreements and covenants used in the 
Netherlands, environmental contracts in Belgium, environment and pollution control 
agreements in Japan247 and voluntary initiatives in the USA. It should be noted that 
many papers intentionally explain the meaning of VEAs for their specific purposes, 
mainly in industrial pollution control.248 It is not surprising that the majority of those 
papers explicitly state that VEAs are concluded between firms or associations of firms 
and public bodies.249 There is a little work stating that individuals can be a participant 
in this kind of an agreement.250 This paper views private participants in a broad 
meaning, and they include firms, their associations and individuals.  
 
1.2 Essential characteristics 
Regarding their essential characteristics, VEAs can be distinguished from C&C 
regulatory tools described in chapter 2 in several respects.251 In the first place, VEAs 
are an outcome of negotiation and cooperation between public bodies and the private 
sector 252 to design a framework of incentives to parties.253 This is different from C&C 
regulatory tools whereby the duties for compliance originate from a non-negotiating 
process.254 Second, agreements are varied in terms of the regulatory formality;255 they 
might be legally binding agreements or non-binding ones (a mere ‘gentlemen’s 
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agreement’).256  VEA, therefore, is a flexible policy choice for negotiation on both 
legal form and normative content while C&C is a top-down regulatory style that 
usually has legal status and features. Third, this tool does not impose mandatory 
participation on firms or individuals,257 and this makes individuals and firms free to 
decide whether to opt into a VEA scheme or not. This is different from persons who 
are regulated under C&C regulation which is subject to rule compliance.  
 
1.3 Roles of VEAs 
Regarding the roles of this tool, policy- or law-makers might employ VEAs for many 
purposes, including for increasing the role of private actors in environmental 
governance.258 Also, this tool offers alternative means for regulation apart from 
employing direct regulatory tools. This can be seen in more detail: firstly, VEAs are a 
mechanism that enables private actors to increase their roles in carrying out activities 
towards an environmental achievement. VEAs are agreements whereby individuals, 
firms and firm associations can negotiate the means or the target of achievement.259 
Such a role can be seen explicitly in the case that the law acknowledges the legal status 
or their legally-binding effects. In this case, the activities which firms have done under 
the VEAs’ requirements will be recognised by the law acknowledging or creating such 
VEAs. Secondly, VEAs can be used as an environmental management tool when there 
is no direct statutory tool in dealing with a particular environmental issue.260 In this 
role, VEAs might act as an alternative mechanism for dealing with environmental 
issues. Thirdly, VEAs can be used as a policy instrument enabling government 
assistance for firms or individuals seeking to improve environmental, process and 
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product performance.261 Fourthly, they can work in a substitutive role in place of or in 
combination with mandatory measures.262 These roles of VEAs are reflected in several 
aspects of the legal features of CAs. For instance, their  role in increasing the roles of 
non-governmental bodies in regulating land-use and looking after natural features on 
land can be observed from CA-enabling laws in the USA, as will be examined in 
sections 4.3 and 4.4 of chapter 5. 
 
2. Origins of VEAs 
VEAs have been used as a public policy choice widely in many jurisdictions 
worldwide for a long time,263 but they are used in different legal and social contexts. 
For instance, in Asia, VEAs have been implemented in Japan since the 1960s.264 They 
are mainly used to mitigate pollution issues arising from the industrial sector.265 In 
Europe, some types of negotiated VEAs have been widely developed and implemented 
in many countries.266 They were mostly concluded in the Netherlands, Germany and 
France,267 but their features and enforcing mechanisms are varied.268 These agreements 
range from informal non-binding agreements to legally-binding ones.269 Although 
many papers question the legitimacy of using non-legally binding agreements and 
suggest to strengthen VEAs by recognising them under statutes, non-binding 
agreements are still popular and used in some countries.270  
In the UK, VEAs have been introduced to deal with particular issues for several 
decades. They have been used for a planning purpose since 1909271 and for the purpose 
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of nature conservation since the 1930s.272 After that, they have been attached in 
parallel with statutory obligations in various statutes, for example, under the 
Countryside (Scotland) Act 1967.273 A voluntary-based measure is a popular strategy 
in conserving nature on privately-owned land because it is less intrusive than that 
imposed by traditional C&C.274 Also, it is an instrument that can help encourage active 
or positive management.275 
 
3. VEAs categorisation  
As the term ‘VEA’ has been used in different ways in several jurisdictions, this may 
cause misunderstanding on their application in practice. For example, it may engender 
the question of whether environmental covenants and voluntary public schemes are 
classified as a VEA or not and how different they are. It is, therefore, essential to 
characterise a typology of VEAs to make this point clear. The findings drawn from 
reviewing of literature illustrate the diversity of the categories observing VEAs. Many 
papers have no intention to make a general conclusion but instead to create a VEA 
typology for explaining the specific aims of their study.276 This chapter has no 
intention to create a new typology of VEAs but aims at presenting how VEAs can be 
viewed from different aspects. Admittedly, the following views are not exhaustive, but 
it will be helpful in understanding the characteristics, strengths and weaknesses of 
tools falling under the definition of VEAs. The first category characterises VEAs based 
on the involvement of the law in creating VEAs. The second one observes VEAs from 
the number of participants in VEAs, and the last one evaluates VEAs from their 
formation and content.      
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3.1 VEAs viewed from the involvement of the law in creating VEAs 
As one of the crucial considerations about CAs entails the examination whether they 
require establishment by the law, it is worth examining at the outset whether or not 
VEAs, created in many jurisdictions, are an outcome of statutory intervention.  Having 
examined relevant literature, VEAs can be mainly grouped as those created by legal 
authorisation (statutory VEAs) and others created without the authorisation of law 
(non-statutory VEAs).   
3.1.1 Statutory VEAs 
Statutory VEAs are those where specific legislation acknowledges their formation. 
The law may be involved in the creation of statutory VEAs in several ways. VEAs 
viewed from this perspective can be summarised loosely into two following types.  
The first is the VEAs where a particular statute allows public bodies, e.g. a minister or 
head of a government department, to create an agreement. VEAs in this category may 
stipulate the underlying content and the details of VEAs or lay down details regarding 
VEAs’ implementation and enforcement.277 For instance, in Denmark, VEAs made 
under the Environmental Protection Act 2016 are examples of VEAs in this group. 
This legislation entitles a competent governmental body to conclude agreements with 
enterprises or associations for the purpose of environmental improvement subject to 
details and content stipulated under this legislation.278  
The second type of statutory VEAs is those where a particular statute empowers an 
authority to make a decision to find appropriate measures to achieve a specific 
environmental goal, but does not explicitly state the power to conclude a certain 
VEA.279 In this regard, this statutory provision may grant the power to public bodies 
to conclude a VEA in particular circumstance. The Dutch Environmental Management 
Act 2004 is an example of the statute conferring this type of power. This Act allows a 
competent governmental body to grant subsidies for activities in the field of 
environmental management, with the details of how subsidies can be granted to 
eligible persons. It falls under this categorisation because it does not stipulate whether 
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such a competent body must prepare this award in the form of a VEA or not. However, 
this provision can be used to make a VEA that is originated from the statutory power. 
3.1.2 Non-statutory VEAs 
Non-statutory VEAs, on the other hand, have no statutory authorisation. Hence, this 
kind of VEA might be legally binding or not, subject to the private law of contract. 
Specifically speaking, the clarity of their legally-binding effect is subject to the parties’ 
intention whether they want the VEAs they created to be legal agreements or not; 
ambiguity on this can give rise to the problem of what to do if the parties fail to comply 
with the commitments.280 Management agreements employed in Scotland, before the 
Countryside Act 1968 was introduced, are illustrative of this type of VEA. In that 
period, activities carried out in rural areas, e.g. agricultural and afforestation sectors, 
had not been fully controlled by C&C legislation. Governments, therefore, used this 
kind of agreements to negotiate with farmland holders based on freedom of contract.281  
Another example is the River Contract of the Upper-Meuse implemented in 1996 in 
Belgium. It is a collective VEA with various participating actors, including 
communities, firms and educational institutions. It does not aim to create inflexible 
legal obligations, but merely encourages its participants in taking appropriate measures 
for conserving the river.282  
 
3.2 VEAs classified by the number of participants 
The potential exists for VEAs to engage multiple parties and to affect whole sectors of 
an industry, although as noted in the preliminary review in chapter 1, the specific 
example of CAs are generally created bilaterally between a landowner and an eligible 
governmental or non-governmental body.  The literature reveals that a VEA can be 
created either as a bipartite agreement, in which two parties agree to do certain things 
or a multi-party one that a group of people or firm agree to do the same task. This 
notion influences categorisation in this part. It considers VEAs as individual VEAs 
and sectoral or collective VEAs.   
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3.2.1 Individual VEAs  
Individual VEAs are those concluded between public bodies, whether central or local 
agencies, and private actors. After entering into this type of VEA, individuals or firms 
bind themselves individually and separately.283 Individual VEAs can be created 
between either particular individuals or firms and public bodies. In general, individual 
VEAs are attractive from the perspective of individuals or firms because this type of 
VEA generally enables individuals and firms to negotiate with government agencies 
individually. Hence, those persons can come to terms regarding the conditions or 
obligations that they can fulfil as well as having an opportunity to discuss their 
limitations in implementing the prospective VEAs. However, the terms and conditions 
of some individual VEAs may be already set by statutes or public bodies, and potential 
participants may not be able to negotiate but still freely decide whether to sign up or 
not. Management agreements established by landowners and a competent agency 
under the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 (UK) can be evidence of the existence 
of this type of VEAs.   
3.2.2 Sectoral or collective VEAs 
Sectoral or collective VEAs in this regard refer to those where the agreement terms 
require a group of participants (mostly an association of firms) to be parties for 
reaching a common purpose.284 Although the parties to sectoral VEAs may have 
common targets to achieve, the liability rules applying for this type of the agreement 
might be either collective liability or individual depending on the conclusion in a 
negotiation stage between parties and public bodies.285 Collective liability, on the one 
hand, may take place when public bodies want all firms in a particular sector to 
conclude VEAs for reaching some specific goals, but in the event that those goals are 
not achieved, public bodies might introduce a stricter formal regulation for all firms in 
that sector.286 On the other hand, it might be possible that collective VEAs are based 
on individual liability. In this case, each of the parties has to monitor its compliance 
individually, and a firm failing to comply with the VEA obligations might be 
                                                     
283 Croci (n 252) 11. 
284 ibid; Rasha Ahmed and Segerson Kathleen, ‘Collective Voluntary Agreements and the Production 
of Less Polluting Products’ (Economics Working Papers 2006) 3. 






sanctioned individually. An example of sectoral VEAs under this rule is the covenants 
used in the Netherlands.287   
Collective VEAs might be concluded or agreed between public bodies and individuals 
or firms or a group of those actors.288 Where this type of VEA is created between 
public bodies and a firm association, collective VEAs may not bind the members of 
such association, unless the members agreed to bind themselves due to the very nature 
of agreement running on a voluntary basis. However, the intention of a firm association 
to conclude VEAs might originate from the consensus of the firm association 
members. Hence, the intention expressed by a firm association might be representative 
of its members. In this circumstance, those consenting members are obliged to comply 
with the negotiated obligations. The agreement between the Walloon Region and the 
Cement Industry for Recovery of Waste289 implemented in Belgium is an example of 
a sectoral VEA. It was created in 1995, aiming at recommending that industry 
members conclude a subsequent agreement with the Walloon Region. This clause 
intended to induce the association’s members to recover waste created by them by 
complying with the Region’s plans of waste management. One of the incentives of 
entering into this VEA was that the Region, as a public authority, promised not to 
introduce stricter regulations without prior consultation. Also, collective VEAs can be 
found in the UK; for instance, the covenants concluded for pesticide control under the 
Pesticide Safety Precaution Schemes between government, manufacturers, and 
distributors implemented between 1957 and 1986.290 
 
3.3 VEAs classified by their formation and content 
The variety of arrangements falling under the term ‘VEAs’ not only makes its 
definition unsettled but also gives rise to the question of how each of them is different 
from others. Thus, it is worth examining how VEAs can be observed from the diversity 
of their formation and content. This section attempts to categorise VEAs into five 
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specific groups. They range from voluntary agreements, voluntary public schemes, 
unilateral commitments recognised by a public authority, third party initiatives and 
private agreements. It is to be noted that although being distinctive in names, content 
and formation, the following VEAs have a common intersection as they are 
theoretically created as a result of the voluntary intention of participants, and share a 
mutual goal in dealing with environmental issues. Admittedly, the examination of this 
aspect might not make a significant contribution to the understanding of CAs 
themselves. Nonetheless, this study should be made to show how voluntary options, 
which share the same underlying concept as CAs, can come in many forms. As the 
study of CA-enabling laws in chapter 5 shows, CAs themselves, however, tend not to 
exploit this full variety. 
3.3.1 Voluntary agreements between public bodies and firms/individuals 
Voluntary agreements are the most crucial voluntary instrument for environmental 
protection that this thesis aims at investigating. This term represents all kinds of 
agreements regardless of their legal forms, legal status and legally-binding effect. 
Voluntary agreements in this meaning might be in the form of an agreement, covenant, 
contract or other names arising from a mutual agreement.291 Although a simple 
agreement can be created with no qualification of its parties, voluntary agreements in 
this regard mainly focus on those made between public bodies and firms or individuals 
as they might be created as a result of statutory authorisation or fall under the term 
statutory VEAs summarised in 3.1 above.  
It should be noted that a number of papers use the term ‘negotiated agreement’ to 
emphasise that this regulatory tool is a result of negotiation between public bodies and 
private actors to carry out activities. Nonetheless, this term might be flawed in that it 
is unable to include an agreement where an authorising statute already provides 
specific terms or content, and requires a prospective party to opt in to this type of 
agreement. In this sense, it seems that there is no obvious negotiation between the 
parties to conclude the form and content of an agreement.292 
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3.3.2 Voluntary public schemes  
Voluntary public schemes and voluntary agreements share a similar feature as they are 
created voluntarily, but the former is part of standardised schemes set by public bodies. 
This type of VEA enables individuals or firms to decide whether to participate in such 
schemes.293 Participants of the scheme are obligated to comply with the conditions of 
the scheme subject to a set of targets and monitoring provisions.294 This type of VEA 
may come together with specific forms of incentive,295 which include technical 
assistance, research and development help, or membership may enhance the reputation 
of the firms that are bound.296 The strength of this voluntary instrument is that it helps 
raise the environmental awareness of firms agreeing to comply with the plan.297 
Voluntary public schemes are popular VEAs in the USA.298  
3.3.3 Unilateral commitments recognised by a public authority 
Unilateral commitments are an instrument whereby firms voluntarily create 
commitments to carry out particular activities in achieving a specific goal.299 The 
commitments creating obligations for firms might be created by their initiatives or by 
codes of practice of business associations.300 Many unilateral commitments used in 
western countries are introduced to encourage industrial and business sectors to deal 
with pollution and environmental issues. Since firms unilaterally start to commit 
themselves in carrying out certain activities, public bodies are not a counterpart of 
commitments301 and all processes of compliance, e.g. setting the rules, monitoring and 
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enforcing, are operated by firms, not by a government authority. An example of this 
voluntary tool is ‘Responsible Care’, the policy instrument by which has been 
implemented in the USA for nearly three decades, and the ‘Global Environmental 
Management Initiative’ (GEMI) by the World Business Council on Sustainable 
Development.  
3.3.4 Third-party initiatives  
Third-party initiatives operate on a similar basis with unilateral commitments 
recognised by a public authority in the sense that firms or individuals intentionally 
bind themselves with certain commitments, but the framework of this voluntary 
instrument is usually designed by institutions that are not public bodies and 
participating firms, for example, ISO302 or NGOs. The scheme may already be set for 
individuals or firms to adopt it. Third party initiatives usually have no financial benefit 
offered by a third-party or public authority in exchange for participation, but 
individuals/firms may get image benefits and access to management improvement 
procedures in return. An environmental management certificate (ISO 14000)303 issued 
for firms when they comply with the frameworks (requirements) of the standard for 
environmental management is an example of this voluntary tool.304  
3.3.5 Private agreements  
Private agreements refer to VEAs for which none of the parties is a governmental 
authority. Although it may not be classified as governmental regulation, private 
agreements may relate to the implementation of practices towards improving the 
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quality of the environment. Private agreements may be concluded between firms (or 
associations of these) which cause pollution and others who may suffer from pollution, 
viz. local inhabitants.305  This agreement can be illustrated by that implemented in 
Sweden. The Swedish Confederation of Professional Employees developed a model 
framework and encouraged industrial bodies to adopt it. It is called the ‘6E model’ 
(ecology, emission, efficiency, economy, energy, ergonomics).306 In principle, private 
agreements are created on the principle of equal bargaining power of private parties to 
undertake some tasks to achieve an agreed environmental goal. Nevertheless, one of 
the parties to an agreement (or contract) may be in a stronger position than another. 
One party may have more bargaining power than another and such high-bargaining 
power may exclusively stipulate the terms of an agreement.307 For example, a coffee 
shop owner may give a 30-pence discount for a takeaway coffee for customers who 
bring their coffee cup. In this circumstance, there is no equal bargaining power for this 
agreement because the coffee shop owner may make a unilateral decision whether to 
create this clause of a coffee sale contract. 
It should be noted that a particular VEA may fall under multiple characterisations 
observed above. For example, the Green Lights and the Climate Challenge Program 
established in the USA in 1991, which aims to increase energy efficiency and reduce 
GHG emissions308 falls under a non-statutory VEA when it is considered from the 
involvement of the law. At the same time, it is a sectoral VEA and a voluntary public 
scheme when it is observed from a number of participants, and that from formations 
and contents respectively.  
Another point worthy to note is about the features of CAs considered from the 
perspective of VEAs. In light of the legal characters of CAs defined in part 6 of chapter 
1, it can be concluded that CAs are a subset of statutory VEAs, which are created for 
specific purposes for the conservation of natural or cultural heritage on land by 
landowners and governmental bodies. They can be distinguished from other VEAs 
which can be implemented for a broader purpose in relation to environmental matters. 
Such specific legal characteristics of CAs will be examined further in chapter 5. 
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4. Reasons supporting the use of VEAs 
As discussed in the following chapter, VEAs have not yet been adopted in Thailand, 
but there are reasons for the use of this tool which could support their adoption. 
Reasons supporting the use of this tool can be evaluated from many aspects illustrated 
as follows.  
From the regulator’s point of view, VEAs are a popular policy choice as they 
commonly generate a low level of confrontation between a regulator and those who 
are regulated. In some cases, the degree of imposing sanctions might be negotiable 
between public bodies and prospective participants during a negotiation process. This 
upside may look more attractive than the sanctions under direct regulation.309 Such 
low coercive enforcement, based on mutual agreement, is likely to be respected by 
participating firms or individuals as there is low resistance to comply with VEA 
obligations.310 Also, it can be considered as a form of deregulation311 of government 
intervention on the one hand, and increasing self-regulation on another.312 This is 
because a private sector actor can take the initiative in creating technological 
innovation for achieving the goal. Also, because of this advantage, some writers 
support that the use of VEAs could save costs and efforts of implementation schemes 
or obligations compared with the use of formal regulation when VEAs are well 
designed.313 This positive character constitutes the creation of a new relationship as a 
public-private partnership.314  
From the viewpoint of firms and individuals, VEAs are attractive for several reasons. 
Regulatory influence theory and market response theory argue that VEAs are 
beneficial for firms and individuals in many ways.315 Firstly, participating in voluntary 
schemes may be a chance to reduce the risk of being regulated by unpredictable 
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obligations in the future (regulation avoidance) as long as they comply with the 
obligation under VEAs.316 Secondly, individuals or firms might participate in VEAs 
as it may help achieve possible practical solutions. On the other hand, VEAs are also 
cost-effective as they enable a target group to have freedom in considering the way to 
reach a goal rather than complying with a mandatory scheme.317 Thirdly, private 
sectors may benefit from many VEAs launched by governments as sources of funding 
offering financial benefits for participants who want to invest in environmentally-
friendly projects.318 For example, Agri-environmental schemes under the CAP regime, 
used in many European countries, are an example of VEAs whereby farmers are 
encouraged to farm with eco-friendly practices. The subsidies under this tool are 
incentives in that participating farmers can get an additional income apart from selling 
their agricultural products.319  
 
5. Matters to be taken into account in creating VEAs 
Although there are many reasons to support the use of VEAs, a number of conditions, 
limitations and challenging issues should be considered before public bodies and 
participants start implementing a particular VEA.320 This paper separates those matters 
into three parts, starting from the stages involved in the application of VEAs, the 
consideration of public involvement and the limitations of VEAs.   
 
5.1 Stages involved in the application of VEAs 
5.1.1 Preparation 
Preparation of a draft of the VEA is important and should be considered here because 
a well-organised structure and content are critical to the success of VEA 
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implementation. Many issues concerning preparation should be considered before the 
commencement of drafting a VEA. These include the preparation of the content of the 
draft, the process of inviting the public to participate in helping ensure transparency321 
and the consistency with the legal regime of each country. Examples of key points that 
should be considered in this stage are:  
 Purposes of introducing VEAs;  
 Details regarding the burdens of compliance;  
 Considerations concerning the ability of participants to comply with the 
scheme, e.g. whether the participants can comply with the burdens in 
conforming with their business-as-usual trends in case that they are firms 
running the business;322  
 Relevant legal and policy issues: whether VEA obligations conform to duties 
or legal requirements under C&C regulation and whether or not and to what 
extent the compliance under VEAs should go beyond the minimum 
requirements under the laws;323  
 Impacts of compliance on third parties;  
 Considerations of, as to how third parties and the public can participate in 
designing or implementing VEAs.  
As will be justified in the opening paragraphs of chapter 5, these considerations will 
be employed to form the key legal matters used for the comparison of CA-enabling 
laws to develop a legal proposal for Thailand in chapter 6. 
5.1.2 Negotiation 
After the issues for a VEA draft have been prepared, the next step could be a 
negotiation stage, whereby interest groups can come to discuss how the issues that 
have been introduced for negotiation should be concluded. This stage could be divided 
into the negotiation between public bodies and private actors who are expected to be 
involved (in the case of public-private VEAs), and that between public bodies, private 
actors and the public. The extent, scope and period of this process might be varied 
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according to the detail of each VEA. The details of the public involvement in 
negotiation will be examined in due course in the following part.  
5.1.3 Implementation and enforcement 
VEAs’ implementation is a process after the contracting parties agree with VEA terms, 
and such VEA starts to enter into force. As with a simple contract, VEAs are expected 
to be fulfilled by their participants, but they may have different details about the 
process of implementation and enforcement.324 Some may provide details for the 
implementation process, and the consequences where a breach of duty arises.325 
However, this might not be the case for others, which could merely stipulate the 
content of implementation but not have clauses on non-compliance. 
Another additional step commonly found in VEAs is monitoring. Monitoring in this 
context is an evaluative activity aiming at generating information, observing and 
tracking the compliance with obligations under the VEAs.326 It may also involve the 
consideration whether the participants comply with the duties stipulated in VEAs or 
not.327 Many papers point out that a monitoring process helps provide transparency 
and accountability for the VEA because it guides how each participant is required to 
fulfil their obligations and goal.328 A popular means of monitoring is self-monitoring, 
where all participants must track their compliance and report the progress to their 
counterparts or the third party in charge of tracking such self-monitoring.329 Examples 
of issues that should be considered for the process of implementation are a method of 
carrying out monitoring and measuring the success of compliance.330   
As in many cases, parties to VEAs might fail to perform the obligations they have. The 
question here is whether such failures should be subject to any negative consequences 
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or not.331 Many commentators support providing non-compliance clauses in VEAs.332 
In the case where a participating firm does not follow the requirement obliging the 
participants to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from their facilities, a non-compliance 
measure, such as the revocation of a financial benefit that they obtained due to joining 
the VEA for reducing greenhouse gases, should be applied. This measure is justifiable 
in the sense that providing negative consequences or penalties for non-compliance may 
help encourage participants to comply with the obligations.333 However, Skjareseth 
puts forward the opposite view, that penalties for non-compliance might be 
inconsistent with the underlying principle of creating voluntary agreements.334 This is 
on the ground that the voluntary agreements should not punish any members who fail 
to comply with the obligations under a voluntary agreement. Otherwise, it might not 
be different from obligations under a C&C regulatory approach.  
The creation of enforcing measures for non-compliance may need to be initially 
considered at the stage of making a decision about the legal form and binding effect of 
a VEA. Where public bodies merely desire to encourage firms to do better than the 
minimum requirements of the duty under the law, a mere non-legally binding 
agreement may be sufficient. This is because this kind of agreement has no legally 
binding effect,335 and it is likely that target firms may not opt in to a scheme for better 
performance if they are coerced with a strong penalty measure. However, if public 
bodies seek to encourage firms to achieve a specific outcome in exchange for benefits, 
they might impose a measure for non-compliance, allowing public bodies to revoke 
incentives given to a participating firm.336 Another approach enabling VEAs to be 
enforceable might be to connect the obligations of VEAs with some conditions in the 
underlying legislation. For instance, if a participating firm fails to comply with VEA 
conditions, such a firm might have less chance to renew a permit for carrying out an 
activity linked to the condition stipulated in VEAs.337 This thesis will discuss further 
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the need for, and the measures addressing, non-compliance for the breach of 
obligations in section 8.4 of chapter 5 and section 2.9 of chapter 6. 
 
5.2 Public involvement 
Although public involvement can be regarded as a process in the application of VEAs, 
it can be observed from another aspect as a key driver to the success of VEA 
implementation. It could help increase the confidence of the public towards the 
fairness and transparency of VEAs’ preparation and implementation.338 Public 
involvement can be implemented in many forms and many stages of intervention. In 
some jurisdictions, third parties are invited to participate in the early phase of VEA 
preparation. In the Netherlands, for instance, the public is involved in the phase of 
setting the objective of VEAs.339 Another means of public involvement could be giving 
information concerning the preparation and implementation of VEAs.  
Allowing participation by the public or third parties may have both upsides and 
downsides.340 On a positive side, this process helps make VEA preparation transparent. 
It also appears that implementing this process may influence participants to respect 
their commitments.341  
Nevertheless, public involvement may be disadvantageous for VEAs’ implementation, 
and it might be more appropriate to avoid this process in preparation or implementation 
of some VEAs. It is possible that in some circumstances, negotiation to launch a new 
VEA might last a long period and prospective participants (e.g. firms) might not want 
to disclose their information to the public. In this situation, public participation might 
demotivate firms from being parties to VEAs. Additionally, it might appear that some 
voluntary deals for improving environmental qualities might not be popular, and this 
process might not be necessary, for example, the negotiation between public bodies 
and individuals to encourage them not to use plastic bags. In this scenario, the VEA 
negotiation is related to the encouragement to change personal behaviour. It might not 
need the process of asking the public whether they agreed with this VEA negotiation. 
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Also, it may cause a delay in negotiation and increase the costs on both negotiating 
and implementing processes.342    
 
5.3 Limitations of VEAs 
Like other environmental regulatory tools, VEAs have both strengths and weaknesses. 
It is, therefore, necessary to identify their limitations. The findings observed in this 
section help this thesis set the scene for some discussions in chapter 5 in light of the 
limitations arising from the application of VEAs. Having investigated relevant 
literature, the following limitations are worth summarising here. 
5.3.1 Problems arising from the voluntary characteristic 
As VEAs are a voluntary and often negotiation-based mechanism, this may give rise 
to some defects that may affect the success of their implementation.
343
 The first 
obstacle is the difficulty in predicting the number of participants. This can be 
illustrated by the example of governments seeking to reduce the amount of plastic 
waste from households.  This might be approached by banning the use of plastic or 
reaching an agreement with each family on voluntary waste reduction. Assuming that 
the second option is chosen, this way is likely to experience problems arising from the 
difficulty of predicting the outcome as there is nothing to provide assurance that a 
majority of people will participate in this voluntary agreement. This scenario illustrates 
that the success of VEAs’ implementation will rely on the substantial involvement of 
firms or individuals who are eligible to enter into the agreement.344 The second 
problem might be the uncertainty of the rate of success. Although there are sufficient 
participants, VEAs’ compliance might be at risk from failure to meet the desired 
outcome because it may difficult to predict whether or not the VEAs’ compliance will 
achieve the goal. According to the scenario in the first issue, imagine there are 1,000 
participants in the plastic use reduction agreement, agreeing to reduce the use by 50 
percent compared to the proportion they used last month. It may be possible that some 
of those may be able to reduce by only 15 percent, and this figure represents the failure 
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of achieving the goal. This is different from implementing a direct regulation tool to 
intervene in the actors’ behaviour in the same activity, which is much more 
predictable.345  
Some commentators observe that such problems could take place because there 
remains the gap of motivation for entering into particular VEAs between public bodies 
and prospective participants. In other words, the failure arises from the difference 
between the benefits of becoming a party to VEAs expected by prospective 
participants, and those that public bodies expect from introducing the VEA.346 This 
explanation can be illustrated by an example where a local government seeks to 
increase the number of trees in privately-owned land by proposing a VEA scheme to 
encourage landholders to sign a voluntary agreement to plant trees with a financial 
incentive. Landholders who have undeveloped property may be interested in this 
scheme, but those who already planned to develop their property to be golf courses 
might not want to join this initiative.  This is because the benefit expected by the local 
government is to increase the trees but that sought by the latter group of landholders 
is to clear the land for creating more profitable golf courses. Another situation where 
VEAs might not be popular might take place where governments offer a proposal for 
negotiating a VEA to a group of firms that are intensely rivalrous. It might be possible 
that some of them may be reluctant to work with other firms who are their competitors 
and using a VEA in this situation may not be effective.347 
5.3.2 Free-riders  
Introducing VEAs in some cases may cause undesired effects, including the emergence 
of free-riders.
348
 This problem may affect the effectiveness of using VEAs. In sectoral 
VEAs, all participants are obliged to comply with a common burden towards achieving 
a particular goal. In order to meet a VEA goal, agreeing firms or individual complying 
firms bear the costs for compliance to achieve an overall goal while those other firms 
that opt-out of such a VEA have no such costs and burdens.349 In this situation, if such 
VEA implementation achieves the goal set by the parties, such success will be 
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beneficial for all individuals or firms who are in such a sector. This means that non-
participants in the VEA take some indirect advantages in the form of a positive 
externality. A high rate of free-riders will generate adverse effects on firms complying 
with a voluntary scheme.350 Some suggest that governments should introduce the law 
to prevent taking undue benefits of free-rider actors to avoid the distortions of 
competition resulting from a free-riding problem.351 This consideration will be 
discussed in the context of a legal proposal of CAs for Thailand in section 2.10 of 
chapter 6. 
5.3.3 Legally-binding status of VEAs 
As mentioned in section 3.1, the considerations of whether and how CAs bind 
landowners and their successors in a land title interrelate to their legally binding status.  
Also, the examination in section 3.1 indicates the existence of two categories of VEAs, 
comprising those remaining legally-binding status and others having no legal status.  
It is worth discussing here whether proposed VEAs should be legally binding or not. 
Where there is no clarity on these issues, some problems of interpretation may arise. 
For example, lack of clarity in voluntary covenants in the Netherlands raises a question 
on whether they are legally binding and enforceable.352  
Although many scholars support the recognition of the legal status of VEAs to ensure 
the enforceability of the agreements,353 several studies point out that stipulating legal 
enforcement may not be necessary as long as VEAs are functional in encouraging 
changing social behaviour. Additionally, such recognition may not guarantee any 
success in compliance.354 The case of VEAs in Germany illustrates their success in the 
implementation despite having no legally-binding status.355 Also, some writers point 
out that VEAs backed by statutes may demotivate prospective firms or individuals to 
join VEAs.356 There is evidence from European countries that the VEAs with 
recognised legal status under specific statutes are not agreed or are rarely used.357 
Hence, acknowledging VEAs under a particular law might have both advantages and 
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disadvantages, and this issue should be considered before preparing or negotiating a 
VEA draft.    
5.3.4 Conflicts among different interest groups  
Although many people support VEAs as an alternative mechanism for regulation due 
to several advantages explained above, many others argue that implementing this tool 
may create many problems. This seems to be a point of tension between different 
interest groups. The first concern is about the lack of accountability and transparency 
of implementing VEAs.358  For example, some argue that VEAs enable an industrial 
sector to set the process and goal of public policy.359 Others point out that the 
negotiation process of VEAs usually tends to be conducted between prospective 
participants and public bodies, and the public and NGOs are excluded. Hence, this 
process is undemocratic, and it cannot ensure transparency of VEAs whether the 
compliance with VEA obligations can serve public benefits and affect the right of the 
third party or not.360 The way of solving this issue could be to invite individuals, 
communities and NGOs to participate in a case where VEA implementation will give 
rise to negative consequences to the public. In other words, public involvement, as 
mentioned in the previous part, is the process that can be used to mitigate this 
disagreement and make the preparation and implementation transparent. As the point 
about public participation and conflicts among different interest groups are extremely 
important for CA implementation, discussion on this point will be elaborated further 
throughout chapters 5 and 6.361 
5.3.5 High cost of negotiation and implementation  
Although the use of VEAs, based on self-regulation, may lead to low monitoring costs 
from the regulator’s point of view, many commentators argue that the cost of 
negotiation and implementation can match those of a C & C approach.362 In a well-
known example, the average costs of developing Project XL were over $450,000 per 
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firm in 2001.363 Firms and the EPA bore this cost for nearly $350,000 and $100,000 
respectively.364 This means that public bodies and firms should estimate whether the 
VEAs that they propose to push forward generate higher costs of preparation, 
negotiation, implementation or enforcement than those of direct regulation or not. 
Also, they might need to consider how the cost of negotiation and preparation can be 
reduced as well as to negotiate who should bear such costs.
365
  
This part illustrates that VEA implementation should be done in light of various 
considerations throughout the stages of negotiation, drafting, implementation and 
enforcement. Public participation should be one of the matters to be taken into 
consideration. This suggests that the development and implementation of CAs, as the 
sub-form of VEAs, should consider those points observed in this part. This point will 
be further illustrated in chapter 5 whether and to what extent the laws of Australia, the 
UK and the USA have these legal requirements for CA implementation.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has highlighted many points interconnected with the investigation in the 
previous chapters and offered room to understand the application of CAs to be 
investigated in chapters 5 and 6. The noticeable points are as follows.  
The main argument is that a CA is a sub-form of VEAs and there is room to observe 
CAs from theoretical and regulatory perspectives through the examination of VEAs. 
The examination of definition, essential characteristics and roles of VEAs indicates 
several standard features of VEAs and CAs. For instance, while VEAs can be applied 
in a broader context of environmental regulation, CAs exclusively apply in the 
narrower context of natural or cultural heritage conservation.366 Additionally, while 
VEAs are within the meaning of the tools for regulation examined in chapter 2, they 
are generally distinctive from C&C regulatory tools in some aspects.367 However, 
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VEAs can be a substitutive option of C&C regulatory tools or can work in combination 
with such mandatory measures. 
The use of VEAs in many developed countries illustrates a wide range of purposes for 
which they have been implemented. Nonetheless, lack of statutory intervention begs 
the question of whether or not and to what extent non-statutory VEAs are enforceable 
against a party who violates VEA arrangements.  
The categorisation of VEA typology offers an opportunity enabling this thesis to 
understand the application of voluntary tools in place in various jurisdictions from 
various aspects. It shows that voluntary agreements between public bodies and 
individuals or firms are one of the voluntary options under the umbrella term of VEAs 
and they can be, or may not be, backed by legal authorisation. Additionally, such 
voluntary agreements might be concluded individually or collectively between a group 
of firms and public bodies. Investigation of this point also offers the room to see the 
differences and similarities between CAs and other kinds of VEAs.  
This chapter also points out what makes VEAs an appealing option from the regulatory 
point of view and in the opinion of firms and individuals. Nonetheless, where this 
policy choice is selected, many considerations should be made to ensure its efficiency 
and fairness of its implementation. This chapter overviews important points to be 
considered in each stage of VEA implementation. The last section highlighted what 
should be aware of the limitations of this regulatory tool.  
As CAs are a sub-set of VEAs, this discussion points to the need not to overlook the 
limitations of VEAs that can arise at the various stages of negotiation, implementation 
and  enforcement. The various aspects raised here will be discussed in more detail in 







Chapter 4 Land rights, land-use regulation and nature conservation in Thailand 
 
Introduction  
As stated in chapter 1, the primary purpose of this thesis is to explore the potential 
value and applicability of CAs and to analyse the room to develop a legal proposal for 
the establishment of this conservation technique in Thailand. This chapter seeks to 
investigate key existing problems and gaps, motivations for reform, and legal 
principles, which are relevant to the creation of CAs in the Thai context. After that, 
this chapter will attempt to draw some conclusions on how the existing facts about 
land use and environmental problems and the applicable laws may offer the room to 
develop a new legal tool to conserve features on privately-owned land. 
A core argument is that understanding these factual and legal backgrounds will help 
this thesis establish the key problems that exist and might be solved by the 
implementation of CAs, and legal gaps that could hinder the implementation of CAs.  
The first part of this chapter illustrates some factual issues about use of land in 
Thailand and  key environmental problems arising from activities carried out on land, 
as well as the consequent potential of the use of CAs in Thailand. This point will also 
become the background for the consideration of whether and how Thailand should 
introduce a particular set of provisions for the creation of conservation agreements 
(CAs), as will be discussed in chapter 6.  
The second part deals with the laws underpinning land rights and the regime in 
controlling the use of land and the conservation of nature. It shows how the laws in 
Thailand establish the legal rules and principles to manage land rights, the use of land 
and the conservation of nature. The examination in this part is not comprehensive but 
merely seeks to provide a fundamental picture of how the laws provide for the 
relationship between persons and the land.   
 
1. Factual issues concerning agricultural land and the impacts of land use in 
Thailand    
As mentioned in the beginning paragraph, it is worth examining some points about 





divided into two sections, namely land use in Thailand at a glance and environmental 
issues arising from the use of land.  
 
1.1 Land use in Thailand as a glance  
Although the use of land can be divided into various categories by the purposes of its 
use, including for housing, manufacturing, tourism, agriculture, forestry and 
conservation purposes (as reserved areas), the use of land for agriculture and forestry 
should be emphasised in this study for several reasons. In the first place, the majority 
of the country’s area is used for these ends.368 While nearly 46 percent of the area of 
Thailand is regarded as agricultural land,369 forestland, land designated both for 
reserved areas and for other forestry, accounts for a further 32 percent.370 Second, as 
mentioned in the opening paragraph of chapter 1, agricultural land and forestland are 
affected negatively by human activities, and there is room to conserve natural features 
in these two areas by a voluntary approach. Third, many activities operated on 
agricultural land are under fewer legal restrictions compared with other types of land 
use.371 For instance, there is no requirement for assessing environmental impacts. This 
makes a myriad of agricultural practices beyond the control by environmental 
regulation.372 This begs the question of whether a voluntary tool should be introduced 
to strengthen environmental governance in this sector. This question will be discussed 
further in part 1 of chapter 6. 
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Pie chart illustrating proportion of land use from three categories373 
Another point worth examining is the average size of parcels of land and farming 
activities carried out thereon. Farmland in Thailand is relatively small as an average 
size is about 25 Rai (4 hectares) for a family. Farmland sizes in the UK, USA and 
Australia are relatively larger.374 
Agricultural activities in Thailand are varied subject to several conditions, viz. 
precipitation, location or soil quality.375 The majority of agricultural land (around 67 
percent) is cropland (paddy land and upland field crop), and the rest of the land is used 
for horticulture and other purposes.376 While activities carried out on this type of land 
may cause many environmental impacts, they have not been fully regulated as will be 
examined in the next part.  
The information about the area of farmland mentioned above could engender the 
question of whether a CA is appropriate for conservation on privately-owned land. The 
use of CAs to protect nature in a large area looks advantageous from many aspects. It 
is easier and cheaper to negotiate, create and monitor the land under a CA with a 
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landowner having a large land plot than to do these tasks with several landowners 
having small pieces of land. Nonetheless, the success in implementing CAs in the 
context of the jurisdictions having small land plots might be slightly different from 
those having larger plots of land. In the first place, the use of C&C regulation may 
encounter difficulty in enforcing legal measures against lot of small farmers.377 This 
regulatory challenge suggests an opportunity to use a voluntary approach to encourage 
land conservation. It is true that if CAs were to be used for small farms, there might 
be some difficulty in enforcing against those owning or occupying such small farms 
where they breach CA obligations. The experience from other jurisdictions, including 
Australia, reveals however that the governance of CAs for local farms could be 
strengthened by building capacity and creating networks among those small-scale 
farmers to help and look after each other.378 This could be advantageous in avoiding 
non-compliance or the breach of CA obligation. Second, the success in employing CAs 
for conserving small-scale farmland may reveal itself not only in the increase in the 
diversity of species and environmental quality on land but also in the encouragement 
of private-land stewardship by individuals. It is true that the change in behaviour of 
landowners in how they treat the land not only helps improve the health of ecosystems 
and workers’ well-being but also can change attitudes of farmers to change the 
environmental impacts resulting from activities in their daily life.379 
 
1.2 Key environmental problems, socio-economic factors and the potential use of CAs 
Similar to other jurisdictions, Thailand has encountered several environmental 
problems arising from various human activities. These problems are complex and have 
been influenced by socio-economic conditions. These considerations are crucial for 
this study because it is crucial to understand what are the problems that CAs might be 
used to solve. The primary purpose of this examination is to exemplify key problems 
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that governments could employ CAs to deal with. The last part of this section will 
provide some scenarios where CAs could come into play. 
1.2.1 Major environmental problems  
The activities carried out on agricultural land are complicated and driven by several 
causes. The following issues illustrate the problems arising from human activities on 
agricultural land in Thailand, and that could be tackled by the use of CAs.  
The first illustration is biodiversity loss, floods and droughts resulting from land 
clearing and deforestation. The demand for land for farming commonly involves the 
change of physical features of undeveloped land to serve specific types of farming. 
Different farming practices generate various levels of environmental consequences.380 
Clearing forestland for cropping has taken places in all areas for centuries. The change 
of land-use patterns from woodlands or undeveloped land to land for mono-cropping 
and tourist resorts is also significant among other activities.381 These activities 
contribute to several problems, including the loss of forestland and biodiversity, as 
well as being major causes of floods in the wet season and water shortage in the dry 
season.  
The second type of problems is global warming and climate change from greenhouse 
gas emissions. The emission of anthropogenic greenhouse gases, e.g. carbon dioxide, 
is widely accepted as a major cause of climate change.382 The primary source of the 
emission is that from rice grown in wet fields, and the planting process which generates 
methane,383 one of the greenhouse gases. Land clearing and burning after a crop 
harvesting period also contribute to carbon dioxide emissions to the atmosphere. In 
2013, the agricultural sector in Thailand emitted around 22 percent of the country’s 
carbon dioxide emissions.384  The open burning of residues after harvesting crops in 
farmland, which has been a traditional means in preparing farmland for the next 
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planning season,385 also engenders air pollution.386  Although the emission from the 
agricultural sector is relatively lower than that from energy and industrial sectors,387 
there is room to mitigate the emission of greenhouse gases from agriculture by 
encouraging the use of CAs to encourage nature-friendly practices. 
The last set of environmental problems are soil degradation and land contamination. 
This partly results from intensive agricultural methods intending to maximise yields 
without appreciating the environmental impacts on land and ecosystems.388 Land 
mismanagement by farmers contributes to agricultural land degradation.389 There are 
many circumstances where farmers might unknowingly degrade soil quality. For 
example, monocropping and the use of chemical fertilisers are essential causes.390 
Planting intensive and short-life crops demands a high rate of artificial fertilisers, and 
degrades the quality of soil.391 At the same time, soil erosion takes place when there is 
sparse vegetation covering the land after farmers harvest their crops. Wind and rain, 
consequently, wash the land surface into waterways.392 Regarding land contamination, 
it is evident that an enormous amount of pesticides and fertilisers are used in farming 
processes and the amount is considerably increasing.393 This is because the rates of 
damage arising from pests, weeds and diseases in farmland in Thailand, which is 
located in a tropical zone, are higher than those in other areas. As a result, the majority 
of farmers use these chemicals to help them eradicate pests, weeds and diseases as well 
as to maximise nutrients for their crops. However, the side-effects of the chemicals are 
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varied. For example, nitrates in chemical fertilisers are leached into rivers and cause 
eutrophication.394  
1.2.2 Socio-economic conditions contributing to the environmental problems  
The problems exemplified in sub-section 1.2.1 above are the result of the complexity 
of social and economic-related problems, which should not be overlooked. It might be 
easy to allege that the poor clear forestland for agriculture, use pesticides which cause 
land contamination and generate greenhouse gases by open-burning. Nevertheless, the 
motivations for such actions are varied, and the problems arising from poverty and 
commercialisation of agriculture are worth addressing here.   
Poverty is one of the factors inducing the poor to harm the natural environment.395 This 
is witnessed by the famous speech of Indira Gandhi, former prime minister of India, 
given in the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (Stockholm 
Conference) in 1972.396 Gandhi emphasised the basis of environmental problems in 
developing countries through the sentences ‘are not poverty and need the greatest 
polluters?’ and ‘poverty is the greatest polluter’.397 In Thailand, this linkage is mixed 
with the trend towards the commercialisation of agriculture, leading to the problems 
noted in the previous sub-section.398 The transition of agriculture in Thailand from 
subsistence agriculture to intensive farming was apparent after the implementation of 
the first National Economic and Social Development Plan in 1961. The targets set for 
the agricultural sector highlighted the importance of maximising, among other things, 
crop yield and agricultural land to increase the productivity and income of the farming 
population.399 This can be seen as the commercialisation of agriculture which helps 
farmers generate income, but on the other side, it comes along with environmental 
problems and socio-economic difficulties. The overuse of agricultural chemicals 
generates farming costs, and it consequently gives rise an increase in household debt. 
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It is estimated that expenses related to chemicals account for half of all farming 
costs.400  
1.2.3 The potential use of CAs 
The problems and factors examined above emphasise that CAs could come into play 
as a legal option in mitigating or solving those problems in many situations. For 
instance, governments may introduce a short-term CA scheme to support conversion 
to organic farming. The scheme may involve the encouragement of farmers not to use 
pesticides and chemicals, coupled with advice on how organic farming can be 
conducted. CAs would thus be the vehicle for a conservation scheme playing a part in 
reducing land contamination and land degradation, as well as providing support the 
conservation of biodiversity. Alternatively, this legal tool could be used on a longer-
term basis to motivate landowners to plant native trees instead of growing a monocrop, 
thereby securing biodiversity as well as storing greenhouse gases. The implementation 
of these schemes would also help the Thai government to deal with socio-economic 
conditions mentioned above, if the schemes were to be supported by public money, 
coupled with a well-organised policy, enabling land to produce an income without it 
being devoted to maximising agricultural production. These conservation schemes are 
possible since several national policies already support the initiation of conservation 
schemes for organic farming.401 
         
2. Fundamental legal principles and rules 
This part examines the established legal rules and principles of land rights, land-use 
regulation and nature conservation. Section 2.1 will mainly summarise how the law 
sets the legal rules connecting the state and people with land through the concepts of 
land rights. Section 2.2 reflects whether and how the law lays down rules, principles 
or measures to intervene in the use of land, and for nature conservation. This section 
will be examined from the perspective of environmental regulation.  
The merits of the examination in this part are that first, it helps to provide the legal 
background of the established regime in Thailand, and reflects whether such legal rules 
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are sufficient to deal with the problems exemplified in part 1 above or not. Second, it 
will be used to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the existing regime to be 
discussed in chapter 6.402 
 
2.1 Land rights under property law and land law 
Land is regarded as property under property law.403 This area of law sets a legal 
relationship between persons and things, as well as the rules regarding, inter alia, the 
acquisition of property rights in real property.404 Although this thesis is not a 
comprehensive study on this point, several legal considerations under property law are 
necessary to the understanding of what the existing legal rules regarding the use of 
land are, and how CAs can become a part of such rules. This section is divided into 
four sub-sections, starting from the legal definition and legal status of land. Then 
consideration of the concepts of property rights, fundamental property rights and the 
relationship between types of land and land rights will be examined respectively.  
2.1.1 Legal definition and legal status of land 
The law giving the meaning of land is the Land Code.405 The Land Code defines land 
with a descriptive approach as the land surface everywhere and includes mountains, 
hills, streams, ponds, canals, swamps, marshes, waterways, lakes, islands and the sea 
coast. Thus, the earth’s surface, whether it is wet or dry, comes under the meaning of 
land.406  
Another consideration to be noted here is about the legal status of land. The Land Code 
enunciates that land which is not vested in any person shall be deemed the property of 
the state.407 This legal rule constitutes two categories of land tenure, comprising 
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land title documents.  
404 Seni Pramoj, Commentary on the Civil and Commercial Code: Law on Property  (The Thai Bar 
Association 2008) 3. 
405 Land Code BE 2499 (1956), established by the Promulgating of the Land Code Act, BE 2497 (1954). 
406 Land Code, s 1.  





privately-owned and publicly-owned land.408 Although the Land Code provides a clear 
division between these types of land, it is not an easy task to determine whether the 
land in question is publicly-owned land and whether people or communities can use 
that land due to the fragmentation of laws establishing land rights.  
As the Thai land law, mentioned above, provides a broad definition of land and 
categorises the land into two groups, these imply that CAs as an instrument for land 
conservation could be implemented to conserve several areas, but there must be 
considered further whether CAs should be used for all or some types of land, as will 
be discussed in section 2.4 of chapter 6. 
2.1.2 Land from a property law perspective 
The examination in the previous sub-section explains what the Land Code provides 
the legal meaning and legal status of land. This sub-section further examines how the 
general rules of property law govern land. It mainly focuses on the examination of the 
rules established under the Thai Civil and Commercial Code (CCC),409 specifically the 
key aspects of property rights410 on land under the law on property (Book 4).411 The 
aim of this discussion is to illustrate the default existing rules of property rights that 
can be established on land. This examination will help this thesis justify why they are 
insufficient for the creation of CAs, which will be discussed in part 1 of chapter 6.  
Apart from the definition of land under the Land Code, land falls under the broad 
concept of ‘immovable property’ under CCC. This law gives its legal meaning as land 
and things fixed permanently thereto or formed as a component part thereof. It also 
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410 Although the core meaning of property rights remains unclear, the words ‘property rights’ and ‘real 
rights’ used in this chapter refers to a group of rights established by the law, for example, ownership, 
servitudes or mining concessions. Holding a specific real right entitles certain persons or communities 
to enjoy the benefit of a particular property, and they must be somehow related to a specific property. 
In this sense, the right to farm on the land of another is a property right. Several laws establish various 
property rights, but the most well-known property rights are set up by the law on property under CCC. 
411 The term ‘property law’ will be used throughout this thesis to reference to the law on property 





includes real rights connected with the land or things attached to or forming a body 
with the ground, for example, servitudes and usufructs.412 This definition makes 
immovable property encompass the physical features as well as the property rights 
attached to the land.  
Another notion relating to the property rights on land is a ‘component part of a thing’. 
This concept provides the legal rules on how one thing can be connected to another. A 
component part is defined as a thing which, according to its nature or local custom, is 
essential to the existence of another. It cannot be separated without destroying, 
damaging or altering its form or nature. Due to the very nature of a component part, 
an owner of the immovable property owns all component parts attached to the 
immovable property.413 Trees in a particular plot of land, for instance, are regarded as 
the component parts of that land, and the landowner is the owner of trees accordingly. 
However, CCC provides an exception that plants which grow only for a short life-span 
(shorter than three-year-old) and crops which may be harvested one or more times a 
year are not fixtures of the land.414  
The definitions of immovable property and component parts described above are 
essential in that they set the scene on whether and how the things regarded as 
immovable property can be an object for the establishment of any specific type of 
property rights. Those rights that can be created on immovable property, specifically 
on agricultural land, are to be summarised in the next sub-section.  
2.1.3 Key property rights on land 
This sub-section is not a comprehensive explanation about property rights under 
property law but instead seeks to overview the property rights that can be established 
on agricultural land.  
2.1.3.1 Privately-owned land ownership  
Ownership is the most important real right as it entitles a person to own property, 
including land. An understanding of ownership is also critical for this study because it 
determines who can be a landowner, entitled to enter into a CA with an eligible body 
(a CA holder). CCC does not state what ownership is but recognises how a proprietor 
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enjoys ownership. The specific bundle of rights conferred on an owner of property 
encompasses the right to use and dispose of property; right to acquire its fruits; right 
to revindicate the property from any person not entitled to detain it; and the right to 
prevent unlawful interference with it.415 
The acquisition of private-land ownership remains different from that of movable or 
personal property in various aspects. In the first place, its validity is subject to several 
legal requirements. The acquisition of landownership by agreement, for instance, 
requires the registration of the transfer from a previous to a new landowner in a land 
title deed or other comparable land documents.416 A contract made for transferring 
land ownership must be made subject to the rules provided in CCC, for example, a 
contract of sale must be fulfilled in the form of writing and registered in a land title 
deed.417 This means that a person seeking to buy land must enter into such a contract 
and register such transfer of the land at the land registry. Second, the acquisition of 
land ownership can be made by other means, including acquisitions by prescription 
(adverse possession) and the acquisition of land resulting from alluvion. However, 
these types of acquisition are out of the scope of this thesis.418  
Ownership is different from other real rights in that it is never exhausted by 
abandonment by the proprietor. However, owners might lose ownership in some 
circumstances. For instance, if they are deprived of possession by another person for 
a period, the new possessor may acquire the ownership of that property through 
acquisition by prescription explained above.  
2.1.3.2 Possessory right over private property 
A possessory right under CCC denotes a property right over a certain piece of property, 
including the right over real property. The content of a possessory right under CCC 
remains unclear as to what extent a possessor is entitled to exercise any rights over the 
thing being held. CCC merely admits that the possessor has the right to transfer the 
thing, to eliminate unlawful interference and to return to possess a specific thing where 
the possessor is unlawfully deprived of possession. As s 1368 of CCC recognises that 
a person may acquire a possessory right through another person holding for him, some 
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scholars interpret this provision that both the lessor and lessee have a possessory right 
to the property leased.419 For instance, where A owns a specific plot of land and leases 
out the plot to B, A, as a lessor, has a possessory right on the land because B holds the 
land for their behalf and will return it to them.420 The consideration of possessory rights 
over certain land is crucial for this thesis because it is worthy of discussion whether a 
lawful occupier of land, other than the landowner, should be eligible to enter into CAs. 
This consideration will be examined and discussed further in section 5.4 of chapter 5 
and section 2.6 of chapter 6. 
 2.1.3.3 Servitudes 
A servitude is a property right that can only be established on parcels of land held as 
different properties and mainly creates restrictions on one land plot for the benefit of 
another. The rule under CCC provides that an owner of a particular piece of property 
(called the ‘servient property’) is bound to allow another landowner to do specific 
activities on the servient property for the sake of another immovable property (called 
the ‘dominant property’).421  
Servitudes can be formed by signing and registering a servitude agreement and by legal 
force (prescription). The former can be made when the parties as owners of different 
land plots reach an agreement. It can be done where the servient owner accepts an 
obligation to refrain from exercising certain rights inherent in his ownership.422 For 
instance, a servient landowner may allow a dominant landowner to walk through the 
servient property to a river to draw water for the use for farming in the dominant 
property.  However, the agreement for creating a servitude must be recorded in a land 
title deed and registered at the state land office to enable a servitude to be enforced 
against a successor of servient property.423   
Unlike other contracts, a servitude created by a contract runs with the land and binds 
future owners. The binding duration might be time-limited or indifinite.  The other 
means of creating a servitude on the land is the creation by prescription in a similar 
                                                     
419 Viriya Ngamsiripongphan, Commentary on the Civil and Commercial Code Book 4: Law on 
Property (Dauentula Press 2014) 69.  
420 B, as a lessee, has an obligation according to the contract to return the land to A when the period of 
lease is terminated. 
421 CCC, s 1387 
422 ibid s 1387. 





vein as the acquisition of landownership by prescription.424 The servitudes created by 
this means are different from those made by agreement in that they run with the 
servient land in perpetuity.  
As will be explained in section 1.2 of chapter 6, servitudes are the legal instrument 
having a similar function as CAs. However, the current Thai law does not allow the 
creation of servitude to impose positive obligations on servient landowner. This is not 
the case for CAs, which can impose both positive and negative burdens to run with the 
land in perpetuity. 
In terms of the duties of a dominant landowner and a servient one, once the servitude 
has been established, the owner of the dominant property is not entitled to make any 
change, either on the servient or on the dominant property, which increases the burden 
of the servient property.425 Also, the owner of the servient property must refrain from 
any act which will tend to diminish the utility of the servitude or to make it less 
convenient.426  
A servitude may involve agricultural land uses in some circumstances. For example, a 
landowner, who has been crossing cropland owned by another to transport harvested 
crops during the harvesting season for ten years, is entitled to a servitude to cross the 
land for moving such crops even though they do not have permission from the owner 
of the servient land.  
2.1.3.4 Superficies 
Superficies is another kind of property right that can be found on farmland. It is the 
right, granted by an owner of a piece of land to another person to permit such a person 
to own buildings, structures or plantations, upon or under the land, by registering the 
contract establishing this right.427 It might be questionable whether this right is the 
same as that generated by a lease agreement. They are different because superficies is 
valid when an establishing agreement is made in writing and registered with the 
competent authority, and a superficies contract might not require any consideration; a 
lease agreement, on the other hand, does not necessarily require registration, but 
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consideration is needed.428 Other characteristics of this right are that the right of 
superficies is transferable and transmissible by way of inheritance unless the contract 
does not allow this.429 Also, it may be created either for a fixed period or for the life 
of the owner of the land or the superficiary.430  It should be noted that several 
provisions in CCC imply that servitudes and superficies can be created only in limited 
circumstances, e.g. the land affected must be privately-owned land.
431
 This is because 
the property rights established under CCC are exclusively related to the concept of 
private ownership. Therefore, it would appear that the government cannot use public 
land to create these property rights.    
2.1.4 Interconnection between types of land and land rights  
As just mentioned, publicly-owned and privately-owned land are clearly divided, but the 
extent to which publicly-owned land can be utilised remains complex. This part illustrates 
how people can use each type of land. The understanding in this sub-section will help this 
thesis examine and discuss further in chapters 5 and 6 whether these two kinds of land 
should be the subject for the creation of CAs.   
2.1.4.1 Privately-owned land  
Privately-owned land is land where an individual is legally entitled to use and transfer 
the land. According to the Land Code, privately-owned land can be split into land 
subject to full ownership and that where the holder has merely a possessory right.  
Regarding the privately-owned land with full ownership, a current rule recognising 
who owns a specific parcel of land is the use of a land title deed. The transfer of 
ownership of the land for which the title deed has already been issued must be made 
in writing and registered with the competent officials.432 The privately-owned land 
with a possessory right, on the other hand, is the land over which people have not yet 
acquired full ownership, but which they are entitled to possess and utilise in the same 
manner as those who hold a title deed. The certified document is called a utilisation 
certificate. In practice, a holder of this certificate is recognised as a landowner having 
a possessory right. This type of property can be changed to be full-ownership land 
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when the holder files a request to the competent authority to remeasure the land plot 
and to change a type of certification.  The transfer of this type of land to another person 
follows similar rules to the transfer of full-ownership land.  
As privately-owned land is considered as private property, landowners can utilise, 
dispose of or sell the land, obtain its fruits and exclude others, as they can for other 
kinds of goods. Some restrictions may be applied to freehold land, e.g. the duty to pay 
a land-related tax and the transfer of property must be in writing and registered with 
the competent officials. The use of land, in general, is under a few legal restrictions.433  
2.1.4.2 Publicly-owned land  
Publicly-owned land in Thailand covers all areas other than privately-owned land. It 
is considered as the property of the state by virtue of the Land Code s 2 mentioned 
above. This means that the law vests the power in government agencies to preserve, 
protect, conserve or use publicly-owned land according to the conditions prescribed 
by the laws concerned. However, the government cannot sell or give publicly-owned 
land to anyone unless allowed by the law.434 This type of property can be divided into 
the land which the authorities are empowered to allow institutions or people to use for 
certain purposes prescribed by laws, and other cases where it is public domain land.435  
For the first category, several pieces of legislation entitle individuals or institutions to 
use publicly-owned land. Those laws usually empower state institutions to manage the 
land, and those competent institutions may authorise people who have suitable 
qualifications to use the land.  The right to use this type of land can be for a limited 
time or without limited period subject to the conditions and purposes of the laws. For 
instance, the Agricultural Land Reform Act BE 2518 (1975) authorises the 
Agricultural Land Reform Office (ALRO) to allocate land in a land reform area to 
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farmers for agricultural utilisation.436 This enables farmers to farm on that land without 
limit of time period as long as they use the land for agriculture, but they cannot sell it 
as the land reform area belongs to the state.437  Nevertheless, land rights entitled under 
this Act remain unclear in many respects. For example, there are the ambiguities 
concerning the legal status of the land right and the effects of or sanction for non-
compliance. However, as an individual can be granted the right to occupy and farm on 
this type of land, it is worthy of attention because this type of land might be subject to 
the conservation by CAs, as will be discussed in section 2.4 of chapter 6.  
Another category of publicly-owned land is public-domain land. Theoretically, it is 
the land held for common use or reserved for the common benefit. The land under this 
category can be divided into the land for the common use and that reserved for the 
common interest. The first denotes the land which people are entitled to utilise 
together, without preventing others from using it as common property,438 e.g. 
foreshores, waterways, highways, lakes. The latter is not allowed for the common use 
per se but reserved for the use by public bodies for the public interest.439 This type of 
land is different from the first group as no one is allowed to occupy it. However, state 
authorities that are in charge of managing reserved areas may allow communities or 
individuals to occasionally use the areas, for example for a recreational purpose.440 
The restriction of uses might be provided to serve the collective benefit of society, e.g. 
national parks and wildlife sanctuary areas.441   
 
2.2 Land use regulation and nature conservation 
As the aim of this thesis is to examine a legal option for conservation, it is worth examining 
whether the existing laws in Thailand provide any measures to control the use of land and 
to conserve natural features found therein. This section investigates the key legal techniques 
which can be employed to control activities on land as well as those implemented for the 
conservation of nature. Admittedly, these two areas are a combination of various pieces of 
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legislation. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to conduct a comprehensive study, and that 
is not the main objective of this thesis.  
This section seeks to overview the established legal measures that can be implemented to 
control or manage activities conducted on land and those for the conservation of natural 
features. This examination intends to view these legal areas from a regulatory perspective 
by highlighting which activities are regulated in what ways. Then, this section will sumarise 
the roles of governmental bodies in employing legal measures for land-use regulation and 
nature conservation.  
The term ‘land-use regulation’ is used here for the legal tools aiming at controlling social 
behaviour regarding the use of land. The laws relating to the regulation of land use, therefore, 
encompass various legal measures implemented or available for the control of how the land 
is utilised. However, this section will pay attention to those relating to the use of privately-
owned land as it is the core objective to be conserved by a new legal tool.  
The law of nature conservation, on the other hand, has no well-accepted definition.442 This 
thesis employs this term as the laws providing the legal measures for the conservation of 
natural features. Its common features can be highlighted as the laws providing measures to 
maintain, enhance or restore the quality of the natural environment, including the population 
of living features and the ecological functions of ecosystems.443  
There are reasons for summarising the laws relating to land-use control and nature 
conservation together. First, several measures falling under the label of nature conservation 
law also are under the definition of the land-use control law.444 Second, the regulatory 
technique employed by these areas of law is the same or very similar. They employ a C&C 
regulatory technique and confer the powers to intervene in human activities on 
governmental bodies. They can be briefly described from a regulatory perspective as 
follows.   
2.2.1 Land-use planning  
The words ‘land-use planning’ reflect the use of plans, policies and strategies to 
manage the use of land. A prominent law dealing with this task is the Town Planning 
Act BE 2562 (2019),445 which was recently enacted and repealed the previous law 
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implemented in 1975. This new law comes with modernised legal options for planning. 
It introduced comprehensive rules regarding strategic plans at national, regional and 
provincial levels.446 Apart from that, this law employs two categories of land-use 
plans, comprising a general town plan and a specific town plan (town plans can be 
used for rural areas).447 These two land-use plans play a pivotal part in laying down 
the rules about the use of land by conforming to the strategic plans mentioned above. 
While the general town plans can be implemented through a general plan, policy, 
project or control measure for the use of land in particular local areas, the specific town 
plans go further. They involve the implementation of a particular plan and project to 
develop or preserve a specific local area, where the general ones are in place.448 
As mentioned above, a general town plan and specific town plan involve the control 
of land use, for both privately-owned and publicly-owned land. These types of plan 
are prepared and implemented by specific governmental bodies subject to conditions 
under the law.449 Similar to land-use planning rules implemented elsewhere, the law 
prohibits any person to use the land contrary to the land-use plans.450 The violation is 
subject to criminal offences in the nature of C&C regulation laid down behind this type 
of legal measure. 
It is important to note that some parcels of farmland in the country are not under the 
land-use planning regime. Some of those, for instance, those declared as a land reform 
area under the management of ALRO, are part of forestland.451 This type of area is not 
part of urban or rural areas, and the law regulates a land reform area with different and 
separate legal rules.   
2.2.2 Designating of reserved or restricted areas  
One of the conventional approaches for the conservation of nature or the management 
of specific areas is to provide legal status to those areas coupled with the adoption of 
an appropriate level of protection.452 Designation of reserved or restricted areas serves 
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this task by embracing the support of legal power. In Thailand, it commonly entails 
conferring power on certain governmental bodies to designate or notify reserved or 
restricted areas. National parks and environmental protection areas represent the 
reserved areas designated for the purposes of nature conservation. The designation of 
a national park, for instance, can be made for a vast area of publicly-owned land having 
ecological values to be preserved for the common benefit, public education and 
amenity.453 Environmental protection areas, on the other hand, can be notified for any 
pieces of land, regardless of ownership by public bodies or individuals. The land 
eligible to be protected must have unique ecosystems or natural values which are likely 
to be harmed by human activities. Also, such land must not have been designated as 
other reserved areas under other laws.454 The designation of a contaminated land area 
exemplifies another function of this regulatory technique in dealing with 
environmental problems caused by anthropogenic pollution. A competent 
governmental body under the Land Development Act BE 2551 (2008) is authorised to 
deal with contaminated agricultural land by notifying the land or area in question as a 
controlled area. From a regulatory point of view, the designation of those areas 
illustrates at least two noteworthy points. First, it comes along with prohibitions or 
restrictions backed by criminal offences or subject to civil liability rules as will be 
summarised in 2.2.4 and 2.2.5. Second, it reflects that a primary approach for the 
conservation of land is reliant on C&C regulation, and there is no measure entitling 
public bodies to use a voluntary tool to conserve land and the features thereon.455 
2.2.3 Listing of natural features to be protected or regulated   
Similar to the regulatory technique of the designation of reserved or restricted areas, the use 
of a listing approach has been employed in Thailand for many decades. The listing of 
regulated trees and wild animals are evidence of this. The first has been used to regulate the 
utilisation of some valuable wood from publicly-owned land (forestland) by requiring a 
licence and royalty for such taking. Arguably, this might be seen as a mere control of natural 
resources on an economic ground rather than for an environmentally-based reason.456  
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The use of a listing technique for nature conservation is clearly illustrated through four 
categories of wild animal lists under the Wild Animal Preservation and Protection Act BE 
2562 (2019). The competent governmental bodies under this Act are entitled to declare the 
lists of preserved wild animals, protected wild animals, controlled wild animals, and 
dangerous wild animals subject to the conditions provided under the Act.457 Again, the 
listing approach is employed with its own reasons, the same as the designation of reserved 
and restricted areas. The main objective of the listing of wildlife is generally for the imposing 
of prohibitions, licence or approval to ensure that the regulated features are well conserved 
or managed. They come together with criminal offences or civil liability for the breach of 
such prohibitions or restrictions as will be seen in 2.2.4 and 2.2.5.458 
2.2.4 Imposing prohibitions or restrictions for activities causing harm to specified 
features 
As observed by many commentators, the mainstay of C&C regulation involves setting 
standards for compliance coupled with sanctions for non-compliance.459 This legal 
technique is often used to regulate the use of land and nature conservation, similar to other 
areas of laws in Thailand. The designation of reserved areas and listing protected wild 
animals will never protect those features unless the law further imposes some prohibitions 
or restrictions for activities causing harm to them. The same or similar technique is also 
applied to other tasks in this legal area. A particular piece of legislation also imposes 
prohibitions on burning forests or causing any damage to waterways in national parks.460 
Some others, for example, land-use control law require formal approval for certain instances 
of land excavation and landfilling to prevent negative consequences.461 Mining law 
exemplifies the prohibitions for causing contamination on watercourses from a mining 
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operation.462 These examples describe the prevalence of this regulatory technique 
permeating Thai environmental-related laws. They also demonstrate that some other 
regulatory techniques, including the use of a voluntary agreement, could be introduced to 
work alongside these legal measures to offer scope for the employment of multiple tool kits 
to deal with environmental problems on land.  Although it is beyond the scope of this sub-
section as well as this study to argue that the adoption of this regulatory approach is better 
than imposing tighter direct regulatory measures for conserving nature, this thesis takes the 
view that the examination how CAs can work along with C&C regulation is worthwhile. 
2.2.5 Setting civil liability rules 
As characterised in chapter 2,463 civil liability can be regarded as a form of legal 
regulation. Civil liability rules are found in various areas of law, including 
environmental law. It is applied to environmental cases in two respects, namely 
environmental damage from the leakage or dispersal of pollutants, and the destruction, 
loss, or damage of natural resources from an unlawful act. This type of regulatory tool 
can be supported by the regulation of land use and nature conservation in many ways. 
In the case of land contamination from any kinds of pollutants, an owner or possessor 
of contaminated land is liable for any damage arising from such contamination to pay 
compensation for those affected by the leakage of pollution based on a strict liability 
rule.464 This liability rule is applicable to damage on private property as well as that 
on environmental loss. Apart from that, there is another liability rule exclusively 
applied for destruction, loss, or damage of natural resources. This liability rule can be 
applied where a liable person causes any unlawful acts and results in the destruction, 
loss, or damage of natural resources on publicly-owned land,465 for example, if a 
person enters into a reserved area and clears vegetation therein for farming. These 
types of liability rule share a common concept in bestowing on a specific governmental 
body the right to claim compensation from a liable person. The damages awarded for 
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these cases can be used for the restoration of contaminated or damaged land or paid to 
the individuals who suffer or are injured from such cases.     
2.2.6 Providing financial incentives  
Financial incentives can be a subsidiary and alternative legal tool that can help regulate 
the behaviour of landholders to carry out eco-friendly practices on farmland. A handful 
of laws provide incentives as part of environmental regulation. Some legislation has 
offered endowments for helping improve the wellbeing of the farmers. For instance, 
the government can use the Farmer Aid Endowment Act BE 2557 (2014) to allocate 
financial assistance for farmers who have experienced problems regarding agricultural 
issues. The Act can help farmers in several ways, for instance, giving a loan for buying 
essential agricultural materials or helping to provide farmland for poor farmers.466 
Apart from that, the Agricultural Economics Act BE 2522 (1979) is in place for 
offering financial assistance for farmers. However, some limitations remain 
problematic. The financial incentive for farmers is exclusively for those farming in 
areas designated as an economic area, and the primary aims of such assistance are to 
build the capacity of farmers in producing agricultural products.467 The use of 
incentives for stimulating agricultural production seems to be an outdated policy. The 
experience from the European Union demonstrates that this policy could lead to 
intensive farming and overproduction.468 This reflects that the legal schemes offering 
financial incentives for an agricultural sector under the existing laws have not been 
implemented for improving farming practices to achieve an eco-friendly goal.  
It is important to note that, from the very nature of C&C regulatory measures, the law 
confers the powers to use most of the above measures on governmental bodies. It 
seems that there are a few cases where non-governmental bodies can come into play, 
for example, the limited role in filing a civil liability case on behalf of injured persons. 
Lack of space for non-governmental bodies to participate under the existing laws raises 
the question of whether a new regime of CA-enabling law provides an appropriate 
place for non-governmental bodies to undertake some regulatory tasks. This question 
will be discussed in sections 2.3 and 2.12 of chapter 6.   
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This chapter has highlighted some points worth noting for the development of a legal 
proposal of a CA-enabling law for Thailand. It explored key existing problems and 
gaps, motivations for reform, and legal principles, which are relevant or support the 
creation of CAs in the Thai context.  
The first part investigated the factual status quo of land use and environmental issues 
arising thereon; this thesis sees an interrelation between land use and environmental 
problems. The majority of land plots being used for agriculture indicates two points 
justifying why this thesis topic should be investigated. First, the diversity and 
complexity of environmental problems posed by human activities on this type of land 
indicate the room to improve agricultural practices to serve the conservation of nature. 
Second, the very nature of this type of land as privately-owned land means that it is 
worth discussing further regarding the use of a low intrusive legal tool to deal with 
such land-related problems, rather than the use of a C&C approach.469 This part also 
provided examples of situations where CAs could be made to deal with those 
environmental problems. 
In light of the factual considerations mentioned above, the second part turned to the 
examination of available legal rules and options in place. This part revealed the 
availability of several laws in Thailand recognising land status, land rights, and 
providing rules regarding land-use regulation and nature conservation. However, the 
examination in section 2.2. above revealed that there is no law entitling governmental 
bodies to enter into a CA with landowners. Another reflection drawn from this part is 
about the regulatory style of the existing laws. Most of, if not all of, them are reliant 
on C&C regulation where governmental bodies play a vital role in implementing this 
kind of regulatory measures. The finding in this section also indicated that there is no 
statute recognising the use of a voluntary approach to conserve natural or cultural 
heritage on privately-owned land. This section noted that a voluntary agreement could 
be introduced to work alongside the existing C&C legal measures, and the examination 
of how CAs could be established is worth considering. 
                                                     






The examination of such two aspects indicates the possibility of developing CAs as a 
new legal tool to work alongside the established laws. In light of the findings drawn 
and the arguments presented in section 2.2 above, this section noted that the 
examinations of how CAs could be introduced to work alongside the existing C&C 
legal measures, and how CAs could be established are worth considering. This thesis 
will examine the point of whether and how the new legal tool should be formulated in 
chapter 6 after the comparative study of CA-enabling legal models is discussed in the 






Chapter 5 The comparison of the selected CA-enabling laws 
 
Introduction 
The overview of CAs in chapter 1 reflects some fundamental aspects of CAs as a 
private law instrument implemented to serve the public interest. This chapter, as a 
crucial element of this thesis, seeks to compare the legal features found in the selected 
conservation agreement-enabling laws (CA-enabling laws) implemented in Australia, 
the UK and USA.470 This comparison aims to uncover the common characteristics of 
the law across different jurisdictions and to identify key strengths and weaknesses of 
each legal model. The findings from this chapter will provide lessons for Thailand by 
drawing out the key legal features of CA-enabling legal provisions.  
One of the points worth discussing at the outset is the legal matters of CA-enabling 
law that should be the object of this comparative study. The findings from the review 
of relevant literature found that different scholars set different structures to analyse the 
application of CAs, and there is no standard for this categorisation.471 This thesis 
identifies the critical elements for this comparative study based on various grounds. 
The first is the categorisation in light of the definition of CAs given by the Law 
Commission, summarised in chapter 1, as well as the matters to be taken into account 
in creating VEAs, investigated in chapter 3.472 The second comes from considering the 
aim of this study, which seeks to introduce CAs to work alongside C&C regulatory 
measures and the existing legal tools in place in Thailand, as examined in chapters 2, 
3 and 4. The last one takes into account the common elements in place in the 
comparator jurisdictions. Based on these three considerations, this thesis argues that 
thirteen legal considerations should be investigated to understand the application, 
strengths and weaknesses of CAs in place in Australia, the UK and USA. They are 
listed as follows.473  
1) Terms, sources and development; 
2) The purposes for which a CA can be created;  
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3) Eligible land;  
4) Holders; 
5) Burdened landholders; 
6) Obligations;  
7) Durations; 
8) Enforcement;  
9) Incentives;  
10) Registration; 
11) Variation and termination; 
12) Public oversight;  
13) Compatibility with existing relevant conservation tools and laws. 
The following sections begin with an introductory part justifying why such a point 
should be examined, along with the identification of specific points to be investigated. 
Then, the legal features extracted from specific statutes of each jurisdiction will be 
examined in turn. Finally, the legal substance drawn from each jurisdiction will be 
compared and analysed in an analysis section. The findings from analysis sections will 
be discussed by considering the problems and existing laws in Thailand as well as 
those relevant to the development of the legal proposal for Thailand. 
Part 1 will illustrate the applicable terms, sources of law and legal backgrounds of CAs 
selected to compare in this chapter. This part aims at uncovering the diversity of the 
applicable terms under various specific laws and explaining how they are developed. 
Although the findings from this part will not be drawn on further discussion in chapter 
6, it is worth investigating at the beginning because an understanding of the sources of 
law and legal backgrounds of CAs helps to explain how the comparator jurisdictions 
have developed their CA-enabling laws.  
Parts 2 to 13 deal with the legal matters commonly established in the laws of the 
comparing jurisdictions.  
The purposes for which a CA can be created, which will be investigated in part 2 is 
one of the vital elements of this tool distinguishing CAs from other voluntary 
environmental agreements (VEAs). This part will investigate the range of purposes of 
CA implementation under each CA-enabling laws, and the relationship between this 
and the points about the relevant actors (eligible holders and burdened landholders), 





Part 3 will investigate what land is eligible to be conserved by CAs. It will examine 
whether and how the law requires any conditions for the areas subject to this type of 
agreement. For example, it will examine whether or not publicly-owned land and water 
areas can be under CAs.  
Part 4 will investigate who is authorised by the law to make a conservation 
agreement474 and what roles they play. The selection of this point for the comparison 
stems from the regulatory character of CAs, which seek to serve the public interest. 
Such character indicates that the issue of ‘who are entitled to make and hold interests 
arising from this tool?’ could be linked to the question ‘to what extent the 
implementation of this tool will be transparent and accountable’. 
Part 5 will examine who is bound in CA obligations. Although landowners are a 
prominent party obligated to fulfil CA obligations, some statutes may set additional 
rules by imposing specific burdens on other persons, including tenants. In some 
statutes, they expressly provide that CAs bind future landowners. These characteristics 
raise the questions of the advantages and disadvantages of such express provisions.   
Parts 6 entails the examination of whether and how the laws of the three jurisdictions 
set a framework of obligations for an individual CA. Obligations imposed by CAs are 
distinctive from other burdens, running with the land, in that they may be positive 
obligations, as well as negative ones. The CA obligations will indicate what the duties 
imposed on a burdened landholder are. Once entering into effect, such a burdened 
landholder is required to fulfil the tasks agreed in the agreement.  
Part 7 will examine how long the obligations imposed on burdened landholders should 
last. This part is critical because the binding period and effect of a CA, which generally 
runs with the land in perpetuity, is a crucial character of this legal tool and 
distinguishes it from an agreement under pure contract law.  
Then, where burdened landholders fail to fulfil the obligation, a holder might enforce 
them with some sanctions. Part 8 will deal with this consideration, and demonstrate 
whether and how the measures of enforcement for a CA are different from those 
stipulated in private law of contract.  
                                                     





Part 9 is about the consideration of incentives. It will primarily investigate whether 
and what type of incentives can be offered to induce a potential landowner to enter 
into a CA. This consideration is crucial because incentives could increase the number 
of uptakes, and a CA with no incentive might look unattractive from the perspective 
of prospective landowners.  
Part 10 is about the registration of the agreement on a land title document, which most 
jurisdictions require as a precondition of making a CA enforceable against a successor 
in title to the land. It will examine how each jurisdiction develops a condition for 
recording a CA, and what the legal effect of the recordation is.  
Part 11 considers the variation and termination of a CA. It will examine whether and 
how CA-enabling laws of each jurisdiction provide rules for the modification or 
termination of CAs. This issue should be examined because CAs can be created to last 
in perpetuity or for decades, and bind future landowners. This could raise the 
discussion whether CA parties should be free to modify or terminate this type of 
agreement. 
Part 12 will examine and discuss the need for a CA to be overseen by public bodies or 
non-parties. It will investigate the oversight measures established under the laws of the 
comparing jurisdictions. This point should be examined because in many cases, this 
legal tool is supported by public money. Without public oversight, the implementation 
of this tool might be questioned about transparency and accountability.475  
Part 13 aims at examining the compatibility between the implementation of a CA and 
other legal tools imposed on the land. It seeks to investigate whether each jurisdiction 
provides legal provisions making this legal tool conform to others. This point should 
be examined because it helps explain how a private law instrument works along with 
other regulatory instruments. It is also helpful in determining and explaining the legal 
form and functions of a CA working in each jurisdiction.    
The result from the examination in these parts will be drawn on to establish the legal 
structure of a proposed legal framework to Thailand by considering the factual and 
legal backgrounds of the country as considered in the previous chapter.  
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1. Terms, sources and development  
This part examines how CAs are named under specific statutes in the comparator 
jurisdictions; and how they have been developed or introduced in a particular statute. 
The examination offers an overview of their legal background before each key legal 
consideration will be examined in parts 2 to 13.  
The relevant label should be investigated at the beginning because CAs are named with 
different terms among the comparator jurisdictions. They include conservation 
agreements, conservation covenants, management agreements, conservation burdens 
and conservation easements. Understanding this point is crucial as each applicable 
term reflects the background of development and legal form of CAs,476 as will be 
observed in the later parts. This research uses the words ‘conservation agreement’ as 
an umbrella term representing those when they are stated in a general context because 
it reflects the legal form consistent with the common phrasing employed in other 
chapters.  
Understanding sources of CA-enabling laws and their development are also worthy of 
study for three reasons. First, it helps to scope a range of statutes and their specific 
names for CAs to be compared in this chapter. Second, the history in implementing 
CAs under specific laws reflects that there is room to learn experience from the laws 
in the comparator jurisdictions. Third, these points reveal whether CAs under a specific 
law were developed as an independent conservation instrument or as a subsidiary tool 
to other conventional C&C regulatory measures.477  
 
1.1 Australia  
Overall, CAs implemented in Australia have different names. They range from 
conservation agreement, biodiversity stewardship agreement, wildlife refuge 
agreement, biodiversity conservation agreement, biodiversity conservation covenant, 
and conservation covenant. These CAs can be found both in the Commonwealth 
legislation and state statutes.  
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The use of CAs in New South Wales (NSW) can be traced back to those created under 
the National Parks and Wildlife Act 1974. This Act conferred on a competent state 
body the power to create a conservation agreement and declare a wildlife refuge on 
privately-owned land.478 After that, several statutes enabled specified public bodies to 
make this type of agreement with various labels.479 They include biobanking 
agreements,480 property agreements,481 and trust agreements.482 In 2016, the coming 
into effect of the Biodiversity Conservation Act 2016 (BCA 2016 (NSW)) made some 
changes in the regime of implementing CAs in NSW. In brief, it repealed and revised 
the rules of making CAs under the NSW regime, and CAs under this Act replace CAs 
under the previous ones. CAs under the new legislation of NSW are divided into three 
categories, which offer different options for conservation. They comprise biodiversity 
stewardship agreements,483 conservation agreements and wildlife refuge agreements. 
The details on how different they are will be examined in the following parts. 
Similar to NSW, Western Australia (WA) introduced several statutes enabling 
competent public bodies to make various forms of CA with landowners. They include 
conservation covenants, agreements to reserve, and heritage agreements.484 In 2016, a 
new generation of CAs under the WA regime came together with the promulgation of 
the Biodiversity Conservation Act 2016 (BCA 2016 (WA)). It offers two categories of 
CAs, namely a biodiversity conservation agreement and biodiversity conservation 
covenant.  
Unlike NSW and WA, the Commonwealth government introduced CAs as a regulatory 
conservation tool in the 1990s under the label ‘conservation agreement’. Conservation 
agreements under the Commonwealth legislation are worth examining as an example 
of the CAs which can be implemented to conserve various natural features in various 
                                                     
478 National Parks and Wildlife Act 1974, ss 68, 69A-69KA.  
479 Environmental Defenders Office, ‘Conservation on Privately-owned land-Fact Sheet’ 
<www.edonsw.org.au/conservation_on_private_land> accessed 14 May 2020. 
480 Threatened Species Conservation Act 1995 (NSW), ss 127D-127U. 
481 Native Vegetation Conservation Act 1997 (NSW), ss 40-45.  
482 Nature Conservation Trust Act 2001 (NSW), ss 30-38B. 
483 Biodiversity stewardship agreements represent CAs introduced to employ a market-based instrument 
for environmental protection, as mentioned in chapter 1. This special purpose of implementation means 
that they require special governing rules. For instance, they require a participating landowner to enable 
the creation of biodiversity credits and their release for sale, as well as to carry out any management 
action in perpetuity. 
484 See Soil and Land Conservation Act 1945 (WA), ss 30A-30F; National Trust of Australia Act 





types of areas.485 This character enables this conservation tool to serve the tasks of the 
federal government, which are distinctive from those of the state and territory 
governments, as will be explained in turn. The advent of CAs under the 
Commonwealth law could not take place without the legislative reform of federal 
environmental law in the 1990s. Thus, it is worthwhile summarising how CAs have 
been developed in the Commonwealth legislation.  
Before 1992, the role of the Commonwealth government remained unclear due to the 
ambiguity whether and to what extent the federal constitution vests the power to 
legislate on subject matters about the environment in the federal government.486 In 
1992 the representatives of federal, state and territory governments agreed to make a 
clarification of environment-related power under the Intergovernmental Agreement on 
the Environment.487 After that, the Commonwealth government introduced the 
Endangered Species Protection Act 1992. One of the legal tools introduced in this 
Commonwealth legislation was the use of a conservation agreement.488 This Act was 
repealed in 2000489 after the coming into effect of the Environmental Protection and 
Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Commonwealth) (EPBCA 1999). The provisions 
regarding the use of a conservation agreement were subsequently reiterated in the new 
federal legislation.  
 
1.2 UK 
The applicable terms for CAs found in the UK are varied, including ‘management 
agreement,’ ‘conservation burden’ and ‘conservation covenant’. Management 
agreements are found in various statutes relating to nature conservation.490 
Conservation burdens, on the other hand, can be created under the Title Conditions 
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conserve various features, as will be summarised in part 2. 
486 See the discussion in James Crawford, ‘The Constitution and the Environment’ (1991) 13 Sydney 
Law Review 11, 12; Scotford (n 58) 102. 
487 Godden, Peel and McDonald (n 17) 116-117. 
488 Endangered Species Protection Act 1992 (Commonwealth), ss 3 (1)(2), 5 and 50-55.  
489 Endangered Species Protection Act 1992 (Commonwealth) was wholly repealed by the 
Environmental Reform (Consequential Provisions) Act 1999 (Commonwealth). 





(Scotland) Act 2003 (TC(S)A 2003).491 Conservation covenants are not in place yet 
but are worth examining as they are contained in the Bill for England and Wales.492  
Management agreements were developed as one of the legal instruments for 
conservation aims.  Despite running for a limited and short period,493 they bind a 
successor in title to land. The term ‘management agreements’ used in this chapter is a 
mere common term representing many others found in certain statutes.494 Other 
comparable names include the terms ‘agreements for the management of nature 
reserves’,495 ‘land management agreement’496 and ‘SSSIs agreement’.497 Management 
agreements have played a prominent role in conserving the environment on farmland 
in the UK for many decades.498 They have a common background in that before they 
appeared in certain statutes, nature conservation on privately-owned land was a 
voluntary practice of landowners,499 and the advent of management agreements 
changed the role of landowners to form a partnership with the governments.500  
The origin of management agreements in the UK can be traced back to the 1930s, 
starting from the use of statutory covenants under the National Trust Act 1937.501 
                                                     
491 This law does not provide the meaning of ‘title conditions’. However, this term is widely used in 
Scottish land law, referring to restrictions or requirements recorded in a title deed. Title conditions could 
prohibit or facilitate specific actions likely to be carried out on the property (see Scottish Executive, A 
Guide to the Abolition of Feudal Tenure Act and the Title Conditions Act for Housing Associations 
(Scottish Executive 2004) 1). 
492 See Environment Bill introduced to the House of Commons on 30 January 2020 (HC Bill 9) at 
<https://services.parliament.uk/bills/2019-20/environment.html> accessed 14 May 2020. This Chapter 
will use the ‘Environment Bill’ to refer to the Environment Bill 2019-2020, in which conservation 
covenant provisions are incorporated.  
493 Management agreements which are in place in the UK usually work for a limited and fixed period, 
for example, those under Higher Level Stewardship Programme lasted for ten years (Colin T Reid, ‘The 
Privatisation of Biodiversity? Possible New Approaches to Nature Conservation Law in the UK’ (2011) 
23 Journal of Environmental Law 203, 211; Christopher P Rodgers, The Law of Nature Conservation 
(OUP 2013) 302). 
494 The term ‘management agreement’ appears in Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981, s 39, and the 
Natural Environment and Rural Communities Act 2006, s 7.  
495 National Parks and Access to the Countryside Act 1949, s 16.  
496 Environment (Wales) Act 2016, s 16.  
497 An SSSI agreement is a management agreement made under s 15 of Countryside Act 1968. The 
abbreviation ‘SSSI’ refers to ‘a site of special scientific interest’, an area designated due to its special 
features. It was first introduced in 1949 under NPACA 1949, and is now governed in England and Wales 
under WCA 1981 (Reid, Nature Conservation Law (n 35) paras 5.5.1-5.5.4). 
498 Christopher P Rodgers, ‘Property Systems and Environmental Regulation’ in Lees and Viñuales (n 
3) 712. 
499 Rodgers dates the starting point of the change in land-use management regime from 1981, when the 
Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 (WCA) came into effect. The change of governmental policies in 
each region of the UK is also observed from the revision of WCA 1981 (Rodgers, Law of Nature 
Conservation (n 493) 111). 
500 ibid 302; Reid, Nature Conservation Law (n 35) para 1.6.30.  
501 See National Trust Act 1937, s 8.  Something similar has also existed in the form of forestry 





These covenants have been implemented for decades before the initiation of 
management agreements. However, their ability is limited to the creation of negative 
burdens, which means that they are unable to require a landowner to plant trees on 
their land for wildlife habitats as it is a positive obligation.  
In 1949, the advent of the National Parks and Access to the Countryside Act 1949 
(NPACA 1949) made a significant change for the conservation of natural features by 
agreement.502 This legislation confers on a competent body the power to create a 
management agreement with a landowner to establish a nature reserve.503 Since then, 
this approach has been used in other statutes.504 Management agreements under 
various laws in place in the UK can be created by specified conservation bodies to 
work alongside or as a supplementary tool of the mainstream regulatory tools of each 
statute.505 They also aim to require landowners or other persons to do or refrain from 
doing certain activities on land, and such a requirement binds a successor in title to the 
land. As observed by Rodgers, management agreements can be categorised into two 
broad categories. The first are those concluded under nature conservation legislation, 
and the latter are those offered and concluded under agri-environment schemes funded 
under the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). In many cases, a landowner may have 
agreements under both at any one time.506 The relevant substantive content of 
management agreements under these statutes will be explained further in the next 
parts.  
Conservation burdens are another legal tool operating under a different legal regime 
and are exclusively applied in Scotland. They can be created under TC(S)A 2003. 
Unlike management agreements which mostly operate as a part of nature conservation 
law, a conservation burden, as a type of real burden,507 is a legal instrument under land 
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503 NPACA 1949, s 16(1).  
504 See Countryside Act 1968 (CA 1968), Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 (WCA 1981), Natural 
Environment and Rural Communities Act 2006 (NERCA 2006) and Conservation of Habitats and 
Species Regulations 2017, SI 2017/1012 (CHSR 2017). 
505 Ross and Rowan-Robinson (n 47) 89. 
How management agreements can work as a supplementary tool within environmental governance in 
the UK will be examined in part 13 regarding the compatibility with an existing regime.  
506 Rodgers, Agricultural Law (n 490) para 13.93. 
507 Specifically speaking, conservation burdens are unlike other burdens in that they are personal real 
burdens. This type of burden is not created to be in favour of a benefited property, but rather of an 
individual legal person (see Kenneth G C Reid, The Abolition of Feudal Tenure in Scotland (Lexis 





and property law.508 TC(S)A 2003 is an outcome of the reform of land law, abolishing 
the remains of the feudal system.509 The idea in developing this legal tool was 
influenced by the first version of the Uniform Conservation Easement Act (UCEA) 
released in 1981.510 This implies that this type of burden has a similar notion as that of 
conservation easements under the UCEA regime. This makes its legal approach in 
dealing with the creation, implementation and enforcement of a conservation burden 
slightly different from those under management agreement authorisation statutes.  
The last type of CA in the UK is a conservation covenant. Though it has not been 
introduced yet, the Law Commission papers, proposing to introduce a conservation 
covenant-enabling law in England and Wales, is immensely important as an important 
work discussing and suggesting a legal skeleton of a conservation covenant enabling 
law.511 The points discussed in these reports will be heavily investigated in this study.  
 
1.3 USA  
CAs implemented in the USA are different from those of Australia and the UK in 
several aspects, and such dissimilarities constitute specific characteristics as will be 
examined in this chapter.  
The first distinction is that they are commonly called ‘conservation easements’. The 
word ‘easement’ itself shows that it is developed from the concept of a traditional 
easement.512 One of the grounds of the creation of this legal tool in the USA is to 
diminish the common law impediments which do not allow the creation of perpetual 
                                                     
508 Real burdens as a legal vehicle under Scottish property law have been commonly used in Scotland 
since the Eighteen century. Landowners, who sell their property, can impose obligations and restrictions 
on the use of land sold, for example requiring the purchaser to maintain the property. This type of 
obligation, which can run with the land, is called ‘real burden’ (Tom Guthrie, Scottish Property Law 
(2nd edn, Tottel Publishing 2005) 186). 
509 Reid and Nsoh (n 17) 181-182; Scottish Law Commission, Report on Real Burdens (Scot Law 
Com No 181, 2000) paras 9.6–9.7 and 9.10-9.12. 
510 Reid, Nature Conservation Law (n 35) para 4.4; Scottish Law Commission, Discussion Paper on 
Real Burdens (Scot Law Com DP No 106, 1998) paras 2.56-2.59; Reid (n 507) para 4.4. 
511 Two reports being examined in this chapter are Law Commission (n 45); Law Commission (n 84). 
512 See National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, ‘Prefatory Note’ (Uniform 
Conservation Easement Act Last Revised or Amended in 2007) 1.  
It is noteworthy that, although developed from the legal concept of an easement, many scholars see 
conservation easements as an ‘agreement’ which creates a property right as many conservation 
easements are created by means of agreement (Elizabeth Byers and Karin Marchetti Ponte, The 
Conservation Easement Handbook (2nd edn, Land Trust Alliance 2005) 7; Environmental Law 
Institute, Legal Tools and Incentives for Private Land in Latin America: Building Models for Success 





and negative easements in gross.513 Although the term ‘conservation easement’ is 
frequently used, some states may use different terms but share the same notion with a 
conservation easement;  for instance, a ‘conservation right’, ‘conservation servitude’,514 
‘land use easement’ and ‘conservation restriction’.  
The second distinction is about sources of CA-enabling laws. The US has its model 
law suggesting how each state could develop its CA-enabling law as well as the state 
statutes, both those adopting the model law and others creating their own version. The 
Uniform Conservation Easement Act (UCEA), a non-legally binding instrument, plays 
a tremendous role in shaping conservation easement-enabling statutes of the majority 
of states. To date, more than 28 states have adopted some version of their statutes based 
on the model provisions stipulated under UCEA,515 and this has become the main 
source for an individual state in drafting its law.516 However, the remaining states have 
developed their own rules for governing the creation of conservation easements (non-
UCEA states). Although such dissimilarities among the states in the USA may look 
messy, they create an opportunity to consider possible options and models of a CA to 
be developed for other jurisdictions. Also, they assist discussion on the strengths and 
weaknesses of the legal model representing each jurisdiction.  
Regarding the development of conservation easements in the USA, their emergence 
and popularity partly resulted from the difficulty in regulating the use of privately-
owned land as that is too politically unpalatable.517 Hence, the use of conservation 
easements, a low coercive approach, was employed in preference.518 Conservation 
easements originated from conservation practices by individuals and public authorities 
before there were general legal instruments in state statutes. The term ‘conservation 
easement’ was initially coined by William Whyte in his works, namely ‘Securing Open 
                                                     
513 Robert H Levin, A Guided Tour of the Conservation Easement laws (Land Trust Alliance 2010 
(updated 2014)) 5; K King Burnett, ‘The Uniform Conservation Easement Act: Reflections of a Member 
of the Drafting Committee’ (2013) Utah Law Review 773, 775. 
514 This term is used in Louisiana, the state where the legal system has been influenced by French law. 
Such a different legal background has influenced the term used, employing the term ‘servitude’ rather 
than ‘easement’ (A N Yiannopoulos, ‘Predial Servitudes; General Principles: Louisiana and 
Comparative Law’ (1968) 29 Louisiana Law Review 1, 12). 
515 Levin (n 513) 6. 
516 Cheever and McLaughlin (n 49) 117-118. 
517 Owley (n 29) 1098; Cantley (n 26) 216. 





Space of Urban America: Conservation Easements’519 and ‘The Last Landscape’.520 
His books argued for an alternative approach for privately-owned land conservation.521 
Conservation practice akin to the use of conservation easements can also be traced 
back to the use of public money to purchase easements to protect the land by the 
National Park Service during the 1930s and 1940s in Virginia, North Carolina, 
Mississippi, Alabama, and Tennessee.522 Then, many states started using conservation 
easements after the late 1950s.523 For example, California and New York introduced 
their conservation easement-enabling laws in 1959 and 1960, respectively. Also, forty 
states had enacted conservation easement-enabling statutes by 1979.524 The popularity 
of donating conservation easements over land also benefited from a tax incentive for 
the charitable gifts of conservation agreements introduced by the Internal Revenue 
Services in 1964.525 Then, this financial incentive gained legislative recognition under 
the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) s 170(h) in 1980.526 In 1981, after the Congress 
passed this law, the Uniform Law Commission held a national conference for drafting 
a model law.527 An outcome of this conference was the promulgation of UCEA, which 
has played a significant role in unifying the legal regime of land conservation by 
conservation easements mentioned above.  
Another point to be noted with the US legal model is about the legal landscape. Unlike 
those of Australia and the UK, conservation easements-enabling laws in the USA are 
comparatively complex due to the interaction between several statutes at the federal 
and state levels. Conservation easements can be made under federal and state laws to 
conserve features on the same parcel of property. Conservation easements under the 
federal regime can be made by an authorised body to serve a specific aim under a 
particular statute. Those under state statutes can be made between an owner of a 
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521 ibid 2-14. 
522 Cheever and McLaughlin (n 49) 117-118. 
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property and public authorities or qualified non-public bodies.528 This type of 
conservation easement will be the primary object of comparison in this chapter. 
Conservation easements made under the rules of federal and state laws are independent 
of each other. In the past, the court ruled that a conservation easement made under a 
specific federal law need not conform to any conservation easement law of the 
states.529  The reasons for this could be that, first, they were governed by different 
pieces of legislation. Second, a landowner may seek to make a conservation easement 
under a state-level statute, and simultaneously desire to ask for a tax benefit from the 
donation of this easement under the federal tax law.  
The significant number and variety of conservation easements in place in the USA 
under various statutes could make this study unreasonably complicated, therefore, this 
thesis will primarily examine some interesting points drawn from the UCEA and state 
statutes to see a range of options for the design of CA provisions. A range of state 
statutes enabling the creation of conservation easement is listed in the appendix of this 
thesis.530  
 
1.4 Concluding remarks 
The examination in the above sections suggests several points about the applicable 
terms, sources of law, as well as the legal background of CAs, which will be examined 
in depth in the latter parts. The first finding is about the variety of applicable terms of 
CAs used in the comparator jurisdictions. It illustrates how the law of each jurisdiction 
sets a primary purpose of CA implementation.531 A CA called a ‘biodiversity 
conservation agreement’ reflects that it is used for biodiversity conservation; while a 
CA which is called a ‘management agreement’ may indicate a broader purpose. Again, 
those ending with the word ‘agreement’ seem to be less formalised in legal form, since 
an agreement is commonly made under the concept of private law of contract. This 
might be in contrast to those called ‘easement,’ which reflects an arrangement which 
                                                     
528 See the legal consideration on who are entitled to hold conservation easements in part 4 below. 
529 See United States v Albrecht 496 F2d 906, 5th Cir (1974), where the court held that a conservation 
easement created by the US Fish and Wildlife Service under the Migratory Bird Hunting and 
Conservation Stamp Act 1934 has no need to comply with the laws of the states because it is an easement 
created under the federal scheme. 
530 The names of the state will be used to represent a full statute’s name in the following parts. 





is formalised and binding in the long-term. This explanation will be comprehensively 
discussed after the key features of each jurisdiction are examined in part 2.  
The second finding shows that CAs in all jurisdictions are an outcome of statutory 
intervention. Those jurisdictions have a certain type of the statute authorising the 
creation of CAs since CAs are unable to exist under traditional regimes.532 The crucial 
legal impediments are that, first, common law does not allow the creation of positive 
obligations running with the land.533 Second, the laws in some jurisdictions do not 
allow the creation of an easement or covenants unless there is another piece of land 
that is benefitting from the easement or covenant.534 Third, there is a need to limit the 
restrictions on land as an asset that can be freely used and transferred by the current 
owner.535 The laws enabling the creation of CAs can be nature conservation-related 
statutes or land and property-related statutes, and the names used in each law could 
reflect the different legal background of the fundamental legal context within which it 
is formulated.  The last observation is about the sources of CA-enabling laws. As it is 
impossible to examine all CA-enabling laws of each jurisdiction, the comparative 
study in the following parts is limited by focusing on some legislation representing the 
noteworthy legal characteristics in each comparator jurisdiction.  
 
2. The purposes for which a CA can be created 
The purposes for which a CA can be created is one of the crucial elements making 
CAs different from other VEAs examined in chapter 3. While the scope of VEAs can 
be to serve various ends relevant to the environment broadly, CAs exclusively entail 
the conservation of some features on land.536 This makes identifying the purposes and 
scope of a CA essential.  
This part examines the question of what aim a CA under each CA-enabling law seeks 
to achieve. The words ‘purpose’ and ‘aim’ are used interchangeably to provide the 
actions, scope of features or other elements for which CAs can be made. This part will 
emphasise the examination of the scope of CAs in three dimensions, comprising (1) 
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No 327 2011) para 3.4; Reid and Nsoh (n 17) 181-182. 
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the actions sought to be captured; (2) features to be conserved; (3) consideration about 
the public interest; as they are key components justifying how a CA is different from 
other voluntary tools.  
Various reasons support the importance of the investigation and comparison at this 
point. First, providing a range of scopes or purposes of CAs under a CA-enabling law 
would prevent misuse of a CA because it frames the activities for which a CA can be 
used.537 Setting a clear purpose for the implementation of this tool will also help shape 
the structure and features of the draft of a CA-enabling law during the drafting 
process.538 Second, the determination of the aims of implementing CAs will help this 
thesis identify the scope of the application of CAs in three jurisdictions. This 
characterisation could help to guide which specific form and purpose are appropriate 
for the development in Thailand. Third, it helps this study conclude whether each CA-
enabling law is created explicitly for biodiversity conservation or can be broadly used 
for conserving natural or human-made heritage on land. 
 
2.1 Australia 
Overall, the purposes of implementing CAs under the Commonwealth and state laws 
are defined clearly, and all of them are illustrative of CAs mainly used for the 
conservation of natural features.539  
The Commonwealth legislation is noteworthy in that it sets a prescriptive list of the 
features to be conserved. Such a list encompasses the conservation of several features, 
which include the world heritage values of designated World Heritage properties; the 
ecological character of a declared Ramsar wetland; the environment in a 
Commonwealth marine area; and the environment on Commonwealth land.540 
Biodiversity stewardship agreements in NSW illustrate CAs having a specific aim to 
establish a biodiversity stewardship site.541 Biodiversity conservation agreements in 
WA represent CAs having a wide range of application, which encompasses the 
                                                     
537 The Law Commission maintains this point that setting a clear purpose could prevent the emergence 
of unnecessary obligations (Law Commission (n 84) para 4.31). 
538 Green Balance, The Potential of Conservation Covenants (Report by Green Balance to the National 
Trust, Green Balance 2008) 18.  
539 BCA (NSW) 2016, s 1.3(j) and EPBCA 1999, s 3(2)(g)(ii). 
540 EPBCA 1999, s 304(1). 





mitigation of negative impacts or prevention of activities harming biodiversity 
components, as well as promoting biodiversity conservation.542 A biodiversity 
conservation covenant, on the other hand, can also be used for supporting scientific or 
public education purposes relating to the conservation, protection or management of 
biodiversity and its components on land.543   
Regarding the requirement of the public interest, Australian laws do not provide that 
CAs must have a common purpose of achieving public interest. However, this element 
is implicit as a matter of consideration, where qualified holders are considering 
whether the proposed CAs they seek to enter into serve a public benefit in conserving 
biodiversity.544   
 
2.2 UK 
Although developed from different backgrounds and implemented to serve various 
objectives, CA-enabling laws in the UK reflect some noteworthy features. First, some 
of them enable CAs for conserving or managing both natural heritage and cultural 
heritage (human-made features), as well as for a recreational purpose, subject to the 
details and requirements under individual statutes. Second, some of them provide the 
meaning of conservation worth discussing for legislative reform.  
Management agreements are representative of CAs that are mainly be implemented to 
conserve natural features. While some can be used to conserve or manage natural 
features or to establish some reserved areas,545 other statutes entitle competent bodies 
to conclude this type of agreement to conserve or manage the land for recreational 
purposes.546  Management agreements also illustrate a type of CA employing the 
words ‘conservation’, ‘restoration’, ‘protection’ and ‘management’ as the actions to 
be fulfilled. However, the provisions authorising the creation of management 
                                                     
542 BCA (WA), s 114(2). 
543 ibid s 122(1). 
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545 See CHSR 2017, reg 20, which entitles the competent bodies to enter into management agreements 
to manage, conserve, restore or protect a European site or the land adjacent to such a site. See also CA 
1968, s 15, which entitles the competent bodies to enter into SSSI agreements to conserve some special 
interest by reason of its flora, fauna, or geological or physiographical features. 
546 See NPACA 1949, ss 15 and 16(1), which allow the competent bodies to create management 
agreements to establish nature reserves for securing the land, to conserve flora, fauna or geological or 
physiographical features and to serve recreational purposes providing opportunities for the enjoyment 





agreements do not explicitly require the achievement of the public interest. Arguably, 
by conferring the power to create management agreements on specified public bodies 
it is implicit that these bodies are responsible for making management agreements 
exclusively for the circumstances allowed by authorising statutes, and this per se could 
satisfy the need to promote the public interest. 
Conservation burdens and conservation covenants have some features worth 
discussing together. First, they provide concise provisions enabling the designated 
bodies to use these CAs to conserve both natural and cultural heritage. Second, the 
achievement of the public interest is enunciated as an element of their implementation. 
Nonetheless, the text employed to deal with their implementation purposes is slightly 
different.  
The Scottish legislation articulates that conservation burdens can be made for the 
protection or preservation of special characteristics of natural features or architectural 
or historical characteristics on land.547 However, the legislation does not employ the 
word ‘conservation’ as a purpose of the implementation but rather uses the term 
‘protection’ and ‘preservation’. This could engender the question of whether the 
conservation bodies are entitled to make a conservation burden to restore or enhance 
natural features on land to increase the rate of biodiversity or not.  
Similarly, the Environment Bill proposes that conservation covenants can be 
implemented to conserve both natural and cultural features on land.548 However, the 
Environment Bill embraces the word ‘conservation’ as an overarching term to deal 
with those features. The term ‘conserving’ of something is also defined to include 
‘protecting, restoring and enhancing’ such a thing.549 Secondly, the Environment Bill 
considers the achievement of public good as a central element of conservation 
covenants, but this element is set as a matter for consideration before a qualified holder 
makes a decision whether to hold a conservation burden.550 
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Conservation easements created under state statutes have some standard features 
regarding the purposes of implementation. First, the majority of them commonly 
provide explicit purposes for their implementation. Second, while many states set the 
purposes for which a CA can be created similar to those of UCEA, some states do not.  
UCEA, as a model law for states, provides a wide range of possible purposes, for 
instance, to protect natural resources and to maintain or enhance air or water quality.551 
The range of possible purposes for the use of conservation easements under UCEA 
demonstrates that conservation easements can be used to conserve the environment 
whether in a natural state or as adapted by humans, for example, open space for people 
to enjoy.   
Currently, many state statutes adopt the purposes set out in UCEA to set their possible 
range of purposes. As summarised by Levin, conservation purposes stated in different 
state laws vary.552 Some states mention the purpose of protecting wildlife habitat and 
rare species.553 Some extend the conservation purposes to cover the preservation of 
palaeontological features (fossil animals and plants) found in real property.554 Some 
allow the purposes to include the improvement of silvicultural and horticultural use.555 
Some embrace the preservation and protection of traditional and family cemeteries.556 
Some further include assuring the availability of the property for educational use as 
one of their conservation objectives.557  
Regarding the requirement of serving the public interest, Maine obliges conservation 
easement creators to illustrate in the form of a statement how the purposes of a 
particular conservation easement will be achieved, and what conservation values and 
general public interest are intended to be served.558 Iowa sets a similar requirement of 
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551 UCEA, s 1(1). 
552 Levin (n 513) 9-10. 
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expressing the extent and purpose of an individual conservation easement.559  
Massachusetts and Nebraska recognise the need to take public interest into account 
when governmental bodies acquire, release or approve a conservation easement.560 
 
2.4 Discussions drawn from the variety of purposes for CA implementation  
The examination in the previous sections illustrates that every jurisdiction has legal 
provisions regarding the purpose of CA implementation. While some provide 
exhaustive details about actions to be fulfilled, features to be conserved and the 
requirement of the public interest, many do not. This conclusion can be further 
discussed in three aspects in light of the issues that should be developed further to 
secure natural features on land in Thailand, as seen below. 
2.4.1 Diversity of actions sought to be captured 
The above sections indicate that the comparator jurisdictions employ different styles 
in relation to the actions sought to be captured. The Commonwealth law of Australia 
relies on the words ‘protection and conservation’. The UK employs many words, 
including management, protection, preservation, enhancement and conservation. The 
USA uses a conservation easement to do many tasks, including to conserve, protect, 
preserve, maintain, retain and assure. Many CA-enabling laws separate the term 
‘protection, enhancement and restoration’ from the word ‘conservation’ but some of 
them use the term ‘conservation’ instead. This begs the question of how the term 
‘conservation’ is perceived, and whether its meaning covers other words used as the 
actions sought to be captured. As a handful of CA-enabling statutes provide the 
meaning of conservation in the context of CAs, the exploration of the meanings of 
‘conservation’ by the reviewing of literature should be made to fulfil this 
consideration.   
‘Conservation’ is one of the terms perceived and used by many writers and law-makers 
in different ways.561 Some use it as a catch-all term to describe many actions. As 
articulated by the World Commission on Environment and Development in 1986, and 
in the World Conservation Strategy drafted by the International Union for 
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Conservation of Nature (IUCN) in 1987, conservation is an umbrella term covering 
the actions of preservation, maintenance, sustainable utilisation, restoration and 
enhancement of the natural resources or the environment.562 Often, conservation is 
used alongside the word ‘nature’ or equivalent terms.563 Domestic laws of some 
jurisdictions defined the features of conservation under the range of actions articulated 
in the World Conservation Strategy.564 The merit of using the word ‘conservation’ of 
certain natural values may vary and is not limited to keeping them without disturbance 
(preservation). It may also involve the use of resources and maintenance or 
enhancement of their quality.565 Sometimes, the word conservation may include the 
protection of some values or characteristics with the aim to use them sustainably and 
efficiently in the future.566 In addition, the interpretation of the term conservation in 
some jurisdictions may go further and include the activities of enabling a natural 
process of some natural features to be continued.567 Another merit of the use of this 
term originates from its flexibility. The Law Commission maintains that the term 
conservation is a dynamic concept and depends on scientific discovery.568 The court 
in England affirms this characteristic that conservation could include the preservation 
of a dynamic process of soil erosion by the natural actions of the sea.569 The grounds 
for this explanation is that although such erosion causes negative impacts in the loss 
of natural features on a designated reserved area (SSSI), it might help human beings 
understand the changes in nature in the coming future.570  
This sub-section has no intention to argue that the term conservation is the most 
appropriate to use as a representative of actions to be fulfilled by CAs. Instead, it seeks 
to highlight the fragmentation and variation of the word conservation used in each 
jurisdiction and to review from the literature how far the term conservation can be 
interpreted or used. Hence, a country developing a CA framework should consider the 
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extent and scope of actions sought to be captured, whether it will use this word or other 
appropriate terms.   
2.4.2 Diversity of matters or values to be conserved 
The examination in previous sections illustrates the use of CAs to conserve different 
matters or values. While Australia tends to use CAs to conserve natural features,571 the 
UK and the USA employ this tool to conserve both natural and cultural heritage. This 
sub-section discusses what can be the advantages and disadvantages to use CAs to 
conserve both natural and cultural heritage?  
Some might maintain that CAs should be used only to conserve natural features 
because a narrow scope of purpose would make reasons for their use clear. Expanding 
the scope of CA implementation would require many bodies to manage this type of 
agreement because a nature conservation body may not have the capacity to protect 
historical or cultural features. In addition, extending the use of CAs to conserve 
cultural heritage might be impossible if the law authorising the creation of such CAs 
has limited scope for the protection of natural features. For instance, it is impossible 
to enter a conservation agreement to preserve an old building in a particular land under 
Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (EPBCA 1999) of 
Australia because the main objectives of this law are to protect and conserve natural 
features,572 and no provision of this legislation allows its use to preserve a historical or 
cultural site.573  
Nonetheless, others may argue, against the above view, that some cultural heritage 
should be conserved, and it is appropriate to conserve by CAs.574 It is possible that old 
buildings, created for a hundred years, are located in an area having no vegetation. The 
point might be that if buildings are not be conserved due to their human-made 
characteristic, the chance of retaining some valuable features for the next generations 
will not be supported. 
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573 The point to be noted here is that CAs cannot be made under EPBCA 1999 to conserve cultural 
heritage. 





Regarding the point whether a CA should be used to conserve human-made features, 
setting a broad purpose of application would encourage eligible people to conserve 
heritage on their land. This would also increase a chance of using CAs for various 
objects or values, and this could help promote the increase in co-regulation, where an 
individual or private entity takes part in the role of conservation under the law.575 Apart 
from that, some features may have a mixed character, for instance, traditional farming 
practices which maintain folk wisdom (which could generate lower environmental 
impacts per se). If a CA can be made only for conserving natural features, this practice 
would be beyond of the scope of the conservation by CAs. 
2.4.3 Public interest requirement 
The use of CAs to serve the public interest engenders several questions, and it is 
beyond the capacity of this thesis to consider all dimensions of public interest in 
relation to land-use regulation.576 This thesis mainly examines ‘should CA-enabling 
laws provide the requirement of public interest as part of their provisions?’ The 
investigation of this consideration would help clarify how far the laws of each 
jurisdiction emphasise any requirement for CAs to serve the public interest, which has 
been discussed in section 1.2 of chapter 2.    
Some might support that the public interest should be explicitly addressed as part of a 
provision in CA-enabling laws. The Law Commission argued for the articulation of 
this requirement in a CA-enabling law to prevent the inappropriate proliferation of 
CAs. At the same time, this could help balance the public interest against the private 
and voluntary nature of CAs.577 The existence of this requirement under the laws 
means that qualified holders are obligated to consider whether a CA they seek to make 
will generate or serve any benefit for society at large or not. This conforms to the view 
of those who support the application of the public interest theories, examined in 
chapter 2, that call on legislators to take account of whether a proposed regulatory tool 
would achieve a particular public interest or not.578 To serve this notion, setting a 
provision requiring the achievement of the public interest is necessary.  
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Nonetheless, some others might oppose providing the requirement of public interest 
due to the difficulty in considering whether there is an overall benefit to the public 
interest.579 Hence, it would make the creation of an individual CA difficult and reliant 
on the interpretation of the achievement of public interest. Additionally, management 
agreements in the UK exemplify CAs which satisfy the need to achieve a public 
interest indirectly.through the designation of public bodies as the only potential holders 
instead of providing an explicit legal requirement of this matter.580 
The difficulty in determining whether and how a particular CA can serve an overall 
benefit to the public interest, mentioned above, raises another discussion regarding the 
domination of the public interest over an individual interest. Reid observes that it is 
acceptable if a CA is created for achieving some public benefits, even though such a 
CA generates a private by-product.581 For instance, a farmer might be required by a 
CA not to use pesticides in a land plot adjacent to a river to avoid water contamination. 
Arguably, this could serve both the benefit to an individual who seeks to use water for 
a commercial purpose and the public as a whole where water in the river is free from 
pesticide. His view reflects the meaning of the word ‘interest’ through the lens on who 
obtains a particular benefit from CA implementation. K G C Reid explains this point 
by emphasising that a public benefit test can be achieved where it meets two 
conditions.582 First, a CA (conservation burden) must generate certain direct benefits 
from the preservation or protection activities emerging from such a conservation 
burden. Second, such the direct benefits must fall, wholly or mainly, to the public 
rather than to individuals.583 
The Law Commission argues that the words ‘public interest’ are not considering who 
would receive a specific benefit from the implementation of a CA, but rather a holistic 
concept. A CA can achieve a public benefit where such a CA can serve the general 
public wellbeing,584 and this value can be met regardless of whether ‘the public is able 
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to visit, to observe, or to touch what is being conserved’. In this sense, the terms ‘public 
interest’, ‘public benefit’ and ‘public good’ can be used interchangeably.585  
 
3. Eligible land 
The next issue is whether CAs should be available for all land, or qualifying land 
should be limited in some way.  This is connected with the issues of who can enter a 
CA586 and the types of obligations involved, as will be examined in the latter parts.587 
Admittedly, the term ‘eligible land’ can be viewed in various dimensions, and it is 
focused here in three aspects. The first considers whether the land is publicly-owned 
or privately-owned. The second examines the physical characteristics whether the land 
is covered in forest or forms wetland or water bodies. The third considers whether the 
land is used for agriculture or any other specific purpose. These three considerations 
should be investigated as they help uncover some findings which are relevant in view 
of the legal characteristics of land use in the Thai context, examined in chapter 4. The 
findings will be employed to further develop a legal proposal for Thailand in chapter 
6. This part mainly examines whether any of the comparator jurisdictions use any such 
categories to limit the land that is eligible for inclusion within a CA.  
 
3.1 Australia 
Overall, CAs in Australia can be made on both publicly- and privately-owned land, 
but the Commonwealth legislation also enables an eligible holder to create a 
conservation agreement on marine areas.588  
The administration of land owned and managed by the states or the Commonwealth 
government in Australia is vested on the notion of Crown land.589 In brief, the land 
which is unalienated to specific bodies or individuals is considered as Crown land.590 
This type of land is eligible for the creation of CAs under the conditions specified by 
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specific statutes. For instance, BCA 2016 of NSW maintains that CAs can be entered 
into by the public authorities who own, control or manage Crown land.591 One of the 
reasons supporting the protection of publicly-owned land by the use of CAs is that 
because this type of land accounts for nearly one-quarter of the country’s area.592 In 
NSW, for instance, over fifty percent of the land is Crown land.593 Therefore, it is not 
surprising that the Commonwealth government has concluded several CAs with state 
governments and regional councils, as explained in part 5.594  
It is to be noted that both the Commonwealth and state legislation commonly provide 
that the land to be created as CA land must not be a parcel notified or established as 
nature reserves. For instance, the proposed land for the establishment must not be 
reserved sites under of the National Parks and Wildlife Act 1974 or a flora reserve or 
special management zone595 under the legal regime of NSW, and must not cover all or 
part of the Commonwealth reserve under the Commonwealth regime.596 The possible 
explanation for this could be that because such designated land is under the protection 
of specific laws. The interaction between the application of CAs and the designations 
of land will be examined further in part 13 below.   
 
3.2 UK  
Unlike Australia, the CA-enabling laws in the UK do not clearly provide whether or 
not water bodies can be conserved by CAs. Specific legislation provides specific rules 
regarding eligible land subject to the purposes of the implementation of each type of 
CA. 
The legal regime for management agreements is noteworthy in that most of them are 
primarily created to conserve natural features on reserved areas or the land adjacent to 
such areas. Hence, several statutes provide that the eligible land must be a piece of 
land ‘notified as nature reserves’ or abutting such areas. For instance, the Conservation 
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of Habitats and Species Regulations 2017 (CHSR 2017) require that the land must 
form a part of a European site, or be adjacent to such a site.597 Similarly, CA 1968 
requires that the eligible land must be or form part of an SSSI.598 However, 
management agreements under Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 (WCA 1981) 
might be an exception to this position. They may be created on land which is not within 
or adjacent to a reserved area.599 For instance, they can be made for the protection of 
water supply on which the conservation site is dependent.600 
It should be noted that some statutes or funding programmes may provide additional 
conditions regarding eligible land. Management agreements administered by Scottish 
Natural Heritage under some specific schemes, for instance, require that eligible land 
must not be supported for conservation by other public funding programmes.601  
In contrast to management agreement authorising statutes, the laws authorising the 
creation of conservation burdens and conservation covenants does not require any 
specific characters of an eligible parcel of land. TC(S)A 2003 articulates that any land 
can be protected or conserved by this type of burden.602 Meanwhile, the Environment 
Bill provides that both freehold and a leasehold estate of more than seven years are 
eligible land for the creation of conservation covenants.603 
 
3.3 USA  
Overall, most of the conservation easement-enabling statutes in the USA provide no 
specific requirements about the characteristics or legal status of land or areas to be 
conserved by a conservation easement. Specific conditions of eligible areas are 
provided as part of the statutes authorising funding for a conservation easement under 
specific governmental programmes, for instance, under the Farm Bills 2014 and 2018, 
which are out of the scope of this study. This means that as a general rule the question 
of eligible areas is not a significant consideration of creating a conservation easement. 
However, qualification of land to be conserved might be considered from the types of 
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conservation purposes. For example, the land eligible to create an open space should 
be land that the public can access and use. A conservation easement created for the 
protection of wetlands should be land that is a wetland itself.604 
 
3.4 An analysis  
As observed from earlier sections, the types of land can be viewed with different 
criteria, ranging from its ownership status, physical features and purposes of the use, 
and the comparing jurisdictions provide different provisions about those 
characteristics. Eligible land under the Commonwealth legislation of Australia can be 
terrestrial or maritime areas, and the former can be in either public or private hands. 
Some of the management agreements in the UK are limited to designated nature 
reserves, whereas conservation easement-enabling statutes in the USA do not require 
any specific features. It is worthwhile to discuss the benefits and drawbacks of such 
variety of legal features in the following considerations. 
3.4.1 Private and public ownership 
The laws in some jurisdictions clearly provide that the eligible land can be in the hands 
of public authorities or individuals, but many others do not provide any rules regarding 
this legal matter.  Such an ambiguity raises the question whether or not land owned by 
public bodies should be included in the qualified land.  
On the one hand, every piece of land should be conserved by CAs regardless of who 
owns them. Conserving the habitats of bees, a creature that helps in the pollination of 
flowers, could help maintain an ecosystem service of pollination regardless of where 
their honeycombs exist.605 Apart from that, not all publicly-owned land is notified as 
a nature reserve, and human activities may similarly threaten this non-nature reserve 
in the same vein as on the privately-owned property. For these reasons, publicly-owned 
land should be eligible for protection by this voluntary tool in a similar vein as 
privately-owned land.  
                                                     
604 Though silent in the conservation easement-enabling laws of most states, various specific 
qualifications of land are required under the law which funds a conservation easement concluded for 
specific aims (see Food Security Act 1986, s 1265C, amended by the Agriculture Improvement Act of 
2018 (Farm Bill 2018)). 
605 This idea lies behind payments for ecosystem services as observed by Reid and Nsoh: ‘Payment for 
ecosystem services (PES) is based on the recognition that land left in an undeveloped state is not actually 
unproductive, as it is often perceived, but is providing a range of services of great practical, economic 





On the other hand, some might argue that the management of publicly-owned land is 
different from the land under the ownership of individuals. Some types of land, owned 
by public bodies, are restricted by the law authorising the management of such land. It 
means that some of them may be ineligible because of the legal restrictions by other 
laws managing the land. As will be seen in part 13 below, it is necessary to consider 
the compatibility of a CA-enabling law and other existing laws. Setting a strong 
argument that all land parcels are eligible might be unwelcome.   
3.4.2 Physical aspect of eligible land 
The Commonwealth law of Australia, recognising the use of CAs to conserve marine 
areas, illustrates an exceptional case in implementing CAs to conserve areas other than 
land. This raises the question of what are the advantages and disadvantages of 
implementing a CA to protect features in water areas and marine areas. Although land, 
water and marine areas are parts of Earth’s surface, and several domestic laws 
recognise the rights to use and impose the duty to conserve them, the legal regimes 
governing these areas are different.606 Most jurisdictions consider that either 
individuals or public bodies can own land and real property thereon. This is not the 
case for water areas where the identification of who owns them is more complex and 
challenging to regulate,607 including recognition of different rights over rivers and 
lakes and their beds, and uses (e.g. fishing). Apart from that, where the areas in 
consideration are marine, various factors create complexities in regulating such 
areas.608 The complexity might be exacerbated by the fact that some watercourses run 
through several States.609 It means that where a CA-enabling law seeks to conserve 
water areas and marine areas, some specific provisions that reflect the rights of people 
who are involved should be made. This reflects that the challenging issues in 
implementing a CA to cover places other than the land might increase the complexity 
of the legal regime in administering a CA. The Commonwealth law of Australia deals 
                                                     
606 Reid, Nature Conservation Law (n 35) para 1.7.2; Rodgers, Law of Nature Conservation (n 493) 241. 
607 See Craig Anthony Arnold, ‘Sustainable Webs of Interests: Property in an Interconnected 
Environment’ in David Grinlinton and Prue Taylor (eds), Property Rights and Sustainability: The 
Evolution of Property Rights to Meet Ecological Challenges (Martinus Nijhoff 2011) 171–72, 179. 
608 See other difficulties in regulating marine biodiversity in Colin T Reid, ‘Protection of Sites’ in Lees 
and Viñuales (n 3) 848-49; Lynda M Warren, ‘Law and Policy for Marine Protected Areas’ in 
Christopher P Rodgers (ed), Nature Conservation and Countryside Law (University of Wales Press 
1996) 69–7. 
609 See the definition of ‘international watercourse’ in Article 2 (b) of the Convention on the Law of the 
Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses (adopted 21 May 1997, entered into force 17 





with this challenge by setting the broad purposes of implementation, as observed in 
section 2.1 above. 
Nevertheless, this might be problematic in other jurisdictions where the proposed aims 
of CA implementation are limited to the conservation of features on land, and the main 
target participant is a landowner. Hence, setting the scope of CA implementation to 
the conservation of features on land by a landowner could help to avoid complexity in 
the governing regime, and the extension of the scope of an eligible area to water areas 
might be out of the capacity of a private law instrument. However, such an extension 
might look attractive in broadening the scope of CA implementation if there are 
identifiable holders of relevant rights to be limited.   
3.4.3 Land categorised by the purpose of the use 
As observed above, the UK statutes, which allow the creation of management 
agreements for nature reserves, exemplify the CA-enabling laws setting a legal 
requirement regarding the types of land use. This example engenders a discussion 
about the advantages and disadvantages of providing the requirement of land-use 
patterns. As observed in the previous chapter, one of the considerations to be taken 
into account when governments seek to introduce a voluntary environmental 
agreement is the amount of uptake (numbers of participants).610 If the eligible land is 
narrowly defined, for example, the land must be native woodland with an area at least 
100 acres, the pieces of land qualifying under this condition are likely be limited, and 
for these it remains uncertain how many of the landowners will be interested in 
entering into this CA scheme. However, providing a specific qualification of land 
might look attractive in some situations. First, it might be appropriate where a law-
maker seeks to introduce a CA as a supplementary tool of C&C regulation. 
Management agreements seeking to establish a nature reserve in the UK are illustrative 
of CAs introduced to serve as a supplementary tool of the designation of natural areas 
under nature conservation law regime in the UK. Second, it might be desirable where 
a prospective holder can predict that the amount of uptake will be high and requiring 
a specific qualification of land would make the uptake manageable.   
 
                                                     






The considerations regarding the actors involved in CA implementation can be 
examined in various aspects.611 This part entails an examination of who can be 
designated by the law as CA holders. The term ‘holder’ is used as meaning the party 
to whom the landowners (or other burdened landholders) owe obligations. A CA-
enabling law generally designates a holder (a qualified holder) for two reasons; (1) to 
enter into a CA with a landowner,612 and (2) to hold the benefits or enforce an 
obligation arising from such a CA. 
The overarching question will be split into three sub-questions. The first is whether 
each jurisdiction has provisions concerning who can be responsible for concluding a 
CA with a landholder. The second entails the investigation of whether non-
governmental organisations or institutions are eligible to play this function. The last 
one considers whether the laws of the comparator jurisdictions provide any rules 
regarded as a back-up holder, where a new body becomes a CA holder where the 
situations stipulated in a CA-enabling law arise. 
The examination in this matter is essential to the understanding of CAs from the aspect 
of environmental regulation. This examination will uncover whether the law views a 
CA as a mere conservation tool of government or as a means of encouraging public 
participation where non-governmental bodies can come into play.
613
 The investigation 
in this part is also linked to matters discussed in later parts, e.g. considerations about 
overseeing compliance as well as the registration of CAs, as will be examined in parts 
10 and 12.614 
 
4.1 Australia 
Overall, CA laws in Australia designate specific public bodies to be the qualified 
holder. At a national level, EPBCA 1999 vests the power on the Minister for the 
Environment (the Minister).615 This is slightly different from the regime in NSW 
                                                     
611 Another consideration to be investigated is that about burdened landholders in part 5 below. 
612 The word ‘landowner’ in this part includes an owner or possessor of a piece of land who is proposing 
to sign a CA or persons who are eligible to fulfil a CA’s obligation. The detail of this term will be 
discussed in part 5 below.   
613 The wider issue of public oversight and participation is dicussed in section 12.4 below. 
614 In Law Commission (n 45) the point about public oversight was examined as part of the consideration 
of responsible bodies. However, this thesis does not follow that approach, and seeks to study the point 
about public oversight and monitoring compliance separately.  





where the power is vested in two public bodies according to the type of CA.616 The 
Minister for the Environment (the Minister of NSW) and the Biodiversity 
Conservation Trust (BCT) are entitled to decide whether a certain type of privately-
owned land conservation agreement will be made between NSW Government and 
eligible landowners or not.617 Similarly, WA sets certain public bodies who are entitled 
to enter into a CA under BCA 2016 (WA). The Minister is entitled to create a 
biodiversity conservation agreement, and the CEO of the Department of the Public 
Service 618 is authorised to create a biodiversity conservation covenant.619 However, 
the laws in Australia do not provide for a holder of last resort. The possible reasons for 
this could be that: the power to create and hold a CA is exclusively reserved for certain 
public bodies, not a non-public one, and such bodies can work and administer a CA 
continually. Hence, there is no need to set this provision.  
 
4.2 UK  
Similar to Australia, all CA-enabling laws in the UK designate specific public bodies 
as a qualified holder. Some of them also entitle specified non-governmental bodies to 
be an eligible holder. However, none of them have any provision on a holder of last 
resort.    
The statutes authorising the creation of management agreements confer the power to 
create this type of agreement on various governmental bodies, specifically those 
having primary functions in relation to conservation. However, local authorities can 
be a holder under some specific statutes. The crucial statutory conservation bodies 
eligible to conclude management agreements under various statutes are Natural 
England (NE), Natural Resources Wales (NRW), and Scottish Natural Heritage 
(SNH).620 Some statutes, for instance, WCA 1981, confer the power on local planning 
                                                     
616 In brief, the process of creation of a CA in NSW involves discussion of the draft CA between the 
Office of Environment and Heritage (on behalf of the Minister for the Environment) and an eligible 
landholder. A draft CA is usually jointly developed and produced and agreed as a final document 
(Office of Environment and Heritage, ‘Conservation Agreement’ 
<www.environment.nsw.gov.au/cpp/ConservationAgreements.htm> accessed 14 May 2020).  
617 BCA 2016 (NSW), ss 5.5, 5.21 (2) and 5.27. 
As authorised by BCA, the Biodiversity Conservation Trust (BCT) plays both administrative and 
contracting-party roles regarding private land conservation agreements. Its functions include providing 
assistance and education to landholders who propose to enter into agreements with BCT (BCA 2016 
(NSW), s 10.5(1)). 
618 The term CEO under BCA 2016 (WA) means the Chief Executive Officer of the Department of the 
Public Service, stipulated under Conservation and Land Management Act 1984 (WA).  
619 BCA 2016 (WA), ss 114 and 122. 





authorities of each region where they seek to conserve or enhance the natural beauty 
or amenity of any land or promote its enjoyment by the public.621 
The legal techniques used for the creation of conservation burdens and conservation 
covenants employ a similar approach. Both of them set the specified conservation 
bodies as a default eligible holder.622 However, local authorities and non-governmental 
organisations are eligible to be a qualified holder where they are designated by the 
Scottish Ministers (for conservation burdens) and the Secretary of State (for 
conservation covenants) subject to the conditions stipulated in TC(S)A 2003 and 
Environment Bill.623 The Environment Bill allows local authorities and other bodies 
to be a qualified holder (designated bodies). However, the designation as a qualified 
holder might subsequently be revoked where certain conditions have been met.624  
Although the provision about the holder as a last resort does not expressly appear in 
those statutes implemented in the UK, TC(S)A 2003 provides a flexible rule akin to a 
holder of last resort. This legislation lays down the rule that where a holder can no 
longer hold a conservation burden, or where it is removed by the Scottish Ministers 
from the list of conservation bodies,625 the right to a conservation burden can be 
assigned or transferred to any designated conservation body or to the Scottish 
Ministers.626  
 
4.3 USA  
Unlike Australia and the UK, the US laws employ a different approach in dealing with 
a qualified holder. A general rule is that non-public bodies are entitled to be a qualified 
holder where they meet a qualification specified under each state law.627  
The majority of the conservation easement state statutes in the USA employ similar 
language regarding the eligibility of qualified holder, but some details vary. UCEA 
offers guidance that eligible holders might be governmental bodies authorised by state 
                                                     
621 WCA 1981, s 39(1) and (5)(c).  
622 The Scottish Ministers are set as a qualified holder for holding conservation burdens under TC(S)A 
2003, s 38(1), and the Secretary of State is set as the qualified holder for conservation covenants under 
the Environment Bill, cl 104(1). 
623 TC(S)A 2003, s 38(4)(5)(7); Environment Bill, cl 104. 
624 Environment Bill, cl 104. 
625 TC(S)A 2003, s 38(7). 
626 ibid s 39. 
627 In practice, non-public bodies play a significant role in conserving private-owned land by 
employing conservation easements (Cheever and McLaughlin (n 49) 109). See also NCED, ‘Profile: 
Easement Holder Type and Access Status by State’ <www.conservationeasement.us/state-profiles/> 





or federal laws to hold an interest in real property; quasi-governmental bodies or non-
governmental bodies; and entities who possess the third-party right of enforcement.628  
The rule of each state is similar to that spelt out by UCEA, but many of them elaborate 
the qualifications of eligible holders in slightly different ways. Most conservation 
easement-enabling statutes allow relevant or authorised governmental bodies at both 
federal and state levels to hold conservation easements. Some states, for instance North 
Carolina, broadly allow state agencies, counties and cities to be a holder.629 There is 
an exception in New Mexico which does not allow governmental bodies to be qualified 
holders.630 
Regarding the qualifications of non-governmental bodies, various state statutes require 
non-governmental bodies to have their operating purposes in conserving certain 
features. For example, Rhode Island permits a charitable corporation, association, 
trust, or other entity to hold conservation easements if their purposes relate to the 
conservation of land or water areas or of a particular area.631 Iowa and Michigan are 
the exceptions for this because qualified holders are not required to have conservation-
related purposes.632 Some states, including California and Oregon, enable some 
specified native tribes to hold conservation easements.633 Some states specifically 
require that eligible non-governmental organisations must be non-profit bodies or 
charitable trusts. Some others, including Colorado, allow for-profit organisations to be 
eligible to be a holder if they have at least one of their purposes relating to 
conservation.634  
Another point to be examined is about a holder of last resort or a backup holder. This 
type of holder is created from the notion that perpetual conservation easements might 
be in danger of being abandoned where a non-public holder ceases to exist or 
dissolves.635 Hence, some provision should be made to tackle this problem by allowing 
the transfer of a conservation easement to a new holder. Pennsylvania provides that 
where a holder ceases to exist or dissolves, and there is no a willing successive holder, 
the municipality where the burdened property locates shall automatically become a 
                                                     
628 UCEA, s 1(2). 
629 North Carolina, s 121-35(2).  
630 New Mexico, s 47-12-2. 
631 Rhode Island, s 34-39-3. 
632 Iowa, s 457A.8; Michigan, s 324.2141. 
633 California, s 815.3(C); Oregon, s 271.715(3)(c). 
634 Colorado, s 38-30.5-104(2). 
635 Levin (n 513) 40; Jeff Pidot, Reinventing Conservation Easements (Policy Focus Report): A 





successive holder.636 This position is similar to that of Virginia where the Virginia 
Outdoors Foundation will automatically hold such a conservation easement unless the 
instrument creating the easement otherwise provides for its transfer to some other 
holder or public body.637  
 
4.4 An analysis  
The examination of the three previous sections indicates that CA-enabling laws mainly 
designate specific public bodies to be a qualified holder. The role of non-governmental 
bodies, as a qualified holder, is apparent in some legislation, mainly in the USA. This 
reflects that governments play a vital role in environmental governance through the 
use of CAs. The points to be discussed below involve the role of non-governmental 
bodies as qualified holders, the approaches in designating eligible holders and holders 
of last resort. These discussions would suggest which approach might be suitable for 
Thailand and demonstrate how relevant actors come into play in the governance of 
CAs. 
4.4.1 Advantages and disadvantages of designating of non-governmental bodies  
The designation of non-governmental bodies as a qualified holder in the US laws and 
some laws in the UK can be discussed from many angles, including the advantages 
and disadvantages of designating non-governmental bodies to be an eligible holder. 
The advantages can be argued on several grounds. In the first place, allowing non-
governmental bodies to be a qualified holder is an opportunity to promote governance 
by multiple players, in keeping with the global trend, which supports the management 
of natural resources using public-private participation.638 Second, there is a witness 
from the success of other conservation schemes that some non-governmental bodies 
are in the position to raise funds for implementing conservation schemes akin to CA 
implementation.639 This upside indicates that non-governmental bodies could acquire 
                                                     
636 Pennsylvania, s 5054(d). 
637 Virginia, s 10.1-1015. 
638 This notion can be seen from the international consensus found in Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration 
on Environment and Development, which declares that all States should encourage public participation 
in environmental issues.   
639 This example can be observed from a conservation campaign running by the World Land Trust, a 
non-governmental conservation body based in the UK. This organisation uses funds from donations to 
buy land and support a local partner to manage the land by adopting a conservation method suitable 
for each area. See World Land Trust, ‘Land Purchase’ <www.worldlandtrust.org/what-we-do/how-





the funds from donation to encourage CA implementation if they are allowed to be a 
qualified holder. Third, the members of some of the non-governmental bodies can be 
those living in the local areas where CAs are sought to be implemented.640 Thus, it is 
likely that members of this type of body may have the capacity to encourage 
landowners to enter into a CA as well as encourage and help them to look after the 
burdened land better than that by a governmental body.641 To exclude such a non-
governmental body from being a CA holder may lose the opportunity to make the best 
protection of land or natural resource management.642  
Nevertheless, allowing non-governmental bodies to hold a CA could have some 
danger. This includes the emergence of complexity in the rules in determining and 
governing non-governmental actors,643 and what to do when they can no longer hold a 
CA. Another danger could be concern over the achievement of public interest, 
accountability and transparency of a CA held by this type of holder.644 There might be 
problems on how to investigate the transparency of their work.645 It means that some 
additional governing rules must be added where the law makes those bodies holders. 
The justification of public spending could also be questioned where governments use 
public money to support non-governmental bodies.  
4.4.2 Benefits and drawbacks of setting specified eligible holders  
Another consideration extracted from the comparative study is about the approach to 
providing a range of qualified holders. The laws in place in Australia and management 
agreement-authorising statutes confer the power to make a CA on specified and fixed 
governmental bodies. The US laws and those authorising the creation of conservation 
burdens and conservation covenants in the UK represent another approach by allowing 
                                                     
640 The Woodland Trust, the largest woodland conservation charity in the UK, can be an example of 
non-governmental bodies having its members in local areas. Its membership of around 2,600 volunteers 
can conserve sites under the management of Woodland Trust in various ways, including giving scientific 
information to people in communities and carrying out management tasks. See Woodland Trust, 
‘Volunteer with us’ <www.woodlandtrust.org.uk/support-us/act/volunteer-with-us/#> accessed 14 May 
2020. 
641 See also the opinion of the Environment Bank, the Central Association for Agricultural Valuers and 
Professor Hodge in Law Commission (n 45) paras 4.42, 4.45 - 4.47. 
642 See the arguments made in Reid and Nsoh (n 17) 188; and that of the Environment Bank in Law 
Commission (n 45) para 4.45. 
643 Adina Merenlender and others ‘Land Trusts and Conservation Easements: Who is Conserving What 
for Whom?’ (2004) 18 Conservation Biology 65, 75; Jessica Owley, ‘Neoliberal Land Conservation 
and Social Justice’ (2012) 1 IUCN Academy of Environmental Law e-Journal 6, 9. 
644 Reid, ‘The Privatisation of Biodiversity?’ (n 493) 225. 





those who are qualified to be a holder subject to the rules specified in each particular 
statute. This finding raises the discussion about the advantages and disadvantages in 
designating specified and fixed bodies as a qualified holder.   
The obvious advantage is that it makes the legal structure of a CA-enabling law not 
too complicated. It is clear that the prescribed bodies under the law are entitled to hold 
a CA, and others are not. Additionally, the model of providing a specified eligible 
holder is convenient to monitor those who hold CAs.  
Nevertheless, some disadvantages should be considered. Providing specified and fixed 
bodies reflects environmental regulation exclusively operating by a limited group of 
eligible bodies. Assuming that only the Minister for the Environment is entitled to do 
this task, there is no opportunity for other actors to be a holder, even though such a 
body could look after a CA better than the Minister.646 Such a single holder could be 
problematic in monitoring the compliance of a burdened landowner who has property 
in a remote area. It is also at risk of becoming out-of-date,647 where the qualified 
holders in the list have changed their tasks of operation. These disadvantages could 
demotivate a potential landowner to enter into a CA. One of the possible means in 
resolving these problems can be observed from the laws authorising the creation of 
conservation burdens and conservation covenants in the UK. They set specified 
governmental bodies as a qualified holder but allow such bodies to designate other 
appropriate bodies as a qualified holder, as observed in section 4.2 above. 
4.4.3 Holders of last resort 
The last point to be discussed is about the need for having the provision of holders of 
last resort or backup holders. As mentioned in the earlier paragraph, this kind of holder 
is exclusively found in the USA and the Scottish legislation. The need for this type of 
provision stems from the attempt to avoid the risk of having an abandoned 
conservation easement where a holder no longer exists or is unable to hold a 
conservation easement.648  
                                                     
646 Hodge commented on the Law Commission Report on this point that, in some cases, non-
governmental bodies may be in a better position to hold a CA, as they are in a position to manage the 
resources efficiently (for example water companies) (see Law Commission (n 45) para 4.47). 
647 Reid and Nsoh (n 17) 188. 





On the one hand, setting a backup holder could help ensure that where one holder can 
no longer hold or look after a CA, other eligible entities can help continue this task.
649
 
This would prevent the occurrence of an orphaned CA,650 where there would be a risk 
of non-compliance and no monitoring or assurance that the conservation ends would 
be achieved.  
On the other hand, the dangers of setting a legal provision for a backup holder could 
be that first, it could make the governing rule of CA governance too complicated.651 
This can be observed from the opinion of Trowers and Hamlin LLP given in the Law 
Commission Report that “the rules that apply to the disposition of other interests in 
land should apply to the benefit of covenants about conservation”.
 652
 It might also 
look unnecessary where an eligible holder is exclusively reserved for a fixed 
governmental body with less chance of it ceasing to exist or collapsing.
653
 Another 
negative point could be that it could be inconsistent to the voluntary character of a CA 
where a certain body is required to take over an abandoned CA involuntarily, and this 
could impose a disproportionate burden in overseeing CAs on the bodies, who are 
designated to be this kind of holder.
654
   
 
5. Burdened landholders  
Although CAs mainly impose obligations running with the land on landowners, CA-
enabling laws may provide further that those other than the owners are bound in CA 
obligations. This part will primarily examine who are the persons that CA-enabling 
laws require to be bound with the obligations agreed with a holder? The words 
‘burdened landholder’ is used here as any person bound to fulfil an obligation on the 
land conserved by CAs.655 Landowners are in the primary position to enter into a CA 
with a qualified holder and become burdened landholders. A standard feature of CAs 
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652 Law Commission (n 45) para 4.70. 
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654 Law Commission (n 45) para 4.76. 
655 This attribute results from a common feature of CAs, which runs with the land and binds a future 





which run with the land means that the future landowners are also bound to fulfil CA 
obligations as burdened landholders even if they did not enter into the CA.656  
This examination should be investigated separately because CAs impose obligations 
on burdened landholders regardless of whether such persons voluntarilily enter into 
CAs, and it is necessary to consider who is this type of person under the laws of each 
jurisdiction. This point is also linked to other considerations, including those 
concerning the nature of the obligation and enforcement for the breach of obligations 
in parts 6 and 8. Without an examination of this matter, the investigations in other 
considerations would accordingly be problematic.657 
 
5.1 Australia 
Overall, the legal approach articulating who are burdened landholders under the 
Commonwealth law is slightly different from those of NSW and WA. While the laws 
of NSW and WA clearly state that landowners can be bound in CAs, the legal approach 
used for providing burdened landholders under the Commonwealth law is broader, 
including those who have rights affecting the features and value to be conserved.658 
The Commonwealth legislation provides that where a conservation agreement is 
proposed to conserve or protect the natural features on land, eligible persons could also 
be an indigenous person where those people have a usage right relating to the land.659 
This additional clause seeks to recognise the native title of indigenous people which 
stems from the traditional laws and customs of indigenous people rather than being 
recognised by a statute.660 It is important to note that in practice, the Commonwealth 
government has created conservation agreements with several public bodies or 
entities.661 According to an online database of the Commonwealth government, the 
                                                     
656 As will be seen in part 10 below, several CA-enabling laws generally set the provision that a CA has 
a legal effect of binding successor landowners (or occupiers) when it is registered.   
657 For instance, if there is no clear statement of who is bound to comply with an obligation in an 
individual CA, the issues who will be forced to comply where a breach of obligation happens (in part 
9) and who is eligible to modify a CA (in part 12) will be unclear.  
658 See the list of features or values to be conserved by conservation agreements in EPBCA 1999, s 305. 
659 ibid. 
660 The milestone of the recognition of native title and indigenous land rights can be traced back to the 
tension arising from the notion of terra nullius before 1992 and the recognition of native title in Mabo 
v Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1. See also Bates (n 7) 663. 
661 These include the Conservation Agreement for the protection and conservation of Lowland 
rainforest of subtropical Australia at Palmview in Queensland and the Conservation Agreement for the 
protection and conservation of the Grey-headed Flying-fox (Pteropus poliocephalus) at Batemans Bay 





government has signed several conservation agreements with both state governments 
and regional councils.662 However, the agreements do not clearly provide whether or 
not such state governments and regional councils entered into the agreements as an 
owner or holder of the land subject to the agreements. 
Unlike EPBCA 1999, the regimes applied in NSW and WA explicitly specify persons 
who can enter into a CA. In NSW, landowners or public authorities who manage the 
Crown land are eligible to enter into private land conservation agreements with a 
designated holder.663 In WA, burdened landholders on a biodiversity conservation 
agreement are reserved for the owner and occupier of proposed land.664 The legal 
approach for a biodiversity conservation covenant, which is more formal in character, 
is reserved for a landowner.665 Again, the public authority is treated as a landowner for 
Crown land if such an authority is in charge of caring for, controlling or managing the 
land.666 
 
5.2 UK  
Similar to Australia, CA-enabling statutes in the UK generally provide who can be 
burdened landholders, but the language employed by particular statutes is different. 
Management agreement and conservation covenant-authorising statutes share various 
standard features, while TC(S)A 2003, which is the source of conservation burdens, 
has a unique approach.    
The common feature of management agreements and conservation covenants 
authorising statutes is that landowners could be a burdened landholder.667 However, 
some of them allow landowners, lawful occupiers of the land and tenants of land to 
enter into CAs with qualified holders.
668
 Apart from that most of them clearly provide 
that CAs impose obligations running with the land, and bind a successor in title. For 
example, CHSR 2017 and NERCA 2006669 employ similar language that a 
                                                     
<www.environment.gov.au/protection/environment-assessments/conservation-agreements> accessed 
14 May 2020.  
662 A full version of this Agreement can be accessed from Department of the Environment and Energy, 
ibid. 
663 BCA 2016 (NSW), s 5.9(2). 
664 ibid s 114(1). 
665 ibid ss 122(1) and 129. 
666 ibid s 5. 
667 For example, see CHSR 2017, reg 20(6); NERCA 2006, s 7(6), Environment Bill, cl 102. 
668 CA 1968, s 15. 





management agreement binds persons deriving title under or from the person with 
whom the appropriate nature conservation body makes the agreement.670  
In contrast to management agreements, TC(S)A 2003 does not state who can enter a 
conservation burden with a holder. However, the Act generally provides that real 
burdens, which include a conservation burden, can be granted only by or on behalf of 
the owner of the land, which is to be the burdened property.671 This binds a future 
landowner.  
 
5.3 USA  
Conservation easement-enabling statutes in the USA employ a similar approach to 
those of Australia and the UK in that all of them entitle an owner of real property to 
create conservation easements.  
Although UCEA does not state who can be a burdened landholder, the legal content 
found in ss 2(d) and 3(a)(1) implies that a landowner can create and will be bound by 
conservation easements. Several UCEA states also employ a similar language.  
The language used for this matter in non-UCEA states is varied. Kansas states that a 
conservation easement may be created only by an owner of the surface of the land.672 
This is similar to Colorado, where the law explicitly states that owners of the land or 
the water or water right are entitled to create a conservation easement.673 Illinois 
broadens burdened landholders to a contract purchaser, a lessee, and a life tenant.674  
 
5.4 An analysis 
5.4.1 Burdened landholders from the dimension of the types of land-related 
rights 
One of the findings from the previous sections illustrates that the laws in some 
jurisdictions clearly provide who are the burdened landholders, but some others do not. 
                                                     
670 CHSR 2017, reg 20(4). 
671 TC(S)A 2003, s 4(2)(b). 
672 Kansas, s 58-3811(a). 
673 Colorado, s 38-30.5-104. 
It is important to note that the legal regime of water rights of Colorado is unique as this state developed 
its own rule, namely the Colorado Doctrine. This Doctrine entitles an eligible person to own water rights 
(see Charles E Gast, ‘Colorado Doctrine of Riparian Rights and Some Unsettled Questions’ (1898) 8 
Yale Law Journal 71). This could be one of the reasons explaining why an owner of water rights is 
explicitly spelt out as one of a person eligible to be a burdened landholder.  





Several CA-enabling laws explicitly state that landowners are eligible to be burdened 
landholders, and some others allow land tenants or other persons who have property 
rights affecting the management of property to do the same task.
675
 This finding raises 
the question ‘should persons other than a landowner be entitled to be a burdened 
landholder?’ The answer to this question would help elaborate the scope of burdened 
landholders for the Thai context, where land can be publicly-owned and privately-
owned with a complicated regime. 
As all CA-enabling laws entitle a landowner to be a burdened landholder, this 
discussion should start from what are the reasons for this? The primary justification 
could be that a CA is primarily created to conserve some features on land, and the 
landowner is the person who has an absolute right over such land or property.676 Thus, 
they should be in an appropriate position to decide whether to enter into a CA, and it 
is sensible to confer this right on them since a CA imposes obligations against the right 
to enjoy ownership on the property.  
However, some CA-enabling laws confer the right to create a CA on a holder of other 
property rights, including water, mineral, hunting rights, and the holders of these type 
of right might be affected by CA implementation. For example, a person having fishing 
right over water bodies might be restricted or prohibited from fishing as a result of a 
CA burden to maintain the population of fish in a particular area. This gives rise to the 
question of whether other owners of these types of property rights should be eligible 
to create and be bound by a CA. This discussion considers the case of water rights as 
a representative of subsidiary rights that can be held separately from the land.677  
                                                     
675 This thesis acknowledges that there are some differences in the recognition of land-related rights 
between different jurisdictions and legal systems. For instance, there is a meaningful difference between 
common law and civil law property systems due to the fact that common law systems generally do not 
have a unitary concept of ownership (which means that it may be easier to recognise holders of rights 
other than full ownership as able to burden land). The variety of approaches in recognising such rights 
might suggest that different underlying frameworks will be able to accommodate different parties being 
bound by CAs in different ways.  The purpose of this sub-section is to provide a more general discussion 
about the benefits and drawbacks in recognising different kinds of land-right holder as being eligible to 
be burdened landholders, without full examination of different conceptions of ownership .  
676 This is because a landowner holds ownership on land, and ownership is the most extensive right in 
respect of an item of property. See C G Van der Merwe, Marius Johannes De Waal, The Law of Things 
and Servitudes (Butterworths 1993) para 9; Simon Gardner and Emily MacKenzie, An Introduction to 
Land Law (4th edn, Bloomsburry 2015) 201; Reid, Nature Conservation Law (n 35) para 5.1.6. 
677 The reason for making use water rights as an example is because it is mentioned in various 





The starting-point here is the notion that in the countries employing the riparian 
doctrine, a person having ownership of land may hold a riparian right678 and other 
types of water rights.679 These water rights,680 arguably, are not part of land ownership 
per se, and they are governed by different rules. Some state laws in the USA are an 
example of the jurisdiction officially recognising water right holders to be eligible to 
create a conservation easement.681 One of the advantages of setting a clear provision 
endorsing owners of other interests in real property can be that it would increase the 
chance of using a CA to protect a watercourse, surface runoff and groundwater. To 
provide such a clear provision could be helpful because it extends CAs to persons who 
hold water rights but do not own a piece of land, specifically the locals who live in an 
upstream river for the  conservation of water for ecological reasons. However, there 
might need to provide a clear condition on what types of interest in real property should 
be considered as similar to ownership of land. 
Another point worth determining is whether other persons who possess the land, viz. 
land tenants, should be eligible to enter into a CA.682 In general, persons who have no 
ownership should not create any burdens on land, specifically those running with the 
land for a long period, because this would negatively affect the ownership rights of a 
landowner.  
However, this view might hamper the possibility to conserve nature by implementing 
a CA. Some scholars support a person holding a right less than full ownership to be 
able to pursue a conservation goal by concluding a CA, and a tenant is an example of 
this type of person.683 Assume that C, an owner of farmland, entered into a 50-year 
lease agreement with D. Then, a government initiates a CA scheme to encourage those 
who holds arable land to conclude a 20-year conservation agreement. In this case, C 
may not be interested or be unable to enter into the agreement because his land is under 
                                                     
678 At the core of riparian rights is the right of a landowner to draw water over an adjacent waterway 
(Richard Macrory, Water Law: Principles and Practice (Longman Professional 1985) 8; David H 
Getches, Water Law (4th edn, Thomson West 2009) 4; Sarah Hendry, Frameworks for Water Law 
Reform (CUP 2014) 37). 
679 For example, the right of landowners of surface runoff on their property and right to extract 
groundwater (Alex Gardner, Richard Barlett and Janice Gray, Water Resources Law (LexisNexis 
Butterworths 2009) 152-62). 
680 The term water rights is used here in a broad meaning, which covers a wide range of rights to 
access and use water (see Hendry (n 678) 36).  
681 See the law of Colorado in the previous section. 
682 See the discussion of whether a tenant should be eligible to make a conservation covenant in Law 
Commission (n 45) paras 5.2-5.16. 





the lease contract. Where the law does not allow a land tenant to enter into a 
conservation agreement, D would be ineligible to conclude the agreement to conserve 
feature on the land.  
Biodiversity conservation agreements in WA and management agreements in the UK 
are examples where a land tenant or other type of occupier can be bound in a CA. This 
might be possible for a short-term agreement because an agreement created by those 
who are not landowners should not be created exceeding the terms of a right they have 
on that land. Other possible conditions could be that a landowner must consent to 
create this type of agreement, which is used in some jurisdictions.684 Otherwise, the 
law may require a landowner to ensure that terms of a CA obligation are part of any 
subsequent lease, so that the terms of the CA are observed whoever is in occupation. 
5.4.2 The legally binding effect on future landowners  
Although the ability to impose obligations running with the land and bind future 
landowners is a crucial feature of CAs, not all CA-enabling laws explicitly cover this 
in detail. Hence, it is worth visiting here the benefits and drawbacks of expressly 
providing whether future landowners are bound in CA obligations. Setting an explicit 
provision as to who are bound in CAs, as seen from the Scottish legislation and some 
conservation easement-enabling statutes, looks desirable because it clarifies who are 
bound to fulfil CA obligations. Some others might oppose this view because setting 
simply a general rule that a CA runs with the land is sufficient because CAs imposes 
obligations to those having interests in the land. Setting a detailed provision might be 
unnecessary for a short-term CA, which seek to bind an owner of the land who enters 
into this type of arrangement, or where the land subject to a CA is publicly-owned land 
under the management of governmental bodies.  
As CAs can impose positive or negative burdens on future owners or occupiers, the 
discussion of the extent to which CAs bind such future owners and occupiers is 
interconnected with that about the binding effect of positive obligations on successive 
landowners and occupiers. However, this consideration requires the examination of 
the obligations imposed by CAs. Hence, this point will be examined as part of the next 
topic.   
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6. Obligations  
The examination in part 6 of chapter 1 revealed that the ability of CAs to impose 
obligations on the burdened landholder when the land changes hand is one of the 
critical features worth examining. Thus, it is necessary to examine how each 
jurisdiction provides for the obligations to fulfil a CA. The word ‘burden’ will be 
occasionally used as an interchangeable term of the word ‘obligation’, mainly, where 
it is used in the context of the laws in the USA and Scotland.685  
As the laws of each jurisdiction provide different patterns and normative content of 
CA obligations, this part does not portray the content of obligations of every 
jurisdiction but rather highlights some noteworthy points, reflecting strengths and 
weaknesses of each legal model. Key points to be examined are whether and to what 
extent each CA-enabling law makes legal provision concerning the obligation of CAs. 
CA obligations are categorised here into negative and positive obligations. The first 
imposes a duty not to do a certain task, e.g. the obligation to refrain from clearing land.  
The latter involves setting a requirement to a burdened landholder to oblige such a 
person to do some activities, for example, to dig an artificial swamp to create a new 
ecosystem.686  
Another point to be examined is about the legal effect of CA obligations. This will 
consider whether the laws have any provisions dealing with the legally binding effect 
arising from the nature of CAs in imposing obligations running with the land. For 
instance, it will examine whether CAs under a particular statute stipulate that positive 
obligations bind future landowners. 
 
6.1 Australia 
Overall, CAs under both Commonwealth and state laws use a similar approach to 
formulate CA obligations. They impose both negative and positive burdens on 
burdened landholders, but the subject matter of the obligations is varied subject to the 
purposes of implementation of each particular CA.  
                                                     
685 The reason for this is because CAs in these two jurisdictions are not an agreement creating a 
statutory obligation, but rather create a property right imposing some burdens on the burdened 
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The Commonwealth legislation creates obligations for a conservation agreement to 
protect or conserve the features or values explained in section 2.1 above. Burdened 
landholders might be obliged to comply with positive or negative obligations, for 
instance, to carry out agreed activities to promote the conservation of biodiversity, to 
restrict the use of the area under the agreement, and to require the owner to contribute 
towards costs incurred in implementing the agreement.687  
CAs in NSW and WA employ a similar approach. They provide that CAs may impose 
both affirmative and negative obligations on burdened landholders, but the details of 
specific duties might be different depending on the particular type of CA. Negative 
burdens can be imposed to restrict the use or development on the land under CAs. 
Positive ones may involve the duty of a burdened landholder to carry out specified 
actions on the land, and to permit specified persons to enter into the land, to satisfy 
monitoring, reporting and audit requirements. Apart from that, as CA-enabling laws 
of NSW and WA may support entering into a CA with financial assistance, they 
provide an additional duty to require a burdened landholder to repay money to a holder 
where they fail to fulfil the agreement.  
Regarding a legally binding effect on the successors of land title, CAs created under 
both the Commonwealth and state laws are binding on, and enforceable by and against, 
the successors in title. This includes a legally-binding effect on a lessee.688  
 
6.2 UK  
Overall, CAs in place in the UK share a similar character in that they can impose both 
negative and positive obligations on burdened landholders, but the legal approaches 
regarding the creation of obligations are slightly distinctive as examined below.  
The obligations created by management agreements are varied subject to their sources 
of legal authorisation. Negative obligations might be restrictions on the exercise of 
rights over the land;  positive ones may involve carrying out work to fulfil the purpose 
of conserving those flora, fauna or geological or physiographical features.689 Another 
interesting point of management agreements is that they may contain provisions on 
                                                     
687 EPBCA 1999, s 306(2). 
For instance, some conservation agreements require their parties to pay their own costs of negotiating, 
preparing and executing this Agreement (see cl 8.5 of the Conservation Agreement for the protection 
and conservation of Lowland rainforest of subtropical Australia at Palmview, Queensland (n 182)).  
688 EPBCA 1999, s 307; BCA 2016 (NSW), ss 5.13, 5.24 and 5.31; BCA 2016 (WA), ss 118 and 129. 





making payments to the persons who are bound to do the tasks, in exchange for 
entering the agreement.690  
In contrast to management agreements, although conservation burdens may provide 
negative and affirmative obligations,691 there is no detailed provision about the actions 
that can be imposed as an obligation. Nonetheless, it does not mean that this type of 
CA can be created to impose a broad scope of obligation since the obligation must be 
created to achieve the purposes set forth under s 38 of TC(S)A 2003 as examined in 
section 2.3 above.  
The Environment Bill employs an approach similar to TC(S)A 2003 in relation to CA 
obligations. Conservation covenants under the Environment Bill may be created to 
require landowners to do or not to do something on land as well as to allow or require 
a holder to do something on land.692 
The last point to be noted entails the legal effects of the burdens running with the land. 
TC(S)A 2003 and the Environment Bill set a similar rule on who is bound in each type 
of obligation. While negative burdens directly bind the successive landowners and 
occupiers, the position for positive ones is more complicated.693 This point raises some 
interesting discussion as will be discussed in the latter section.  
 
6.3 USA 
Overall, both UCEA and the majority of state statutes provide that conservation 
easements may impose both negative and positive obligations. However, some of them 
do not enunciate what the obligations for fulfiling conservation easements are.   
The UCEA and most UCEA state statutes694 use very similar language in providing 
the meaning, purposes and types of obligation. These components usually are 
articulated simultaneously that a ‘conservation easement means a nonpossessory 
interest of a holder in real property imposing limitations or affirmative obligations the 
purposes of which include …’695 Apart from that, UCEA and many UCEA state 
statutes maintain that a conservation easement might create both a negative or 
                                                     
690 This provision can be seen in CHSR 2017, reg 20 (3); NERCA 2006, s 7 (2); CA 1968, s 15 (3); 
NPACA 1949, s 16 (3); WCA 1981, s 39(2). 
691 TC(S)A 2003, s 2. 
692 Environment Bill, cl 102(2).  
693 See TC(S)A 2003, s 9; Environment Bill, cl 107(2)(5). 
694 Except for Florida, which employs a different approach as explained below.   





affirmative obligation, and the latter one is exclusively imposed on an owner of the 
burdened real property and a holder. Florida is distinctive from other UCEA states in 
that it only allows the creation of various restrictive burdens, but not positive ones.696  
In contrast to the regime of UCEA and UCEA-state statutes explained above, the 
obligations under non-UCEA state statutes are varied. Some provide an extensive list 
of activities that can be set as obligations and purposes of a conservation easement; 
many mention this point with a few words. Another point to be noted is that some of 
the non-UCEA states do not mention any positive obligation. It can be interpreted that 
these states mainly use a conservation easement for prohibiting, limiting or restricting 
activities carried out on land, rather than to require a burdened landholder to conduct 
active practices on the land. For instance, Montana uses a conservation easement to 
limit or prohibit excavation, dredging, or removal of loam, peat, gravel, soil, rock, or 
other material substance, among other things.697 This is similar to the position in  New 
York698 and North Carolina699 where a conservation easement can only impose an 
obligation to forbid, limit or restrict the development, management or use of real 
property, but there is no word explicitly allowing an affirmative duty.  
 
6.4 Legal implications of distinctive approaches regarding types and scope of CA 
obligation 
The examination in the previous sections indicates that the comparator jurisdictions 
use different approaches in dealing with the obligations for fulfiling the purpose of a 
CA, but they share some characteristics. For instance, the majority of CA-enabling 
laws allow the creation of CAs which impose both negative and affirmative 
obligations. However, their substantive content remains varied subject to the purposes 
of the implementation of a particular CA. The differences among them make some 
interesting points and should be further discussed as follows.  
6.4.1 Scope and detail of obligations  
Regarding the normative content and types of obligations, some jurisdictions, as 
mentioned, divide affirmative and negative obligations from each other, some provide 
a detailed and extensive list of obligations, while some elaborate an obligation based 
                                                     
696 Florida, s 704.06(1). 
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on the purpose and nature of a CA with a very brief provision. Some others may not 
explicitly state what a CA can prescribe on the exact features of an obligation. Such 
variation demonstrates that the legal approach regarding an obligation can be 
categorised as the one employing an exhaustive approach and another with a short 
provision. This raises the question, what are the strengths and weaknesses, if any, of 
each approach?  
As seen from the provision under UCEA, the obligations and purposes of a 
conservation easement are provided as part of the definition of a conservation 
easement. This looks attractive where a conservation easement-enabling law is enacted 
to be a mere framework statute for recognising the legally binding effect of this type 
of instrument and leave room to prospective parties to negotiate what obligations 
should be concluded subject to that framework provision.700 The positive side of this 
approach is the flexibility in arranging the terms of a CA. It leaves room for a qualified 
holder and landowner to negotiate a specific obligation in light of the primary purposes 
of CAs prescribed in a CA-enabling law. However, a loose approach could be 
problematic in some aspects. These include where CAs are introduced to achieve a 
specific end of C&C regulation as observed from management agreements related to 
establishing an SSSI in the UK.701 Without a detailed provision prescribing what types 
of obligation can be created, it remains unclear whether and how these CAs would 
achieve the aim of their creation.  
An extensive and exhaustive approach commonly involves setting legal guidance on 
what should be or can be created as CA obligations. It is advantageous in that the 
parties do not need to consider what should be created as they can take the instant 
obligations from a prescriptive list under a CA-enabling law to create the content of a 
CA. A CA under a detailed CA-enabling law could be easier to monitor and assess in 
terms of successful implementation rather than leaving room to create an individual 
arrangement by the parties. Nevertheless, this may look undesirable because the 
exhaustive detail in the legislation may result in difficulty in the use of a CA for a 
broader purpose and inability to adapt the specific terms of a CA where change 
                                                     
700 See the benefits and drawbacks of drafting a CA with more specific substantive terms as discussed 
in Reid and Nsoh (n 17) 200-201. 





happens in the future.702 Having a fixed ‘menu’ may also not be attractive to 
prospective landowners considering entering an agreement.  
6.4.2 Strengths and weaknesses of CAs reliant on negative obligations 
Although the introduction of CA-enabling laws in some jurisdictions partly arose from 
the need to broaden the scope of obligations imposed on land to cover positive 
obligations, the laws of some states in the USA merely impose a negative obligation. 
This feature engenders the discussion on whether CA-enabling laws which merely 
impose negative burdens, but not positive ones, are desirable or not.  
On the one side, some might insist that a mere restrictive obligation might be 
insufficient to make a CA successful. For instance, if a prospective holder seeks to set 
aside a piece of privately-owned land for public access for a recreational purpose, this 
type of purpose may not only require permission from a landowner but also obligate 
the landowner to clear some parts of the land for a pathway and ensure that it is safe 
for walking across that land. This requires an affirmative obligation to clear vegetation 
per se. As exemplified in sub-section 1.2.3 of chapter 4, if the Thai government was 
proposing to encourage eco-friendly practices on farmland, imposing both negative 
obligations (e.g. not to use dangerous chemicals in farming processes) and affirmative 
ones (e.g. to plant native trees), implementing CAs might be desirable. Apart from 
that, some commentators argue that preserving some types of land without requiring 
any active management may be inadequate because it does not help maintain the 
balance of ecosystems at an appropriate level.703 As a result, imposing both affirmative 
and restrictive obligations could be more desirable.  
On the other side of the coin, some might argue that setting a CA-enabling law with 
an ability to impose positive obligations could come along with costs for 
implementation. This could give rise to the question of who will bear the costs, and 
whether a holder will help support the fulfilment of such active operations. Positive 
obligations may also demotivate landowners from entering into a CA, particularly 
where the costs of operation are high. Additionally, setting the rule recognising the 
creation of positive obligations could give rise to complexity of the governing rules. 
For instance, it might be questionable who will be bound to fulfil positive obligations, 
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and whether those who are not landowners but occupy land as a lessee are bound in 
this type of obligation.  
6.4.3 The binding effect of positive obligations on successive landowners and 
occupiers  
Although providing positive obligations is advantageous for several reasons, it may 
require an additional provision to govern who will be bound by such positive burdens 
where the land changes hands. The comparative study above demonstrates that some 
CA-enabling laws, for example, those authorising the creation of biodiversity 
conservation agreements in Australia, provide that both positive and negative 
obligations bind the future landowners and tenants. This is different from those 
authorising the creation of conservation burdens and conservation covenants in the 
UK, which provide that positive obligations do not bind the future occupiers, e.g. land 
tenants. This means that if a landowner agrees not to change the woodland to other 
types of land use, and plant more trees, and then leases the land under this covenant, 
the obligation not to change the land-use pattern binds a lessee, but that requiring to 
plant more trees does not.  
The Australian approach looks attractive in that there is no need to interpret whether 
an obligation in question is a positive or negative burden, and who is bound in such an 
obligation because they are under the same rule. This is the opposite to the UK model 
where some statutes provide an additional rule that positive burdens exclusively bind 
the landowner, and not for land tenants. The UK approach looks attractive as it is clear 
that persons who are not a landowner may not be bound to fulfil positive obligation 
directly imposed by a CA-enabling law.704 
  
7. Durations  
This part investigates whether each selected CA-enabling law sets the provision about 
the binding duration of CA as in perpetuity or for a limited term. This issue is worth 
considering as it indicates whether or not CAs can be implemented to secure long-term 
conservation. The need to secure a long-term or perpetual binding effect is linked to 
the central element of a CA in imposing obligations running with the land, as partly 
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discussed in part 5 above. This legal matter is closely linked to the provisions for 
modification and termination.705 Apart from that, as the physical nature of land plots 
in Thailand is relatively small compared with those of the comparator jurisdictions, 
this makes the examination about the range of binding durations, their strengths and 
weaknesses crucial for the development of a legal proposal for Thailand.  
The legally binding period of CA is one of the points making this tool different from 
a mere private contract. While the latter commonly binds the parties with a specific 
and limited time and comes to an end when either party dies or ceases to exist, the 
former could impose burdens on burdened landholders and last in perpetuity.706 
 
7.1 Australia 
Australia represents the jurisdiction where the binding periods of a CA under the 
Commonwealth and state laws are varied. They can be those running in perpetuity,707 
with a limited period and without specifying the provision about a binding term.   
CAs running in perpetuity can be observed in biodiversity stewardship agreements in 
NSW. As mentioned in part 1, this type of agreement has a unique character as a legal 
tool based on a market-based instrument for securing biodiversity values. It is not 
surprising that BCA 2016 (NSW) sets a fixed rule, making them run with the land in 
perpetuity.708 Nonetheless, they can be varied or terminated subject to the conditions 
stipulated under the law.709 
Another category of CAs is those which may last for a limited period. CAs in this 
category can be observed in conservation agreements and wildlife refuge agreements 
in NSW,710 and biodiversity conservation covenants in place in WA. They have a 
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706 Environmental Law Institute (n 512) 21. 
707 As will be observed in section 9.1 below, perpetual CAs under the law of NSW are attractive in 
offerring landowners, who entered into this type of arrangement, to be eligible to claim a tax benefit. 
708 BCA 2016 (NSW), s 5.10(2). 
709 ibid s 5.11. See further examination in this point in section 11.1 below. 
710 In practice, the Biodiversity Conservation Trust offers two options for the binding period for a 
prospective landowner interested in entering into a conservation agreement. The first is a term 
agreement with a minimum of 15 years; the latter is a perpetual agreement. The binding term for a 
wildlife refuge agreement is not indicated, but it is a non-permanent agreement subject to the period 
being negotiated (see Biodiversity Conservation Trust, ‘Wildlife Refuge and voluntary Conservation 
Agreements - Resources’ <www.bct.nsw.gov.au/wildlife-refuge-and-voluntary-conservation-





similar governing rule in running with land in perpetuity or for the period set out in 
the agreement711 and the latter take effect until terminated.712 
The Commonwealth law provides a distinct rule from the state laws because this 
legislation does not explicitly state whether a CA lasts in perpetuity or with a limited 
duration. In practice, many CAs made by the Commonwealth government and other 
eligible parties have included both those concluded with an open-ended term713 and 
those binding for a limited period.714 But they usually come with the clause that the 
termination can be made by agreement between the parties or by order subject to the 
conditions prescribed in EPBCA 1999.  
 
7.2 UK 
Management agreements, conservation burdens and conservation covenants 
implemented in the UK have different binding periods. These three types of CA can 
be created for a limited period or run with the land permanently subject to the purposes 
of implementation.  
The majority of management agreements are created for specific purposes and their 
binding periods vary accordingly. While many enabling statutes do not state explicitly 
their binding terms, some provide that management agreements may last with a 
specified term or without limitation of the duration of the agreement.715  In practice, 
most of them are limited and short-term agreements and they may last up to twenty 
years.716 This leaves room to the parties to negotiate and agree on an appropriate term.  
Conservation burdens employ a different approach from that of management 
agreements. They set a default binding period to run with the land permanently, but a 
                                                     
711 BCA 2016 (NSW), s 5.23(3). 
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713 This can be seen from conservation agreements created to protect and conserve Quassia bidwillii 
(one of the vulnerable native plants found in Queensland and NSW), and that to protect and conserve 
the Grey-headed Flying-fox (Pteropus poliocephalus). The full versions of these Agreements can be 
accessed from Department of the Environment and Energy (n 661). 
714 Again, this type of agreement can be observed from the conservation agreement to protect an area 
under the Tasmanian Forests Intergovernmental Agreement (see ibid).   
715 WCA 1981, s 39.  
716 This can be observed from a specific programme, including those under Higher Level Stewardship 
Programme which lasted for ten years (Reid, ‘The Privatisation of Biodiversity?’ (n 493) 211; Rodgers, 
Law of Nature Conservation (n 493) 302). 
The Wildlife Enhancement Scheme (WES) initiated for protecting the land notified as SSSIs by Natural 
England is an example of a short-term management agreement. It usually runs for three to four years 






limited-term burden is possible if it is specified in a constitutive deed.717 This approach 
is then followed by a conservation covenant under the Environment Bill, whereby 
conservation covenants can be made with a limited period subject to the negotiation. 
Apart from that, if the eligible land is under a lease, its binding period may last up to 
the period of the lease.718  
 
7.3 USA  
The USA exemplifies a jurisdiction having a variety of binding periods under state 
statutes. While a fixed-term conservation easement can be made in some states, a 
perpetual conservation easement is popular due to the requirement of tax regimes 
under both federal and state levels.  
UCEA, as a model law, provides that conservation easements are unlimited in duration 
unless provided otherwise in the instrument creating them.719 Several states adopt this 
model.720 Nevertheless, some states provide different terms. For instance, California, 
Florida, and Hawaii require that conservation easements must be perpetual in 
duration.721 Some states set the default term in perpetuity, but permit a limited period. 
Colorado, Iowa and Nebraska are the examples of this category.722 Some states provide 
the minimum term of conservation easements. For instance, Montana sets the 
minimum term as 15 years.723 Pennsylvania and West Virginia do the same at 25 
years.724 Alabama allows creating a fixed period conservation easement which lasts at 
least 30 years or for the life of the grantor.725 Kansas set a default period as the lifetime 
of the grantor and it may be revoked at the grantor’s request.726 Some states, including 
New Jersey, have no provision on the duration of an easement. The legal model of 
Maine is developed further in this matter. It sets a default binding period as a perpetual 
agreement, but allows a change of the term where circumstances have changed and the 
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718 Environment Bill, cl 106. 
719 UCEA, s 2(c). 
720 This provision can be found in the conservation easement-enabling statutes of many UCEA states, 
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721 California, s 815.2(b), Florida, s 704.06(2), and Hawaii, s 198-2(b). 
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fulfilment of the conservation easement no longer serves the public interest as 
determined by the court.727  
It should be noted that although many states set a default binding period to last in 
perpetuity,728 they authorise the court to determine whether a particular conservation 
easement should be modified or terminated under specific rules. This consideration 
will be discussed in section 11.3 of part 11 below. 
 
7.4 Strengths and weaknesses of various approaches in relation to the binding 
durations of CAs 
The laws examined above illustrate that the majority of CAs set a default rule to run 
with the land in perpetuity, but the variation and termination of this type of CA are 
possible, subject to the conditions set under the laws.729 Some of them have a fixed 
term of legally binding period, both long and short-term agreements. A handful of 
them do not provide any provision about a binding period. The strengths and 
weaknesses of perpetual and fixed-term CAs are worth discussing together, while 
those for CAs having no binding duration should be discussed separately. 
Perpetual CAs could look more appealing than fixed-term ones in two regards. The 
first is when they are considered from the perspective of achieving conservation aims 
requiring long-term conservation. A perpetual term is advantageous in that it helps 
conserve some natural or cultural features in the long run.730 A permanent agreement, 
seeking to keep a certain piece of the property as woodland, secures such land from 
being changed to a factory site forever. Additionally, this might be desirable for some 
conservation practices, including for carbon sequestration by trees or for the creation 
of ecological communities where it requires many decades to reach maturity level.731 
Also, it conforms to the notion of conserving natural features to serve the benefit of 
communities examined in chapter 2, where a certain community value should be 
conserved for future generations.732 In contrast, a fixed-binding term could create a 
risk of failing to achieve a long-term conservation purpose. It might not be suitable to 
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729 See the examination of variation and termination in part 11 below. 
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secure forestlands used to store carbon dioxide to deal with global warming and 
climate change resulting from greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.733 
The second one is about the costs and risk arising from CA initiation and 
implementation. As a perpetual CA is a one-off agreement, there is no need to renew 
or renegotiate this type of arrangement. This not only reduces some transaction costs734 
but also the risk of uncertainty whether a new landowner will continue a CA for the 
land in question or not.735 This, however, is not the case for a fixed-term CA, which 
could be costly because of the requirement of renewal and renegotiation.736 At the 
same time, a fixed-term CA could impose the risk of failure in dealing with a CA 
renewal because a landowner at the time of its expiry may not desire to continue 
implementing a CA in the land.  
Nonetheless, fixed-term CAs are more desirable than perpetual CAs when considering 
the aspect of the attractiveness to prospective landowners and the fairness to future 
landowners. The limited-term CAs look attractive in that they allow landowners to 
decide how long they will be bound by such a CA and have a choice to manage the 
land with other means after the termination of a CA. This cannot be made where the 
landowners enter into the perpetual CAs. This type of CA also looks disadvantageous 
in that the right to use the land is limited or restricted by a current landowner,737 which 
means that future landowners are unable to manage their land where it is inconsistent 
with the obligations by which they are bound.738 For this reason, landowners tend to 
prefer a short-term or a fixed period for a CA.739 
                                                     
733 REDD+ (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation) is an example of the 
scheme introduced to tackle the increase in carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. This scheme requires an 
eligible participant, which includes a landowner, to plant trees on a certain area. Such trees act as a sink 
for carbon dioxide. This scheme will be secured where trees in a participating area are not cut down to 
prevent carbon dioxide leakage (Rosemary Lyster, Catherine MacKenzie and Constance McDermott 
(eds), Law, Tropical Forests and Carbon the Case of REDD+ (CUP 2013) 32-7). 
734 Bayers and Ponte (n 512) 190; Barton H Thompson, ‘The Trouble with Time: Influencing the 
Conservation Choices of Future Generations’ (2004) 44 Natural Resources Journal 601, 613-14. 
735 Jessica E Jay, ‘When Perpetual Is Not Forever: The Challenge of Changing Conditions, Amendment, 
and Termination of Perpetual Conservation Easements’ (2012) 36 Harvard Environmental Law Review 
1, 37–43; Jessica Owley and others, ‘Climate Change Challenges for Land Conservation: Rethinking 
Conservation Easements, Strategies, and Tools’ (2018) 95 Denver Law Review 727, 731. 
736 Jeff Jones and others, Common Questions on Conservation Easements (Center for Collaborative 
Conservation 2009) 13. 
737 Reid and Nsoh (n 17) 190; Colin T Reid, ‘Conservation Covenants’ (2013) 77 Conveyancer and 
Property Lawyer 176, 179-180. 
738 Julia D Mahoney, ‘Perpetual Restrictions on Land and the Problem of the Future’ (2002) 88 Virginia 
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In light of the adaptability to uncertain change in the future, a fixed-term CA tends to 
be more desirable than a perpetual one. A perpetual CA created to maintain and 
enhance a wetland in one area might be useless if droughts take place and cause such 
a wetland to dry up. This weakness notes that a ‘dead-hand’ approach, which sets a 
permanent binding period, cannot help achieve effective adaptive management dealing 
with environmental changes.740 The limitation of perpetual CAs in this regard reflects 
that fixed-term CAs or those that can be modified or terminated are desirable.  
Providing no legal provision specifying the binding period is another option employed 
in some jurisdictions. On the one side, it enables the parties to a CA to create an open-
ended term of a CA, which is flexible depending on the intention of an intended holder 
and landowner. This means that the parties to a CA could set a CA which runs in 
perpetuity or for a limited time. This adaptive approach could increase the rate of 
participation in CA implementation. This approach may be appropriate with a CA law 
which seeks to initiate a broader scope of CA implementation, mainly where anyone 
can come into a CA with an eligible holder as seen from EPBCA 1999 of Australia. 
Nevertheless, CA parties might interpret that a CA having no binding period can be 
terminated at any time, which cannot guarantee the success of CA implementation.    
Determining the appropriate duration for CAs is related to other considerations 
discussed above. For instance, CA durations are interrelated to the purposes for which 
CAs are created. Whilst setting aside the land for nature reserves requires the 
implementation with a perpetual or long-term CA, the encouragement of farmers to do 
or not to do some activities on their land, converting to new practices, might be 
achieved with a short-term agreement.741 Above all, the strengths and weaknesses of 
the binding duration of CAs discussed above might be influenced by other provisions 
of a CA-enabling law. For instance, a perpetual CA might be more desirable if the law 
allows parties or a court the ability to modify or terminate it. This point will be 
subsequently discussed in part 11 below. 
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8. Enforcement  
The very nature of CAs as a voluntary agreement means that their successful 
implementation is reliant on the fulfilment of obligations by CA parties, and the breach 
of CA obligations could make their implementation fail. This part seeks to examine 
the existence of measure for the breach of CA obligations under the laws of the 
comparator jurisdictions. This thesis provides this investigation separately for various 
reasons. In the first place, the comparator jurisdictions provide various models for the 
sanctions for non-compliance, and they should be examined in more detail. Secondly, 
as mentioned above and suggested in sub-section 5.1.3 of chapter 3, the laws providing 
the enforcement measures in the event of non-compliance could make the legal 
implementation of a particular tool more or less effective,742 specifically, where a 
burdened landholder breaches the terms of CA.743 Hence, this examination offers the 
room to consider what mechanisms can be available for enforcing a CA, apart from 
legal sanctions under the private law of contract.744 Third, the investigation of this legal 
matter will help justify the necessity of providing for this issue in the context of 
Thailand in the following chapter. 
 
8.1 Australia  
Australia demonstrates a jurisdiction where the legal measures for the enforcement of 
the violation of a CA duty are stated clearly. The range of enforcing measures includes 
civil, administrative and criminal sanctions subject to the conditions stipulated under 
each CA-enabling law. The rules governing the enforcement by civil law remedies are 
contained in the Commonwealth laws and the laws of NSW and WA. Administrative 
sanctions can be observed from the law of NSW. Criminal sanctions can be illustrated 
from the law of WA as summarised below.  
As mentioned, all CA-enabling laws embrace the use of civil law remedies as a primary 
means for the enforcement. For instance, a burdened landholder who fails to comply 
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with CA obligations may be required to repay money paid by CA holders.745 However, 
the rules for the enforcement under the NSW regime are noteworthy here as an 
illustration of the regime providing comprehensive details on who is entitled to enforce 
CA obligations against burdened landholders, and what types of remedies can be 
awarded.  
The law of NSW allows the Minister to enforce all types of private land conservation 
agreements by civil actions for an order to remedy or restrain a breach.746 In this case, 
the court may restrain the breach or award damages against landowners for a breach 
of the agreement.747 The enforcement by the Minister may take place whether the 
violation has occurred intentionally, recklessly or negligently. This includes the 
situation where a landowner has failed to prevent another person from causing the 
agreement violation.748  
The rule for biodiversity stewardship agreements in NSW is also worth highlighting 
as it entitles any person749 to file a case in the court750 for an order to remedy or restrain 
a breach of a biodiversity stewardship agreement.751 This provision can be regarded as 
enforcement by a third party. The court may make orders as it thinks fit to remedy or 
restrain the breach or direct the owner of the biodiversity stewardship site to retire 
biodiversity credits of a specified number and class (if applicable) within a period 
specified in the order.752  
The availability of administrative sanctions can also be observed from the rule under 
the NSW regime. In the case where participating landowners break the obligations 
under a biodiversity stewardship agreement, such persons might be ordered by the 
Minister to comply with the obligations. Alternatively, the Minister can authorise 
another person to carry out such tasks and order the landowners to pay for the costs 
arising from such activities.753 Although this legal measure could be viewed as civil 
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746 BCA 2016 (NSW), s 13.5(2). 
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748 ibid s 13.15(4)(a). 
749 Under the NSW regime, a majority of environmental civil cases allows open standing, which means 
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enforcement,754 it could also be seen as an administrative measure because the law 
entitles the Minister to impose a ‘biodiversity offsets enforcement order’ on a violating 
landowner, failure to comply with which is a criminal offence.755 
As mentioned above, WA is representative of a jurisdiction employing criminal 
sanctions for the enforcement of CA obligations, which is unusual.756  The WA 
legislation establishes the rule that a person who breaches a biodiversity conservation 
covenant might be subject to a penalty with a fine of 50,000 Australian dollars.757 
Another situation where this type of sanction can be applied is when burdened 
landholders under a biodiversity conservation agreement or biodiversity conservation 
covenant fail to notify holders when a change in ownership or occupation of the 
burdened property has been made.758 
 
8.2 UK 
Unlike Australia, CA-enabling laws in the UK do not have provisions providing 
explicit criminal and administrative sanctions for the breach of duty. However, the 
comprehensive rule for civil law remedies is in place and can be observed from the 
Environment Bill authorising the creation of conservation covenants.  
Having examined the Environment Bill, this Bill provides the rule on what situations 
are regarded as the breach of obligations. The Bill provides that a negative obligation 
is breached where a burdened landholder does something which this type of obligation 
prohibits or where such a person permits another person to do such a thing.759 The 
Environment Bill also provides the subsequent steps for the enforcement of the breach 
of obligations. For instance, the Bill provides the rule for available remedies, which 
include specific performance, injunction and damages. Additional rules are also 
provided that the court must consider what remedies are appropriate for the breach of 
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duty, and the award of damages must be applied on the basis of contract law 
principles.760   
In contrast to the regime of conservation covenants, that of management agreements 
merely entitles competent authorities (holders) to enforce the agreement but does not 
provide specific details on how it can be enforced. For example, many statutes provide 
that management agreements can be enforceable by the appropriate nature 
conservation body against persons who created a management agreement and 
successive landowners.761 Some legislation provides specific measures comparable to 
a sanction for the breach of duty, but there is a further step that may be available. For 
instance, the breach of duties may trigger the compulsory purchase of the land subject 
to the agreement under the legal regimes creating SSSIs and nature reserves.762 
Similarly, the legal regime of conservation burdens in Scotland does not elaborate on 
the detailed provision of enforcement. TC(S)A 2003 merely provides that a 
conservation burden is enforceable by the holder of the burden irrespective of whether 
the holder has completed title to the burden.763 
Regarding third-party enforcement, CA-enabling laws in the UK do not provide any 
rule in this matter. However, some legal rules are in place, allowing contracting parties 
to confer a right to enforce the contract to a third party where certain conditions have 
been met.764 This means that the absence of this rule from CA-enabling laws in the UK 
does not wholly settle the matter since a holder may authorise other qualified bodies 
to enforce a CA so long as it is not prohibited by the CA-enabling laws. 
 
8.3 USA 
The laws of the USA provide comprehensive rules for the enforcement of the breach 
of conservation easement obligations. Most state statutes lay down legal provisions on 
who can enforce a conservation easement and how a conservation easement can be 
enforced both by holders and courts. Both UCEA and state statutes deal with the first 
consideration by authorising bodies or persons who can bring action to the courts in a 
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very similar way. They generally provide that the bodies and persons entitled to do 
this task might be the owner of the subject property, the holder of the easement, a 
person having a third-party right of enforcement,765 and a person authorised by other 
law. 
Some states may provide for this issue with slightly different rules. For instance, in 
Mississippi, the Attorney General of the State and the Department of Wildlife, 
Fisheries and Parks, are entitled to enforce conservation easements. A possessor of 
burdened property or one having any interest or rights in the burdened property has the 
same right in Pennsylvania. Some states grant this power to a governmental body when 
there is no holder or a third party who can enforce such a right, and some states confer 
the right to bring an action to a neighbour who owns or possesses property nearby the 
burdened property.766 The types of enforcement action against conservation easements 
can be either against any persons who violate or threaten to violate a conservation 
easement or against a holder. 
Regarding the enforcement by the court, all states allow the bodies or persons 
mentioned above to bring a civil action to courts, and they are entitled to request 
various kinds of remedies, including injunctive relief and damages. Some allow the 
court to award damages for the loss of scenic, aesthetic, or environmental value as well 
as expenses arising from bringing an action to the court.767 Some allow pursuit of 
punitive damages.768 However, there is no state conservation easement law providing 
the use of criminal sanctions for the breach of duty. 
 
8.4 An analysis  
The findings from the laws of the three jurisdictions illustrate the use of different legal 
tools for the enforcement of the breach of CA obligation. Such a difference is worth 
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discussing to see the benefits and drawbacks of each legal model. The discussion can 
be conducted in three aspects as follows.
769
   
8.4.1 Scope of the legal provision  
The first distinction of the provisions of CA enforcement of each CA-enabling law can 
be seen from the scope of the legal provision. As observed above, some of the laws 
provide comprehensive detail for the enforcement by civil, administrative and criminal 
sanctions; many others provide a handful of provisions. This inconsistency begs the 
question which one is better. A short provision, as seen from management agreements 
and conservation burdens in the UK, prescribing that a CA can be enforceable by a 
holder, looks attractive when a drafter does not want to add any special features for 
enforcement of violation. This would enable a CA to be enforced under the general 
private law. This would be advantageous in that there will have no concern about the 
inconsistency between a new legal regime and the existing one. Yet a short provision 
could give rise to several problems of interpretation. This includes the ambiguity as to 
who, if anyone, will be eligible to enforce against a burdened landholder where a 
holder is reluctant to do this task. Additionally, this legal approach would make a CA 
close to a private legal tool which no-one other than the holder can participate in to 
investigate whether a CA in question will achieve the aim of conservation or not. 
Another drawback could be that it would close the door to use other types of legal 
enforcement, including administrative sanctions, to make it enforceable beyond mere 
private law remedies. 
The comprehensive rules, on the other hand, come with both benefits and drawbacks. 
On the positive side, the availability of a range of enforcement options means that an 
enforcer has a choice in determining which is the most appropriate to deal with non-
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compliance in a certain situation. Nonetheless, some downsides of this approach 
should not be overlooked. For instance, this approach would make the governing 
regime of CA complicated as well as making a CA very similar to C&C regulatory 
tools. The use of administrative and criminal intervention could also detract from the 
very nature of CAs as private law instruments.  
8.4.2 Eligible enforcers  
Another distinctive issue in relation to who can enforce a CA in the comparator 
jurisdictions is about third-party enforcers. This feature is put in place in the USA but 
is not be found in CA-enabling laws of Australia770 and the UK.771 This begs the 
discussion about the benefits and drawbacks of providing a third-party enforcer.  
Fundamentally, those who can enforce a private contract are the parties to the 
contract.772 A third-party should not be eligible to do this task as a contractual 
obligation is generally created to serve the interest of the parties.773 Allowing a third-
party enforcer could be problematic in that it increases the complexity to a CA-
enabling law. There might be need to consider what to do if one party does not want 
to enforce against another, but the third-party wants to do so.774 For this reason, setting 
a provision for the enforcement by the parties alone might be more appropriate.  
Nonetheless, there might be an exception for a CA because this type of agreement is a 
conservation tool seeking to serve the public interest rather than the mere mutual 
benefit of the parties. Vesting the entitlement to enforce a CA on the holder alone could 
be questioned in some aspect. For example, if a holder is reluctant to enforce against 
a burdened landholder, this could make a CA fail.775 Hence, some commentators 
suggest that setting a third-party enforcer, as employed in the USA, or allowing 
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citizens to sue could make CA implementation transparent and encourage public 
participation.776 The detail on how a third-party right of enforcement can enforce a CA 
will be examined in part 12 regarding public oversight, as it relates to the point how a 
non-party oversees a CA after it is implemented.  
8.4.3 Types of legal enforcement and remedies  
The examination in the regulatory chapter summarised three available sanctions, 
namely civil, criminal and administrative sanctions.777 The UK and USA mainly use 
civil law remedies. Australia, on the contrary, employs a wide range of sanctions, 
including civil, administrative and criminal measures for enforcement. This engenders 
the question ‘should a civil law remedy be the only means for non-compliance 
enforcement of a CA?’ As a CA is based on the concept of private law of contract, 
civil enforcement is set as the primary method to enforce against a violator. Thus, it is 
undeniable to conclude that civil law remedies, such as injunction, and damages,778 
should be available in line with the enforcement measures available in each 
jurisdiction. This notion is widely accepted as seen from the implementation of this 
idea in the comparing jurisdictions. Nevertheless, it might be necessary to consider 
what types of civil remedies should be offered for the enforcement of a CA. As seen 
from Australia and the USA, several civil remedies are in place. One of the advantages 
of having such measures in a CA-enabling law is that it enables the court to choose the 
most appropriate one to enforce against a liable person. Yet the downside of allowing 
the use of a wide range of remedies is that it could discourage a potential landowner 
from entering into a CA with a prospective holder.  
Another point to be considered is whether a criminal offence and/or an administrative 
sanction should be used for the breach of a CA. This could be based on how a CA is 
viewed. A person who considers a CA as a private law agreement may argue that 
neither criminal nor administrative sanctions should be imposed against the person 
who does not comply with a CA obligation. This is because a criminal sanction runs 
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counter to an underlying concept of a private law agreement.779 Indeed, civil law 
remedies could be sufficient because the court can award several enforcement 
measures, including injunctive relief, damages or any other types of compensation. 
The use of criminal sanctions could discourage prospective landowners from 
becoming involved as they might be aware of being liable. On the contrary, those who 
consider a CA as a regulatory tool may oppose the previous view because civil law 
remedies might be insufficient to serve a conservation goal. This is because the 
majority of civil law remedies require an enforcer to bring a case to the court, and this 
is time-consuming.780 The use of administrative enforcement, such as a biodiversity 
enforcement order, implemented in NSW, could be more appropriate because a holder 
could employ this type of sanction immediately. 
Regarding a criminal sanction, although it might look inappropriate for enforcing a 
violation of a CA obligation, in reality, this is not too strong because it can be a mere 
monetary penalty.781 In many cases, a criminal penalty is used as a last resort to secure 
compliance after a certain administrative measure has been used. The case of penalties 
for the breach of CA obligations under the law of WA, Australia exemplifies the use 
of a trivial criminal sanction which may not be different from civil penalties in place 
in the UK.782 Hence, the categorisation as ‘civil’ or ‘criminal’ may be of limited 
practical significance.783 Some also maintain that imposing a criminal penalty for a 
violation in certain circumstances could help deter a person who intentionally seeks to 
violate an obligation.784  
 
9. Incentives 
The examination in chapter 2 revealed that the use of incentives to motivate or 
demotivate some activities is a matter of choice for social intervention.785 Although 
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incentives look appealing in that they encourage or direct people to change behaviour 
through a price signal or property system, some disadvantages should not be 
overlooked, such as whether they represent an efficient use of public funding.786 
This part further examines the benefits and drawbacks of the use of incentives for CA 
implementation. It considers whether CA-enabling laws of the comparator 
jurisdictions have any provision providing incentives for CA participants, what form 
they take, and whether they provide any conditions to be eligible for the incentives 
available. These examinations aim to set the scene for further discussions on whether 
incentives should be implemented to encourage landowners to enter CAs.787 Also, it 
will consider whether a clause on the use of incentives should be part of a CA-enabling 
law or not.  
The justifications for the examination at this point are that, first, incentives could help 
motivate those entering into a CA. In many cases, a specific type of financial incentive, 
for instance, payment, is introduced to encourage entering into a CA.788 Thus, a CA-
enabling law having provisions about the rewards or compensation for burdened 
landholders may look appealing compared to another offering no incentive.789 Second, 
the consideration of incentives is interrelated to other matters. These include linkage 
to the point about the need to conduct public monitoring being investigated in part 12.  
 
9.1 Australia 
CAs recognised at both the Commonwealth and the State levels provide specific kinds 
of financial or technical assistance to encourage entering into a CA. Under the 
Commonwealth legislation, financial, technical or other assistance can be made in 
exchange for entering a CA,790 but a participating person might be required to share 
the cost of implementation.791 A CA created under EPBCA 1999 may offer the costs 
                                                     
786 Daniel Halperin, ‘Incentives for Conservation Easements: The Charitable Deduction or a Better 
Way?’ (2011) 74 Law and Contemporary Problems 29,41-3. 
787 See further discussions in this point in section 2.10 of chapter 6. 
788 Natalie Pratt, ‘Analysing Conservation Covenants’ (2014) 12 Journal of Planning and Environment 
Law 1310, 1315. 
789 Tilmann Disselhoff, ‘Alternative Ways to Support Private Land Conservation,’ (Report to the 
European Commission, No E.3-PO/07.020300/2015/ENV 2015) 13. 
790 EPBCA 1999, s 306(2)(e) provides that a CA may specify the conditions about money paid to the 
owner under the agreement. 
791 A possible reason behind this clause can be that in many cases, conservation agreements are made 





of fencing to landholders so as to maintain some native vegetation to protect 
biodiversity values.792 
The legal regimes of NSW and WA employ similar language in this matter. They 
provide that specified public bodies, who are holders, might be obliged to provide 
financial or technical assistance and goods or services.793 However, they do not 
provide any detail on how such assistance will be calculated or granted. 
Apart from above provisions, landowners who enter into a CA are entitled to claim 
income and land tax deduction under the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 
(Commonwealth) and the Land Tax Management Act 1956 (NSW). This type of 
incentive is available for landholders signing a CA with state or local government 
authorities.794 Landowners eligible to claim a tax benefit must enter into a perpetual 
CA that meets the conditions for tax benefit claims.795  
 
9.2 UK  
In the UK, the provisions regarding incentives are found in the law authorising the 
creation of management agreements, but not in those authorising the creation of 
conservation burdens and conservation covenants, as can be further explained below.  
The provisions regarding the support of incentives for persons who enter into 
management agreements commonly articulate that management agreements can 
provide for the making of payments by either party to the other or any other person. 
Some of the authorising statutes provide a framework or guidance in awarding 
payment.796 The guidelines for awarding payments can be observed from the one 
created by virtue of WCA 1981.797 The latest version is the Guidelines on Management 
Agreement Payments and related matters created by Department of the Environment, 
                                                     
within a particular state. This could make it  fair to require the two parties to share costs arising from 
CA implementation.  
792 EPBCA 1999, s 306(2)(f); Department of the Environment and Heritage, An overview of the 
Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (1999) 13. 
793 BCA 2016 (NSW), ss 5.6(1), 5.22(2) and 5.29(2); BCA 2016 (WA), s 115(2).  
794 Rosemary Lyster and others, Environmental and Planning Law in New South Wales (2nd edn, 
Federation Press 2009) 367; DECCW (n 82) 12. 
795 Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Commonwealth), s 31.5(2).  
796 WCA 1981, ss 39(2) and 50; CHSR 2017, regs 20(3) and 22; NERCA 2006, s 7(2).  
797 The Guidelines apply to management agreements created under WCA 1981, SSSI agreement under 





Transport and the Regions (DETR) in 2001,798 which replaced the previous version 
released in 1981.799 Rodgers notes that the 2001 Financial Guidelines changed the 
fundamental concept of management agreements under WCA 1981.800 In the past, 
financial payments could support buying out damaging land-use proposals. This 
approach was criticised on various grounds. For instance, Reid noted that this approach 
was ‘not only unduly expensive but also enabled unscrupulous landowners, by 
threatening to develop their land, to blackmail the authorities into paying out large 
sums, regardless of how speculative the proposed development might be’.801 The 
(current) Guidelines have been changed by exclusively supporting positive 
conservation work in SSSIs,802  and have a legally-binding effect by virtue of s 50 of 
WCA 1981.803  
As mentioned above, the laws authorising the creation of conservation burdens and 
conservation covenants have no provision for awarding incentives for entering into a 
CA. Nonetheless, this does not preclude an authority seeking a burden in exchange for 
any payments. The Scottish Law Commission, which prepared a draft bill which later 
became TC(S)A 2003, took the view in regard to conservation burdens that this type 
of CA should not be an object of commerce and not be income-producing.804 
 
9.3 USA  
The USA provides several forms of financial incentives to encourage entering into a 
conservation easement. Predominantly, a tax benefit has been used for such a purpose 
since 1976.805 This type of benefit plays a major role in inducing landowners to donate 
a conservation easement.806 Other kinds of financial rewards are also in place, 
                                                     
798 DETR, ‘Guidelines on Management Agreement Payments and Other Related Matters’ (Revised 
Guidance under s 28M and s 50 of the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981, DETR 2001). 
799 Rodgers, Law of Nature Conservation (n 493) 116-17. 
800 ibid 117.  
801 Reid, Nature Conservation Law (n 35) para 5.1.8; See also Ian Hodge, The Governance of the 
Countryside: Property, Planning and Policy (COP 2016) 186-87; Rodgers, Law of Nature Conservation 
(n 493) 118; Marion Shoard, ‘The Wildlife and Countryside Act and the Development of a Conservation 
Protection Racket’ in Marion Shoard (ed), This Land is Our Land: Struggle for Britain’s Countryside 
(Gaia 1997) 364. 
802 Rodgers, Law of Nature Conservation (n 493) 117. 
803 Rodgers, Agricultural Law (n 490) para 13.138. 
804 Scottish Law Commission (n 509) para 9.20. 
805 Nancy A McLaughlin, ‘Internal Revenue Code s 170(h): National Perpetuity Standards for Federally 
Subsidized Conservation Easements Part 1: The Standards’ (2010) 45 Real Property, Trust & Estate 
Law Journal 473, 476. 





including direct government funding. An economic incentive provision rarely appears 
in state statutes but can be found in the laws authorising the use of incentives or 
subsidies for conservation or agricultural purposes as summarised below.  
The UCEA and the majority of state statutes, in both UCEA and non-UCEA states, 
have no provision providing specific detail about the types of incentive to be used. 
This kind of provision is occasionally found in the statutes of some states. For instance, 
Maryland allows landowners to claim a state income tax credit when they conclude 
conservation easements which meet certain conditions. For instance, an eligible 
conservation easement must be held by specified conservation bodies with a perpetual 
term. Additionally, the statutes of Maryland and Mississippi set the detailed provisions 
on how such a tax benefit is calculated.807 Texas makes an explicit provision on this 
legal element by articulating that the acquisition of a conservation easement can be 
supported with finance subject to the conditions under the specified statutes.808 
As mentioned earlier, many states have no provisions awarding incentives. However, 
landowners who donate a conservation easement may claim a benefit where they meet 
the conditions in the statutes authorising public funding or tax interests. This includes 
the support of the federal government under specific laws or schemes or through 
funding by states.809 Despite being beyond the scope of applicable laws being 
examined, it is worth mentioning the sources of the incentives a landowner could ask 
for. This can be exemplified from the rules under the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) 
and the Farm Bill.  
The rules for a tax incentive available for persons who donated conservation easements 
can be found both in IRC and state statutes. S 170 (h) of IRC provides the rules 
substantially influencing the conditions of creating the conservation easement regime 
of many states. It enables a landowner who donated a conservation easement to claim 
a tax deduction equal to the value of the easement.810 As observed in section 7.3 above, 
a qualified conservation easement must bind in perpetuity, and be entered into with 
qualified entities (holders) for stipulated conservation purposes.811  
                                                     
807 Maryland, s 10-723(b); Mississippi, s 89-19-11. 
808 Texas, s 183-006. 
809 Cheever and McLaughlin (n 49) 175. 
810 In brief, the value of a conservation easement can be calculated by comparing a fair market value of 
donated land at the time before and after a conservation easement donation subject to the rule under the 
Treasury Regulation, s 1.170A-14(h)(3)(i).  
811 See the requirements regarding the qualification of an eligible holder to claim a tax incentive under 





Regarding funding from the federal government, the Farm Bill represents the 
legislation offering financial incentives for the purchase of an agricultural land 
easement by eligible entities in eligible land. The funding can also be spent as technical 
assistance to implement this programme.812 Additionally, many states have introduced 
state and local level funding programmes to encourage a donation of conservation 
easements and many of them established agricultural conservation easement purchase 
programs for the fulfilment of this task.813 
 
9.4 An analysis  
The observation in the above sections illustrates various distinctions regarding 
incentives, and such distinctions can be drawn on in discussing the following points.  
9.4.1 Benefits and drawbacks of making use of incentives 
As explained at the beginning of this part, incentives could induce prospective 
landowners to enter a CA. Financial benefits paid to landowners could cover the cost 
of the operations required to fulfil a CA obligation. Payments, offering rewards in 
exchange for the loss of the opportunity in making a profit, help compensate for 
income foregone.814 This means that establishing a CA framework without introducing 
any incentives could be less attractive from a landowner’s perspective.815 Additionally, 
some scholars view that a CA with no consideration seems to create less legitimacy 
for public oversight.816 From a regulatory perspective, creating a legal commitment 
from a private law instrument with no reciprocal incentive, should not come with high 
expectation of compliance, enforcement and monitoring by a holder.  
However, some consider that the use of incentives might be problematic. First, 
incentives are commonly taken from public funds. They include public payments and 
the reduction of the tax expected to be collected from a landowner, as a taxpayer. The 
use of incentives from these sources means that governments could lose revenue that 
                                                     
812 See Food Security Act 1986, s 1265C, amended by Farm Bill 2018.  
813 Cheever and McLaughlin (n 49) 179.  
814 However, as observed from the case of the UK above, there is need to consider which conservation 
practices should be supported by incentives to avoid the trap of buying out the right to cause harm to 
the land without doing any positive actions.  
815 Pratt (n 314) 1315; Reid, ‘The Privatisation of Biodiversity?’ (n 493) 214. 






they could spend on other conservation programmes.817 Second, some may take the 
view that public money should not be spent to support the protection of privately-
owned land where it is difficult to measure the success.818 Paying landowners who 
entered into management agreements in the UK in the past to stop them changing the 
type of land use and then receiving grant aid from taxpayers was criticised as unduly 
expensive.819 Third, some people argue that incentives may distort the motivation for 
conservation of a landowner from a willingness to conserve valuable features on land, 
incorporating an altruistic view, to a desire for taking money from participation in a 
CA. The use of financial incentives is an example of a negative side of this aspect.820 
In the case of conservation burdens, the Scottish Law Commission noted that they do 
not want a landowner to view a CA as an instrument to make a profit from land.821 
This indicates that the Commission wanted to encourage people to conserve their land 
with a real conservation mindset rather than to enter a CA with a commercially-based 
reason. Some note that if landowners participate in a CA scheme for a short-term 
incentive rather than the aspiration to conserve the land, this could be problematic 
where the prices of agricultural products increase significantly; they might abandon 
the CA and to comply with its obligations in pursuit of greater income.822  
9.4.2 The necessity of including a provision granting incentives 
The discussion in this sub-section can be divided into two points starting with the 
discussion about the benefits and drawbacks of incorporating a provision granting 
incentive in a CA-enabling law. Then, the upsides and downsides of providing a 
detailed provision for this legal matter will be discussed.  
As seen from the laws implemented in three jurisdictions above, some CA-enabling 
laws have this type of provision, but many do not. This difference engenders the 
question of what the advantages and disadvantages of two such different approaches 
are.  
                                                     
817 Owley (n 643) 12. 
818 Christopher Rodgers, ‘Nature’s Place? Property Rights, Property Rules and Environmental 
Stewardship’ (2009) 68(3) Cambridge Law Journal 550, 561-2, Rodgers, Law of Nature Conservation 
(n 493) 118. 
819 Reid, Nature Conservation Law (n 35) para 5.1.8; Hodge (n 801) 186-87; Rodgers, Law of Nature 
Conservation (n 493) 118. 
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821 Scottish Law Commission (n 509) para 9.20.  
822 Sue Stolton, Kent H Redford and Nigel Dudley, The Futures of Privately Protected Areas (Protected 





On the positive side, providing an incentive provision in a CA-enabling law could 
guarantee that burdened landholders will be eligible to get some form of incentives 
which could help them fulfil obligations arising from a CA. Without this clause, it 
remains uncertain whether or not a holder or government is obliged to provide some 
assistance in return. Apart from that, this approach makes a CA-enabling law attractive 
and can be seen as an economic instrument for environmental protection. However, 
others might oppose the previous notion on grounds that there is no need to incorporate 
this type of condition in a CA-enabling law but rather it should appear in other laws, 
which are the sources of incentives. This is supported by the US model, where the 
majority of CA-enabling laws are silent on incentives in their state statutes. This view 
looks attractive in that a CA-enabling law should exclusively set the most critical 
elements for creation, compliance and enforcement of land-based obligations, and the 
matter about incentives might not be an important one. This approach enables the laws 
authorising the sources of funding to elaborate specific conditions for eligible persons 
and type of CA that are compatible with the requirements of granting incentives under 
those laws.  
Another discussion is about the benefits and drawbacks of providing a detailed 
provision about incentives. This question is set to enable further discussion in the case 
where a law-maker seeks to incorporate an incentive provision in a CA-enabling law. 
This consideration emerges from the fact that many CA-enabling laws contain 
provisions on incentives.  
The incorporation of a detailed provision about incentives in CA-enabling laws looks 
desirable because they not only guarantee a chance of receiving some form of incentive 
but also provide how a specific type of incentive can be granted and to whom. This 
feature can induce a prospective landowner who seeks financial support to opt into a 
CA. Nonetheless, it may generate some difficulty as it means that a qualified holder 
might need to offer a specified incentive to a landowner where such a qualified holder 
wants to enter into a CA, and this may not be appropriate for the needs of a specific 
landowner. For instance, if the CA-enabling law prescribes that a CA participator may 
receive an income tax deduction, this may not be attractive from the view of a 
landowner who has to pay a low rate of an income tax.  
Such a limitation could suggest that the use of a provision with no detail regarding the 





which specific types of incentive are appropriate for an individual CA subject to the 
agreement between parties to a CA. This approach sees the place for detailed 
provisions being in the law aiming at granting financial support, as seen from the case 
of the Farm Bill in place in the USA. Participating landowners are eligible to receive 
payments from governments when the CAs they entered into meet the conditions 
specified by laws granting such a payment. The disadvantages of this brief provision 
are that they are less clear on what type of incentives can be made, and from where the 
sources of incentive come. In this regard, a detailed provision, elaborating what 
specific forms of incentive are available, and how they are granted could look more 
attractive. However, this approach should be exclusively employed where a 
government decides to support the use of CAs with specific types of incentive and 
ensure that such support will be available throughout the binding period of a CA. This 
discussion will be examined in-depth in the next chapter in the context of Thailand.  
 
10. Registration and the system of making CA information available  
This part primarily investigates how the comparator jurisdictions set the provisions 
recognising CA registration. It is interlinked to the very nature of CAs in imposing 
obligations running with the land, as observed in the previous parts.823  
As will be observed in the later sections, the rule of CA registration is part of land 
registration under the legal regime of each jurisdiction. In brief, a fundamental rule for 
the acquisition or transfer of property rights on real property is reliant on a requirement 
for the registration of burdens on a land title deed.824 This rule requires landowners to 
                                                     
823 The examination in the previous parts indicates that the ability of CAs to run with the land and bind 
future landowners plays a vital part in shaping the legal features about burdened landholder, types of 
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824 See a range of land registration systems in European countries at Christoph U Schmid, Christian 
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register or record the acquisition or creation of any obligations running with the land 
to make them legally binding.825 This process could be done in a land title document.826  
Several reasons can justify making use of land registration. First, it is a pre-condition 
of making rights arising from a CA fully implemented and enforced. At the same time, 
where a CA is varied or terminated, making some change in land registration also 
brings the change into effect. In many cases, as will be seen from the investigation 
below, this process is employed to give a CA legally binding effect. Second, land 
registration is evidence of the existence of a CA, displayed on a title document of 
property. Land registration could help a person who seeks to purchase the land subject 
to a CA to be on notice.827  At the same time, it plays a vital role in keeping a record 
where a CA is varied or terminated.  
Another point worth examining as part of the investigation at this point is about the 
system of making CA-related information available for the public, although it is not 
part of the requirement of CA registration and established with a different purpose.828 
The rules, nevertheless, involve the recordation of CA information. This system may 
require a governmental body to set a system to gather information about CAs made 
and make it available to the public. This information could help local planners to be 
aware that which piece of land is under a CA and avoid declaring such a land to be 
restricted by another legal restriction.829 It also could help secure the openness and 
transparency about the existence of a CA.830  
                                                     
825 The details in making the registration of the land in each jurisdiction might be varied but follow this 
basic pattern. In the context of England, see Land Registration Act 2002, ss 2 and 48. See also Law 
Commission (n 534) paras 2.55-2.58. 
In Australia, see the rule for NSW in the Real Property Act 1900, s 46A (creation of easements over 
own land by a dealing).  
In the USA, the rules might be slightly different from the UK and Australia subject to the land law of 
each state. For instance, the rules of land registration in California are stated in the Civil Code about the 
recording transfers, ss 1213 – 1220. 
826 In England, for example, see the explanation about the registration of easements or covenants in 
England in Law Commission (n 534) 2.50-2.64; Land Registration Act 2002, ss 2 and 48; Judith Bray, 
Unlocking Land Law (6th edn, Routledge 2019) 57-81. 
827 Law Commission (n 45) para 5.62; Amy Wilson Morris and Adena R Rissman, ‘Public Access to 
Information on Private Land Conservation: Tracking Conservation Easements’ [2009] Wisconsin Law 
Review 1237, 1242. 
828 While the main purpose of CA registration is for dealing with the land in future, the system of making 
CA information available is primarily for transparency in serving the public goals involved. 
829 Gerald Korngold, ‘Private Conservation Easements: Balancing Private Initiative and the Public 
Interest’ in Property Rights and Land Policy, Proceedings of the 2008 Land Policy Conference (Lincoln 
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Overall, Australia provides some conditions for making the information about CA 
implementation available for the public, but the means of CA registration or 
recordation are slightly distinctive. Commonwealth legislation does not require a 
competent body to register or record a conservation agreement, but the laws of NSW 
and WA employ such legal techniques as a key mechanism.  
The requirements of CA registration under the laws of NSW and WA are similar in 
that they require registration of the creation of CAs on land title documents, but the 
governing rules remain distinctive subject to the general rules under land law of each 
state. In general, the regimes of two states require a holder to notify the Registrar-
General. Then, the laws require the Registrar-General to register a particular CA.831 
The legal effect of registering a CA is that it enables a CA to run with the land and to 
be enforced by and against a successive owner of land title.832 The failure to register 
could leave a CA unenforceable against anyone other than the original party who 
entered it. It is to be noted that registration is also required when a holder and burdened 
landholders seek to vary or terminate a CA. The details for this will be examined in 
part 12 below.  
As mentioned, the legal technique employed in the Commonwealth level under 
EPBCA 1999 is unique. Although registration is not a requirement under the 
Commonwealth regime, the Minister, as a holder, is required to publicise a 
conservation agreement in the Gazette or other way stipulated in regulations.833 This 
can be seen as a system of central recordation of CAs similar to those used in the USA 
as will be seen in section 10.3 below. The reasons for this could be that as noted in 3.1, 
eligible areas for concluding a CA can be either terrestrial areas or maritime ones, 
where there will be no title document. In many cases, a conservation agreement is 
merely an agreement to manage publicly-owned land by states or local authority, 
which might not be owned by such bodies. Making a formal public declaration seems 
to be more desirable than providing a legal requirement to register the creation of CAs 
in a land title deed. 
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832 BCA 2016 (NSW), ss 5.13(1), 5.24 and 5.31; BCA 2016 (WA), ss 118 and 129. 







Similar to the legal regime in Australia, the coming into effect of CAs in the UK 
requires a certain method of registration but the legal procedures employed in each 
region are slightly different subject to the land law background and the legal provisions 
requiring such registration. However, there is no comprehensive system collecting 
information about CAs.  
The legal regimes in the registration of management agreements under various statutes 
use the same basic notion. However, they provide separate provisions about the 
methods of land registration between management agreements in England and Wales 
and in Scotland. Regarding those implemented in England and Wales, several statutes, 
for instance, WCA 1981,834 provide that the registration of management is required 
similarly as that of forestry dedication covenants.835 In England, an SSSI agreement is 
registered as a local land charge.836 In Scotland, an SSSI agreement can be recorded in 
the official land registration system (the Register of Sasines and now the Land 
Register).837 After being registered or recorded, management agreements can be 
enforced against persons who have an interest in the land and those who will be in this 
position in the future.838 Similarly, the Environment Bill provides that a conservation 
covenant is a local land charge,839 which means that it requires registration to make it 
enforceable against successive landowners and occupiers.840 
TC(S)A 2003, which enables the creation of a conservation burden, is another Scottish 
statute requiring the registration of real burdens. Conservation burdens can be created 
by duly registering a constitutive deed.841 The registration of burdens under this Act is 
                                                     
834 WCA 1981, s 39(4).  
835 The governing rule for the registration of forestry dedication covenants can be observed from s 5(4) 
and Schedule 2 of Forestry Act 1967, s 72 of Settled Land Act 1925. These provisions are designed to 
deal with the special case where land is held by someone who is not the absolute owner who enters the 
agreement.  It is implicit in s 5 of Forestry Act 1967 that it is the owner of land who is entering the 
agreement (only the full owner will have the capacity to make/accept the promises involved).  The other 
provisions then set out the rules for those who have less than full ownership, allowing them to enter 
agreements that apply as far as their own limited interests do. This special provision is not something 
that needs to be mentioned. 
836 DETR (n 798) para 3.11 and 4.2. 
837 CA 1968, s 15(6). 
838 ibid s 15(6). 
839 Environment Bill, cl 105.  
840 ibid cl 107(2)(5). 





unique in that it sets an effective date of a conservation burden after it is registered, 
and such a constitutive deed may postpone an effective date of a conservation burden 
to the date specified in that deed subject to conditions under this Act.842 As 
conservation burdens are a subset of real burdens, they run with the land after the 
registration has been made.843 TC(S)A 2003 stipulates that the registration of this 
burden in a constitutive deed844 makes the burden run with the land and binds an 
owner, tenant or persons having the use of the burdened property.845  
  
10.3 USA  
As conservation easements constitute an interest in real property, most of the 
conservation easement-enabling statutes and UCEA employ a similar language 
regarding a land registration requirement. They commonly state that conservation 
easements can be recorded in the same manner as other easements.846  
The details on how conservation easements can be recorded are different subject to the 
legal rule of recordation in each state. California and Hawaii require the recordation in 
the office of the county recorder, and the bureau of conveyance.847 Colorado requires 
the recordation upon the public record subject to the laws regarding recordation.848 
Some states require further detail about the recordation. For example, Illinois, New 
York and Montana use very similar language that the recordation must describe details 
about the land with a sufficient legal description or by reference to a recorded plot 
showing its boundaries.849 
Regarding the legal binding effect of conservation easement recordation, many UCEA 
state statutes employ the same or similar provisions which they adopted from UCEA. 
They require the acceptance of conservation easements by a holder and the recordation 
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845 TC(S)A 2003, ss 9 and 10. 
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of conservation easements as the pre-conditions making the rights arising from 
conservation easements enforceable in favour of or against a holder.850  
The legally binding effect of conservation easement recordation under the laws of non-
UCEA states are slightly different from those adopting the rule of UCEA. They 
provide a fragmented picture, but the legal consequence is similar to those of the 
UCEA states. Michigan, for example, provides that conservation easement must be 
recorded ‘with the register of deeds in the county… to be effective against a bona fide 
purchaser for value without actual notice’.851 
Regarding the system in compiling conservation easement-related information, the 
USA has a central database compiling information about conservation easements 
nationwide, namely the National Conservation Easement Database (NCED).852 This 
database is not an outcome of a statutory requirement but rather the effort of several 
public and non-public bodies in the country, who help collect necessary information 
about each easement, for instance, its location and extent, This system becomes a tool 
helping governmental bodies and land trusts to plan a strategy of land conservation, 
enhance collaboration and advance public accountability regarding conservation 
easements held by those bodies. It is worth noting that the National Conservation 
Easement Database is not a complete record of all conservation easements and data 
availability in the US has been criticised.853 
Apart from the central system explained above, a few states set a legal requirement 
considered as a central recordation system of each state. Maine, for instance, requires 
all easement holders to file an annual report to the Department of Agriculture, 
Conservation and Forestry. The report must indicate the number of easements held, 
their location, and the amount of acreage protected.854 Utah uses a different approach 
in that it obligates a burdened landowner, not a holder, to submit a copy of a 
conservation easement signed and binding their properties to the Utah County 
Assessor’s office.855 
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852 See NCED, ‘National Conservation Easement Database: About Us’ 
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10.4 An analysis  
The investigation about CA registration above shows that all CA-enabling laws 
provide the means for providing evidence for the coming into effect of CAs. 
Registration is prevalent in the majority of CA-enabling laws, but the means, 
procedures and legal effect of the recordation are slightly different. Some provide the 
details on how to register CAs while many do not. The variety of details concerning 
the means of making a CA be in effect constitutes various points for discussion, 
including the limitation, legal effect and the system of recordation as will be observed 
below.   
10.4.1 Necessity of land registration 
Although most CA-enabling laws require the registration of a CA in a land-related 
document subject to the broader national schemes for land titles, this does not mean 
that land registration has no drawbacks or limitations. This sub-section considers the 
reasons for and against the use of CA registration. 
As mentioned at the beginning of this part, the most crucial reason, requiring the CA 
registration, stems from a traditional concept of land law in many jurisdictions. 
Without the registration of the creation of CAs in a land title deed, an obligation or 
right created between two parties is a mere personal right or contractual obligation. 
Land registration would help standardise a CA in the same position of other types of 
interests in the land and enables a person seeking to purchase a piece of land to notice 
title conditions recorded in a land title.  
Nonetheless, it is worth considering what the limitations of land registration might be. 
First, recordation might be problematic where a proposed CA-enabling law seeks to 
conserve some features that do not appear on the land which have a land title 
document, for example, to oblige an agreed person to improve water quality in a river, 
to require a particular public body to conserve some publicly-owned land, as the case 
may be. This could arise where a CA is created as a vehicle for creating payments for 
ecosystem services between e.g. persons living in an upper stream and the government. 
CA registration on a land title might not be appropriate if CA-enabling laws aim at 
conserving features in the areas other than the privately-owned land. Land registration 





seems bureaucratic from the viewpoint of a landowner. It also indicates that any 
modification and termination may need to be done in the same vein as that of creation.  
10.4.2 Legal effect of land registration 
As observed above, many CA-enabling laws require the registration of a CA with 
different conditions, and this constitutes different legal effects. Some CA-enabling 
laws view land registration as a condition of the validity of a CA. Without land 
registration, no right arising from a CA can be claimed against an opposite party. 
However, many others see it as a condition of making a CA run with the land. Although 
unregistered CAs do not run with the land, they are legally binding and generate 
contractual obligations on the parties who made them.  
The first model considers that an unregistered CA constitutes no rights and claims to 
a holder and burdened landholder. This view looks appealing because, first, it forces a 
holder or landowners to record a CA as soon as practicable. A holder will be unable to 
claim any rights against a burdened landholder unless the recordation has been 
completed. Second, this approach increases the likelihood of land being secured by a 
CA. Once a CA has been registered, a prospective purchaser, who seeks to develop the 
land under a CA, has notice that such land is restricted for development by a CA. 
Nevertheless, some negative sides could occur from this approach. In the first place, 
setting land registration as a pre-condition of making a CA legally binding denies the 
trial period for implementation of CAs. It could be possible that where one of the 
parties has started carrying out some tasks with a cost, such a party will be unable to 
claim any rights from a CA unless such a CA is officially registered.  
The latter approach considers an unregistered CA as a personal right which creates a 
contractual obligation. This view enables CA parties to claim the right arising from a 
CA against each other. A holder can ask a burdened landholder to carry out the tasks 
agreed as the obligations, which means that the specified objects will be immediately 
conserved. It also looks desirable in that, from a regulatory point of view, a holder can 
require a burdened landholder to complete their tasks. Where such a burdened 
landholder no longer owns the burdened land, such an unregistered agreement will 
become unenforceable or terminated. This can be seen as an alternative way to create 
an initial agreement and allows the parties to decide whether they want to make the 





downside could be that an unregistered agreement may prevent a burdened landholder 
from claiming some benefits, such as tax breaks, which rely on there being an 
adjustment of property rights, not just a personal contract. This may motivate such a 
person to abandon a CA. This means that the fulfilment of a conservation purpose will 
be insecure, mainly, where the burdened land changes owner. This is a crucial point, 
especially in view of the discussion earlier about how a real virtue of CAs is that they 
create a long-term obligation. 
10.4.3 Necessity of a system to make information available 
The last point is about the advantages and disadvantages of setting a system for 
compiling CA information as seen in many states in the USA. As mentioned at the 
beginning of this part, this objective of the introduction of this system is to bring 
transparency and accountability of actions and spending for the public good, not 
informing those people who are directly affected from CA implementation. The 
establishment of this system is appealing in various repects, including, first, this 
system is a mechanism for gathering information about CAs, and to ensure the 
consistency between CA obligations and land-use planning of governments.856 
Second, providing this system would help governments assess the success of CA 
implementation.857 Third, it guarantees transparency and accountability to the wider 
public where the public can access the information provided by this system.858 
Nonetheless, publicity of a CA through the compilation system could generate some 
threats to the features conserved under a CA. It could become the map showing where 
some valuable features can be found, and some people may enter into the property and 
take such features.859 In the USA and Australia, the opponents of registering a parcel 
of land subject to a CA are concerned about their privacy on land, and the need to 
protect fragile species and habitats from unwelcome visitors.860 At the same time, it 
might be questionable what type of information should be compiled and made 
available for the public.861 Others add that the information made available for the 
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public should not be limited to that available in a registration process but should 
include that deriving from monitoring and enforcement stages. The Law Commission 
mainly discussed whether a central recording database should be introduced, in what 
form and how it will be made available, and who will take responsibility and bear the 
cost of making the information available.862 
 
11. Variation and termination 
The consideration of whether and how CAs can be varied or terminated is a further 
element worth examining. The ability of agreements to run with the land, especially 
those running in perpetuity to secure long-term conservation, means that they could 
experience some unanticipated events and it is challenging to predict whether their 
implementation will continue to serve their purposes and what may arise in the 
future.863 The word ‘variation’ refers to the action of changing or revising a term in a 
particular agreement after being entered into. A variation could make a change in the 
obligation of a burdened landholder, the scope of the purposes of the implementation 
of a CA or the binding period. The word ‘variation’ will be used interchangeably with 
the terms ‘modification’ and ‘amendment’. The word ‘termination,’ on the other hand, 
refers to the action seeking to cease the application of a CA before the date or period 
indicated in a CA. In many cases, a perpetual CA can be terminated according to the 
conditions specified under a CA-enabling law if it can no longer be used to serve the 
purpose for which it was initially created. The words ‘cancellation’ and ‘discharge’ 
will be occasionally used in place of the term ‘termination.’ 
Although the variation and termination of a CA constitute different legal effects, this 
thesis will examine these considerations together. This is because most of the CA-
enabling laws generally deal with these two matters with the same or similar rules, and 
they share the same points for discussion. This part will mainly examine three points, 
comprising: the actors entitled to vary or terminate a CA; the circumstance where a 
CA can be varied or terminated; and the process of variation and termination. 
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Overall, CA-enabling laws at both Commonwealth and state levels share a similar 
approach regarding the variation and termination. First, they allow the parties to the 
agreement to vary or terminate a CA. Second, the court has no role in deciding whether 
a CA should be varied or terminated. Third, the majority of the laws allow a holder to 
terminate a CA unilaterally where such termination meets certain conditions. 
However, the rules dealing with such variation and termination are slightly different, 
as will be illustrated as follows.  
The legal approaches for modifying or terminating CAs under the Commonwealth 
legislation and law of NSW are similar. They can be modified or terminated by a 
subsequent agreement between the parties. Such an agreement can be made between 
the public bodies who are a holder and a burdened landholder according to the rules 
under specific provisions.864 The unilateral variation by a holder, on the other hand, 
can be made where it meets the conditions stipulated by the law,865 including when a 
CA is no longer able to achieve its purposes,866 or when a mining or petroleum licence 
will be granted on the land subject to a CA.867  
The legal approach used for the modification and termination of CAs in WA is slightly 
different from those examined above. BCA 2016 (WA) requires that an amendment of 
a biodiversity conservation agreement and biodiversity conservation covenant can be 
done with the consent of the parties,868 which means that unilateral modification or 
amendment cannot be made. The termination of such two types of CAs is distinctive 
in that the covenant can be cancelled by a mutual agreement or by unilateral written 
notice by a holder.869 The agreement, on the contrary, can be exclusively terminated 
by a holder without the consent of a burdened landholder where the agreement can no 
longer serve its purpose for which it is entered into.870  
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Overall, the rules for modification and termination in the UK CA-enabling laws are 
fragmented. Some provide procedures on how CAs can be varied and terminated, but 
many do not. Management agreement authorising statutes do not have this kind of 
detail. This silence can be interpreted that the parties to the agreement are free to decide 
how a particular agreement will deal with these legal matters, in the same way as a 
private contract.871  
However, the rules for conservation burdens and conservation covenants are different 
from those of management agreements. They provide some rules dealing with the 
variation and discharge (termination) of burdens.  
A conservation burden holder is free to discharge a conservation burden by ‘registering 
against the burdened property a deed of discharge granted by or on behalf of the holder 
of the burden’.872 The court (the Lands Tribunal) becomes involved where the 
landowner wants some change or otherwise to end the agreement and cannot get the 
holder’s consent, or vice versa. In this case, a burdened landowner or a holder who 
seeks to vary or discharge a conservation burden must submit an application to the 
Lands Tribunal.873 In deciding whether to allow the verification or discharge of a 
conservation burden, the court is required to consider various factors, including the 
change in circumstances since such a burden was created, and the public benefits and 
the enjoyment of the burdened property.874 This approach not only exemplifies a legal 
model for amending or discharging a CA by the court but also illustrates the 
intervention of public bodies in determining whether a certain CA should be changed 
or terminated. This reflection will be discussed again in part 12 regarding public 
oversight.  
The discharge and modification of conservation covenants are different from those of 
conservation burdens. The Environment Bill provides that conservation covenants can 
be discharged and modified by agreement and by the court subject to detailed rules.875 
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The latter follows a similar procedure to that for conservation burdens under TC(S)A 
2003 explained above.876  
 
11.3 USA  
The USA represents the jurisdiction where conservation easements can be modified or 
terminated both by parties and by judicial power. The UCEA and many state 
conservation easement statutes, particularly those of UCEA-states, express the same 
or similar provisions in that conservation easements can be modified, terminated or 
otherwise altered or affected in the same manner as other easements. Both UCEA and 
some state statutes also empower the court to terminate and modify a conservation 
easement in light of the principles of law and equity.877  
Many state conservation easement-enabling statutes follow the UCEA approach, but 
many others do not. This research will draw the example of the state statutes from 
those having comprehensive details, namely Maine, Nebraska and Rhode Island. 
These three states share the same rules in that, in general, conservation easements may 
be modified or terminated by agreement between a holder and burdened landholder. 
However, in certain cases, the court will take over this role.  
In Maine and Rhode Island, a variation or termination which materially detracts from 
the conservation values intended for protection must be approved by the court and with 
the consent of a holder.878 In making such a decision, the court is required to consider, 
among other factors, the stated publicly beneficial conservation purposes. The statutes 
also articulate that ‘a landowner may have to pay for the increasing value of property 
to a holder if the variation or termination constitutes a financial benefit to a 
landowner’.879 In Nebraska, the statute offers an option for amending or terminating a 
conservation easement by an action of a landowner or holder. Both of them could ask 
for judicial power to vary or terminate a conservation easement by proving that a 
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conservation easement in question can no longer serve the public interest or is unable 
to achieve a conservation purpose for which it was created.880  
 
11.4 An analysis  
Although all CA-enabling laws provide rules regarding the variation and termination 
of CAs, some distinctive details observed above are worth discussing in three 
following respects.    
11.4.1 The importance of the provision of variation and termination 
The first discussion involves the point concerning the role of the legal provisions about 
the variation and termination of CAs, where views can be divided into two strands. 
Some people see that parties should be able to vary or terminate CAs in the same way 
as a simple contract, and an additional rule is unnecessary. Others might oppose this 
view, and see that an additional rule governing the variation and termination should be 
made.881  
Those who see that the provision of variation and termination is unnecessary might 
argue that a CA is a private law instrument created voluntarily. Thus, its variation and 
termination should be conducted by agreement between the parties or where the 
agreement provides a specific condition. Setting an additional rule could place a holder 
in a higher position to modify or terminate the agreement, which looks unfair.882  
Those who support the provisions of modification and terminations might argue that 
the lack of a governing rule could give rise to various problems. As a CA could last in 
perpetuity or for a long period, the person who becomes a burdened landholder will be 
changed over time, and some unanticipated change could happen. It is true that, on the 
one hand, allowing CA parties to decide whether to vary or terminate a CA could be 
justifiable for a perpetual or long-term CA, which is at risk of unsuccessful 
implementation due to the occurrence of some unanticipated change. In this regard, 
the variation or termination of a CA could help the successful implementation of CA 
by taking account of an unexpected change in the future. However, such a view might 
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be flawed because it could enable CA parties to thwart the conservation purpose by 
modifying or terminating CAs, and this could make the use of a CA worse or weaker 
than direct regulation.883 Hence, setting the conditions or rules on how CAs can be 
varied or terminated seem to be desirable. Apart from that, this view can be justified 
by the reasons that, first, providing the additional rule will help CA parties to get out 
of a permanent obligation even if other party is not available to agree or is being 
unreasonable. Second, since the main objective of CAs is to fulfil a public purpose, 
and in many cases, public money is spent for their implementation, it should not be in 
the hands of the parties alone to decide to abandon it.884  
11.4.2 Actors eligible to vary or terminate a CA 
The second point entails who are entitled to vary or terminate a CA. As seen from the 
investigation in previous parts, each jurisdiction provides different rules for this point. 
Some consider this point as an exclusive right of parties; others do not allow CA parties 
to do this freely unless approved by the court subject to conditions specified under the 
law. The first view might argue that a CA should be treated as a private agreement 
since a landowner and holder create it. Thus, these two persons are in the position to 
know whether a CA serves the aim of its creation or not. For this reason, they should 
be permitted to swap, trade, amend, release, and otherwise terminate a CA.885 Another 
might oppose the first view with a similar reason given in the first discussion that a 
CA exists to serve the public good.886  Hence, the importance of protecting the public 
interest suggests that a CA should be amended or extinguished through a court 
proceeding.887 This research views that this point should be discussed further with the 
point about the grounds for modification and termination below.  
11.4.3 Neccessity of grounds for modification or termination 
As observed above, some legislation states the circumstance where a CA can be varied 
or cancelled, but others do not. Some confer the power on the court to decide whether 
a CA in question should be varied or terminated. These findings can be further 
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discussed in two respects, namely the need to provide the grounds for the modification 
and termination, as well as the role of the court in doing these tasks.   
For the first consideration, the advantages of providing the grounds for CA 
modification and termination could be that it justifies the reasons of the variation or 
termination, and this makes the change transparent and accountable. Providing the 
grounds for CA modification, for example, where the CA in question can no longer 
serve the conservation purpose initially set by its parties is desirable because it can be 
justified with the public why a term of CA should be changed. Also, it might be 
possible that CA parties agree to terminate a CA, but this is opposed by the public. 
Thus, providing the grounds and processes for modification or termination could 
reduce the downsides of the private law nature of CA which could marginalise the 
public transparency and accountability.888 However, it could make the change too 
complicated and time-consuming. It might engender the questions ‘who will decide, 
for instance, when a perpetual CA is no longer serving its intended public purpose?’889 
And ‘who will take responsibility to amend or terminate a CA where such change 
arises?’  
In light of the preference to provide an additional rule as the grounds for CA 
modification and termination, discussed above, another consideration involves the role 
of the courts in modifying or terminating a CA. Reid and Nsoh argue that where one 
party is not available or being wholly unreasonable to modify or terminate a CA, some 
other bodies, including the court, should come into play to resolve such a difficulty.890 
The way in which the court can come into play has been illustrated and partly discussed 
above,891 but the point to be considered here is the advantages and disadvantages if the 
court is conferred the power to vary or terminate a CA.  As the very primary role of 
the court is to resolve the dispute, the court is in an appropriate position to decide 
whether a CA in question should be modified or terminated. The use of judicial power 
to deal with this matter is also appealing as it can be regarded as the oversight of CA 
by the public.892 Nonetheless, the court proceedings may be time-consuming. Apart 
from that, there is a need to consider the circumstances where the court can do this task.  
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12. Public oversight 
This part considers legal matters about public oversight stipulated in CA-enabling laws 
of the comparing jurisdictions. It entails the examination of whether or not and to what 
extent those laws provide any rules of public oversight of CAs, and  considering the 
advantages and disadvantages of such a legal requirement.   
The term ‘public oversight’ is used in two respects. First, it is an umbrella term for 
various processes or actions where non-CA parties are required or empowered to get 
involved, which reflects public oversight in the sense of public participation in 
environmental matters.  Second, this term also covers the circumstances where 
burdened landholders or holders are supervised or controlled by public bodies to 
ensure that a CA will be implemented and enforced properly (public oversight via 
public bodies).893 Public oversight in such two respects might occur in the stage before 
a CA is created, the stage of implementation or enforcement, subject to the stipulation 
by the law.894  
At the stage of creation, public oversight may take place in the form of public approval 
or public comment before a CA is concluded. Once a CA has been entered into, 
monitoring compliance may also be required. Monitoring entails setting an obligation 
to monitor CA implementation. Monitoring by a holder may involve the actions of 
keeping a record for itself or for reporting an implementation result to a public body. 
Public oversight also includes involvement by communities or individuals. It could be 
done in the form of a requirement of making information regarding CA 
implementation available to people and enable them to bring a case to the court where 
the breach of a CA obligation causes significant environmental impacts. Apart from 
that, public oversight may take place where it is proposed to vary or terminate a CA, 
as observed from the variation and termination of CA by the court in the previous part. 
Several explanations are suggested as to why this matter is essential to the conservation 
of features on land by a private legal tool. Some observe that CAs may involve the use 
of public funds to encourage landholders to conserve biodiversity on their land for 
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public goods. Hence, the implementation of CAs with the use of public oversight, as 
an alternative to direct regulation, would help achieve a particular goal or purpose for 
public goods.895  
  
12.1 Australia  
Overall, there are some legal measures regarded as public oversight in place in 
Australia. The Commonwealth legislation briefly provides that parties to a 
conservation agreement might agree to create a monitoring system,896 and this could 
be regarded as public oversight mentioned above because one of the parties is a public 
body (the Minister).897 The WA legislation has no explicit requirement of oversight or 
monitoring, but the law enables parties to agree to implement a plan for the 
management of agreement land.898 Some scholars question such lack of provision for 
monitoring, in that it could lead to ambiguity in the standard and approach of 
monitoring.899 However, in practice, public oversight by monitoring and report is 
required for a CA with financial assistance900 or where parties to a CA agree to set an 
overseeing clause. For example, a conservation agreement may entitle the 
Commonwealth agency to access and inspect the land under this conservation 
agreement for monitoring compliance and taking any action that is required to remedy 
or monitor any breach of this conservation agreement.901 
The law of NSW seems to be one providing details of oversight. For example, once 
registered and entered into, the NSW legislation requires the Environment Agency 
Head to make information regarding public registers of privately-owned land 
conservation agreements available on a government website and be made available on 
request by any person on payment of a reasonable fee.902 Although this legislation has 
no explicit provision requiring inclusion of a clause for monitoring compliance, in 
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practice, the Biodiversity Conservation Trust usually prepares a draft conservation 
agreement which requires a landowner to, among the other things, inspect and survey 
the agreement land.903 In the stage of enforcement, as mentioned in part 8, NSW also 
entitles anyone to bring a civil action for the breach of obligations.904 
 
12.2 UK  
In the UK, provisions requiring public oversight are rarely found, but some provisions 
under the Environment Bill and WCA 1981 seem to be an exception. Regarding WCA 
1981 as a statute authorising the creation of management agreement, it confers the 
power of entry to an authorised person to enter into the land for various grounds. One 
among them is to ascertain the compliance with the term of a management 
agreement.905 
The Environment Bill, on the other hand, sets the rule requiring the specified holders 
to report the information about conservation covenants to the Secretary of the State 
annually. The annual return reported to the Secretary of State must provide the 
information regarding the number of conservation covenants and areas of land held by 
such holders.906  
It is to be noted that the scarcity of provisions regarding public oversight does not 
mean that public oversight is not implemented for CAs in the UK. In fact, it is in the 
very nature of the limited number of holders means that they are subject to public 
oversight, either as public authorities (political accountability, public audit, judicial 
review, Freedom of Information) or as charities (Charity Commission).907 Apart from 
that, the right to access to environmental information, recognised in the UK, is 
regarded as a means of overseeing the implementation by the public. It means that 
where CAs are made between public authorities as a holder and landowners, the 
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information relevant to such CAs are regarded as environmental information subject 
to the access by the public under some environmental information-related statutes.908  
 
12.3 USA  
The USA represents the jurisdiction providing the most exhaustive details of how the 
public can oversee conservation easements. The possible explanation for this could be 
that because a large number of public and non-public bodies can come into play as a 
holder, and this requires tighter rules for overseeing these qualified bodies. Although 
UCEA and many state statutes contain no provision requiring this matter,909 it can be 
observed from the provision of some state statutes.  
In the stage of creation, many states require public review before a conservation 
easement will be created or registered. Massachusetts requires that the heads of certain 
public bodies must approve a conservation easement held by them depending on the 
purposes of the easements and the identity of the holders.910 Nebraska requires 
municipal or county approval of all easements, except for state-held easements, to 
minimise conflicts with land-use planning.911  
Additionally, many state laws provide a similar measure enabling non-parties to 
enforce the burdens of conservation easements where parties or other persons violate 
an obligation of a conservation easement.912 The enforcement by non-parties in court 
can be categorised into (1) enforcement by the entities having a third-party right of 
enforcement913 and (2) enforcement by certain authorised bodies or person. The 
enforcement by persons in the first category may happen where the parties who entered 
into a conservation easement agreed to set this type of right of enforcement.914 This 
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thesis regards third-party enforcement as a form of public oversight because the actors 
eligible to enforce are those who are not the parties, which reflects a characteristic of 
oversight by the public.  
Apart from the right to enforce conservation easements by a third-party prearranged in 
a conservation easement, many state statutes also authorise certain bodies or person to 
enforce conservation easements with specific conditions. For instance, Connecticut 
confers the power to enforce the public interest in a conservation easement on the 
Attorney General.915 Arizona authorises a governmental body to take a judicial action 
where the holder is no longer in existence, and there is no third-party right of 
enforcement.916 Illinois confers the right to bring an action on the neighbour who owns 
or possesses property nearby the burdened property.917  
 
12.4 An analysis  
The examination in the previous sections indicates the fragmentation of the use of 
public oversight in CA implementation. It does not explicitly appear in the 
Commonwealth and WA laws in Australia. In the UK, most statutes do not provide 
this matter similar to that in majority states in the USA. However, the appearance of 
this provision in some statutes could raise the question of why do they stipulate legal 
requirements for overseeing a CA by the public or individuals in the laws? What are 
their benefits and drawbacks? 
12.4.1 The need for an element of public oversight 
Although the desirability of oversight provisions must be considered in the context of 
the specific measures, there should be some general discussion of whether such 
arrangements are necessary or not. This discussion does not seek an exact answer but 
seeks to identify their benefits and drawbacks.  
Legal provisions about public oversight may look attractive for a law-maker for 
various reasons. Some consider public oversight as a mechanism to guarantee the 
achievement of the public interest, accountability and transparency, specifically, 
where a holder is a non-governmental body.918 For instance, public comment by 
relevant governmental bodies whether a CA in question is consistent with local land-
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use planning or not would justify that a purpose of implementing such a CA conforms 
to the public interest served by a local authority. Moreover, where a government uses 
public money to support the implementation, public oversight helps justify the use of 
public investment in CAs.919 Another positive dimension is about the enhancement of 
environmental and social justice. A particular form of public involvement, e.g. to make 
information available to the public or public consultation, could be seen as a way of 
increasing better decision-making by enhancing the transparency of environmental 
justice.920 However, some point out that public oversight is unnecessary or 
burdensome. Such provision might be not needed if governmental bodies alone are 
assigned to hold a CA921 because, presumably, such bodies are screened for their 
qualifications before becoming eligibile holders, and this could guarantee their 
capacity in overseeing a CA.922 At the same time, oversight provisions could increase 
the level of CA governance, make a governing regime too complicated both in 
administrative and financial matters.923 Some observers also note that the use of public 
oversight might detract from the legal nature of a CA, which is a private law 
instrument.924  
12.4.2 Advantages and disadvantages of the oversight by public comment, 
monitoring and public involvement 
As public oversight could be introduced before the creation, during the 
implementation, for the enforcement, variation and termination of CAs in various 
forms, it is worth discussing some advantages and disadvantages of the oversight by 
means of public comment, monitoring and public involvement.   
Public oversight could happen in the form of the requirements of commenting or 
approval by relevant public bodies and by public consultation before a CA takes effect. 
Such a pre-implementation process is desirable because it helps ensure that measures 
implemented by a bound landowner will be consistent with other land-use instruments. 
This process also enables a holder and landowner to know the concerns or issues raised 
by non-parties before formal implementation will be launched. However, this process 
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could have some drawbacks. For instance, public consultation is time-consuming925 
and might increase the costs of negotiation and implementation of a CA.  There might 
be a risk that a CA will not be entered into if the law requires public approval. 
Additionally, the disclosure of some pieces of information during a public consultation 
process, for instance, those about landowner’s names, locations of the proposed land, 
and natural and commercial features on the land, might increase the concern about 
privacy and confidentiality, similar to the disclosure of CA-related information 
discussed in sub-section 10.4.3 above.  
After a CA is created, oversight can be in the form of making information available to 
the public and monitoring compliance and reporting. The availability of information 
is a vital element enabling non-parties to participate in the implementation of land 
conservation through a CA. It not only makes CA implementation credible,926 but also 
helps prevent land-use conflicts among landowners and people in a relevant area.927 
Assume that a CA is created for biodiversity offsetting. Natural features on one parcel 
of land will be conserved, but those found on another place will be harmed from the 
development on that land, equivalent to those conserved on the first parcel of land.928 
If the parties to a CA do not disclose relevant information on what values are being 
conserved and degraded on the stewardship and offsetting parcels of land, the 
implementation of this type of CA will be questioned or opposed. However, there must 
be consideration of which pieces of information will be publicised and which will 
not.
929
 Another challenge is about the form and place where CA-related information 
will be publicised. Registration of a CA is indeed necessary as justified in part 10 
above, but the point of whether and how to make information available are 
questionable. Some noted that the recordation of a CA just in the deed to the property 
could be hard to find and understand.930  
Monitoring compliance is another tool commonly required under various CA-enabling 
statutes, specifically in the USA. It could help indicate whether or not CA 
implementation will succeed and meet the targets or goals initially set when it is 
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created. At the same time, tracking the progress of the implementation over the period 
of time could make a CA active and not forgotten.931 Nevertheless, the use of 
monitoring is burdensome in many aspects. Empirical study of conservation covenants 
in Australia in 2014 showed that effective monitoring requires resources to monitor, 
including staff numbers and time. Furthermore, the measurement of the success of 
implementation requires benchmark data and length of time.932 Additionally, it might 
be challenging to monitor the agreement land where the size of the land is vast, remote 
and likely to be subdivided in the future.933  
As mentioned in sub-section 9.4.2, non-CA parties could be eligible to enforce a CA 
where the breach of particular CA obligations arise in NSW and some states of the 
USA.934 This is an example of public oversight in the stage of CA enforcement. The 
rare appearance of this provision reflects that whether to introduce this measure might 
be debatable. Some might argue that a CA is an agreement between a holder and bound 
landowner. Thus, enforcing the obligation should be an exclusive right of the parties 
rather than to open for non-parties.935 The risk of being sued by various persons could 
discourage a prospective landowner from entering into a CA. At the same time, it 
would detract from the voluntary nature of a private law agreement. However, some 
observers argue that conferring the right to bring a civil proceeding to non-parties 
could support the encouragement of public involvement, which is necessary to secure 
public benefits.936 It also could be used as a last resort of litigation where a holder is 
reluctant to enforce a burdened landholder as discussed in sub-section 8.4.2 above.937  
 
13. Compatibility with existing relevant conservation tools and laws  
After the legal components of a CA have been investigated above, the issue of how an 
individual CA works with other conservation tools should be examined. This part 
involves the examination of whether and how a specific CA-enabling law interacts 
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with existing regulatory tools. This investigation helps this thesis justify the role of 
CAs in the nature conservation regime of each jurisdiction. It also helps to decide 
whether a CA-enabling law should be introduced as a stand-alone statute or be part of 
nature conservation law. 
Apart from that, the very nature of CAs, as a private tool used to serve the public 
interest, engenders a tension between the achievement of public and private interests, 
as mentioned in section 1.2 of chapter 2. The examination in this part will illustrate 
how the comparator jurisdictions provide legal provisions in dealing with this tension. 
The need to develop a new legal tool to work alongside nature conservation and land 
use regulation in Thailand also makes this worth examining. 
In general, CAs can work with several roles. A CA-enabling law might set them as a 
subsidiary tool to serve a specific conservation aim, as seen from an SSSI agreement 
concluded to restrict the exercise of rights over the land designated as a reserved area 
(SSSI). In many cases, CAs could be an optional instrument and work as a scheme 
encouraging landowners to work beyond a minimum standard of governmental 
regulation. These two attributes make the legal effect of CAs interact with the 
application of other legal tools. For example, CAs established for encouraging the 
conservation of biodiversity938 might requiring a landowner to refrain from or not 
permit activities causing land degradation, and this CA implementation might 
contradict an existing mining law, where mining on privately-owned land is 
possible.939 Such a legal effect begs the question of how the implementation of a CA 
under a specific CA-enabling law affects the implementation of other legal tools and 
vice versa.  
Such a main question can be investigated through two sub-questions. The first is ‘what 
roles does a CA play among other conservation tools?’ And ‘how does a specific CA 
affect the implementation of other conservation or regulatory tools, and vice versa?’  
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In general, the majority of the CAs in Australia operate individually as a biodiversity 
conservation tool, but some of them are regarded as a legal mechanism for 
implementing other schemes. CAs implemented at the Commonwealth level and in 
WA are examples of CAs that can be implemented independently. In NSW, a 
biodiversity stewardship agreement is one of a few cases of CAs implementing 
biodiversity offsetting. Yet all of them share a common feature as a biodiversity 
conservation tool under the laws related to nature conservation.  
The interaction between CAs and other instruments is an interesting point. Although 
almost all CAs operate individually, the Commonwealth and NSW legislation stipulate 
specific provisions regarding interaction with other legal tools. For instance, EPBCA 
1999 requires the Minister to take account, among other things, whether a proposed 
CA is consistent with the wildlife conservation plan made under this legislation.940 
After being entered into, activities covered by a conservation agreement can be taken 
without approval for development control under Part 3 of EPBCA 1999,941 as long as 
they conform to the conditions specified in a conservation agreement. EPBCA 1999 
also acknowledges that the activities complying with conservation agreement 
obligations are not offences even though such activities harm endangered species, 
migratory species or cetaceans protected under the lists of this Act.942  
Under the NSW regime, BCA 2016 has some provisions illustrating how private land 
conservation agreements interact with mining law, nature conservation law and 
planning law. For instance, biodiversity stewardship agreements are terminated if the 
sites are reserved as national parks or other reservations.943 Apart from that, all private 
land conservation agreements can be varied or terminated if the land is granted a 
mining licence.944  Regarding the interaction with planning law, BCA 2016 prohibits 
a public authority from carrying out any development on land subject to any private 
land conservation agreements unless the proposed development is given consent by 
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the Minister. The Minister’s consent can be granted where the development will not 
adversely affect, among the others, the biodiversity protected by the agreement.945  
In WA, biodiversity conservation agreements and covenants are a legal tool created 
for achieving biodiversity conservation ends similar to other regulatory tools.946 Yet 
there is no provision prescribing how the implementation of these two agreements 
interact with other conservation tools as found in the Commonwealth regime. In the 
absence of provisions describing the interconnection with the wider conservation law, 
it might lead to some uncertainty.947  
 
13.2 UK  
The UK has both CAs that operate as a part of legal regulation, and others implemented 
independently to encourage landowners to carry out activities beyond a minimum legal 
standard. The first can be observed from some management agreements created to 
establish nature reserves under NPACA 1949. The latter can be seen from conservation 
burdens and conservation covenants.   
As observed by Ross and Rowan-Robinson, management agreements are generally 
created to work alongside or as a part of a direct regulatory conservation tool to achieve 
environmental ends.948 Management agreements for the establishment of SSSIs 
represent CAs operating as a subsidiary tool of legal regulation for the designation of 
sites.949 Rodgers notes that management agreements under WCA 1981 illustrate the 
use of governmental power in enforcing positive management of nature 
conservation950 and buying out damaging development proposals from SSSIs.951 In 
most cases, after a certain parcel of land is notified as an SSSI,952 a competent 
governmental body will negotiate with a landowner of that land to conclude a 
management agreement to manage that land.953 In this case, the landowner who wants 
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to secure certain patterns of land use and give up others may agree to conclude an SSSI 
agreement.954 This type of agreement identifies the activities955 allowed to operate and 
to be restricted or to be managed so as to achieve the aim of the establishment of an 
SSSI.  
Apart from the role as a subsidiary part of conservation regulation, the implementation 
of management agreements could interact with other regulatory rules, including the 
interplay with the provisions of nature conservation and compulsory purchase. For 
instance, a bound landowner can carry out operations likely to damage the flora, fauna, 
or geological or physiographical features with no offence if such operations conform 
to the terms of the management agreement or management scheme.956 Yet the breach 
of such an agreement might lead to the exercising of compulsory purchase the land 
under the SSSI agreement.957  
In light of the independence and interaction of other schemes, conservation burdens in 
Scotland employ a different approach from that of management agreements. Scottish 
legislation does not provide whether and how the creation of conservation burdens 
affects the implementation of other conservation or land-use planning schemes. Reid 
notes that they can either operate independently from other conservation schemes or 
be implemented as a legal mechanism conveying other conservation schemes, 
including payments for ecosystem services.958 How they are created is exclusively by 
agreement between a designated conservation body and an appropriate landowner. It 
is closely linked to the operation of land law in that first, it shares the legal regime with 
other real burdens. Second, it limits the right to use a burdened property of landowners 
and occupiers.  
The Environment Bill is an example of a provision demonstrating how conservation 
covenants may interact with other legal measures. For example, the Bill lays down a 
defence for the breach of CA obligations where burdened landholders are unable to 
comply with the obligations as a result of the matter beyond their control.959 This 
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includes the situation where the burdened land has been formally designated for a 
public purpose and compliance with the covenant’s obligation would involve a breach 
of any statutory control applying as a result of that designation.960 The example 
indicates that the compliance with CA obligation can be overridden by some legal 
measures introduced by other laws.961 
 
13.3 USA  
As examined in section 1.3, the legal landscape of conservation easement-enabling 
laws in the USA is very complex due to the interaction of various statutes, at both 
federal and state levels. Conservation easements can be concluded as an independent 
tool for land conservation or as a subsidiary tool of conservation regulation. 
Conservation easements in the latter case are created under a specific federal statute, 
for instance, those concluded under the Agriculture Improvement Act 2018 (Farm Bill 
2018) and the Migratory Bird Hunting and Conservation Stamp Act 1934. However, 
as this thesis exclusively examines those established under the enabling statute of each 
state. This section will only examine conservation easements which operate 
individually rather than those working as a supplementary tool of C&C regulation.  
Overall, under state statutes conservation easements can be created voluntarily and 
independently. They do not need to be part of a conventional conservation tool as seen 
in management agreements in the UK and biodiversity stewardship agreement in 
NSW. However, the statutes authorising the creation of conservation easements of 
some states provide how conservation easements could affect or be limited by the 
application of other legal tools.  
As mentioned in section 1.3, one of the grounds for the introduction of conservation 
easement-enabling laws in the USA is to eradicate the impediment of creating 
perpetual and negative easements in gross. However, as enunciated in UCEA and 
many state statutes, the laws creating a conservation easement have no intention to 
exclude the burdened land from other means of legal controls, for instance, eminent 
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domain962 and zoning. However, some states, for example, Rhode Island, set additional 
duties on the bodies seeking to acquire a burdened property by eminent domain to 
notify the purpose of intended public use to holders and pay a fee for taking.963  
Apart from that, some state statutes require that conservation easements created in a 
particular jurisdiction must be consistent with some of the other legal provisions. 
Virginia requires that the obligation created under conservation easements must be 
consistent with the comprehensive plan of the area where the burdened property is 
located.964 Montana requires the process of public review by an appropriate local 
planning authority (as explained in the previous part) to minimise conflict with local 
comprehensive planning.965 This process is required prior to the process of recording 
a conservation easement on a land title.  
 
13.4 An analysis  
The examination in the previous section illustrates the fragmentation and scarcity of 
rules regarding the compatibility of CAs and other legal instruments. The majority of 
them set a CA to work independently, but not as a substitute for conventional legal 
regulation since CAs could work alongside other conventional conservation 
instruments. However, some CAs are part of the government regulatory tools. 
Regarding the interaction with other legal tools, a majority of CA-enabling laws set 
some provisions on what to do when CA implementation overlaps or conflicts with 
other regimes. The independence of CAs and the interaction of CAs with other legal 
instruments can be further discussed below. 
13.4.1 The importance of independence 
The independence feature of a CA could be justified with various reasons, including 
first, that independent CAs encourage their creation based on the negotiation of a 
perspective holder and landowner. Such two parties could opt into a CA where they 
agree that an individual piece of land should be secured by the agreement. This enables 
CA parties to conserve the land or features any individual or body thinks important, 
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not just those that have been identified by the governmental policy and bodies. Second, 
making a CA an independent legal tool means that CAs could work without the support 
of C&C regulation. Land conservation by the use of CAs can help conserve some 
features in the areas where C&C is absent, inadequate or ineffective. Also, CA 
implementation can make progress even where official schemes are not strong. Third, 
a CA, which operates independently, is attractive in that it invites non-public 
organisations to come into play, while a CA running as a supplementary of government 
regulation may not. The cases of biodiversity stewardship agreement in NSW and 
management agreements in the UK, which are a mere supplementary regulatory tool, 
reflect that they vest the power to create a CA in certain public bodies. This means that 
there is no place for a non-governmental body to participate in conserving the land if 
a CA is a part of government regulatory scheme unless the law entitles such a body to 
oversee both a regulatory scheme and a CA created therein. Another reason supporting 
independence is that where a CA can work independently, the success and failure of 
the implementation of such a CA will not affect the implementation of other regulatory 
schemes. 
However, the downsides of independence should not be overlooked. Some others may 
argue that setting a CA as a supplementary tool of a conventional C&C regulation 
could look more appealing. It is suitable for a jurisdiction where a CA has never been 
implemented before, and there is uncertainty whether the establishment of an 
independent scheme for CAs is necessary or creates a new problem in the regime of 
land conservation. The appeals of a dependent CA could be, firstly, that it becomes an 
option for the use of government regulation for conservation aims. The case of 
management agreements in the UK demonstrates a CA running with an existing 
conservation regime, which is easier to introduce as it is a part of government 
regulation. Second, as there is a public body in charge of implementing a conventional 
legal measure, there is no need to set a new body to administer a CA. While setting an 
independent CA might be costly and raise concerns over transparency, setting a CA as 
a supplementary tool exercised by a public authority could be more transparent and 
accountable because it is subject to a judicial review. Third, as mentioned in part 2 
regarding the purposes and scope of CA implementation, the object of CA 
implementation, which is overseen by a public body, is likely to serve a specific public 





conservation measures could make the implementation of land conservation 
programmes as a whole consistent, efficient and coherent.
966
 Such consistency, 
coherence and efficiency can be apparent in the case where public money is used on 
those programmes. It means that where a CA is one of the conservation options in the 
hand of governmental bodies, such bodies could prioritise which ones should be 
selected. And where a CA is selected, such bodies can design a scheme by targeting the 
land where the conservation goal is likely to succeed.967 
13.4.2 The interaction with other legal instruments 
In most cases, the implementation of CAs interacts with the legal tools concerning the 
use and restriction of the use or carrying out activities on land. This section considers 
how a CA can interact with other land use control-related measures. Admittedly, this 
examination is not comprehensive since land conservation by CA implementation 
interacts with a very wide range of legal tools.
968
 This examination will exclusively 
investigate the interaction of a CA with the legal provisions about nature conservation; 
planning; and mining activities, respectively as the illustrations of the interaction 
between CAs and other tools.   
A. Interaction with nature reserve designation under government regulation  
The starting point is that the use of nature reserve designation and CAs resemble each 
other in that they create some restrictions concerning the use of land.969 However, they 
are created from different regulatory concepts. While CAs are a privately-owned land 
conservation tool made voluntarily, the designation of a nature reserve is in essence a 
form of C&C. In many cases, the latter is undesirable due to political limitations or the 
legal culture of each jurisdiction.970 Nonetheless, the following cases exemplify how 
these regulatory options are interrelated. 
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As seen from the law of NSW, the land protected by a biodiversity conservation 
agreement can be released from the status under this agreement when it is designated 
to be a national park or other nature reserve under the National Parks and Wildlife Act 
1974. Another opposite case is management agreements in the UK that could be 
created to secure a nature reserve status. Such a distinction indicates that a CA could 
interact with the legal regime of nature reserve designation in two ways. First, it can 
be an instrument creating protection for nature akin to a nature reserve on privately-
owned land where there is no law entitling this. Second, in the case where the law 
allows nature reserves on privately-owned land, a CA could operate as a temporary 
voluntary instrument to secure such land before a competent public body decides 
whether to declare such land as a nature reserve. In this instance, CAs can be regarded 
as a more flexible alternative to direct regulation before being strengthened by the 
permanent status of a nature reserve under legal regulation.  
B. Interaction with a legal planning regime 
Although CA-enabling laws in Australia and the UK make a few provisions dealing 
how a CA could affect the implementation of planning regime, several conservation 
easement-enabling statutes in the USA illustrate how they are linked together.971 The 
examination in the previous sections suggests at least three legal implications. First, 
planning permission could be prohibited or restricted to secure conservation practices 
on a particular piece of property under a CA, as seen from CAs implemented in NSW. 
Second, the content of a proposed CA might need to conform to planning 
requirements, or be subject to public review by a local authority in the area, as seen 
from the laws of Virginia and Montana. This requirement is interesting and may be 
worth considering because it is possible that where the land is proposed to be 
conserved under a perpetual agreement, a planning authority may have to consider 
whether to exclude such piece of land from a land-use development plan.972 Moreover, 
where such proposed land is already designated to allow some development activities, 
the parties should know whether it is possible to conclude a CA on that land. This is a 
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possible approach that has been used in the USA in recent years.973 Third, the very 
nature of CA obligations which commonly restrict the use of land might possibly 
conflict with land-use planning, which is likely to be changed from time to time. This 
reflects that CA obligations might interact with a planning rule in the manner that the 
first is overridden by the latter (by the subsequent permission).  These possible 
circumstances illustrate that although CAs are useful in several respects, the 
implementation of this conservation tool may give rise to public-private regulatory 
tension.974 
C. Interface with mining law  
The point whether the land secured by a CA could be affected by mineral exploration 
and exploitation-related laws is worth considering as an example of the clash between 
nature conservation law and a natural resource exploitation-related regime. These two 
instruments can interact with each other because they entail the use of land. While a 
CA generally protects features found on land by restricting land use of a landowner, 
mining law, for instance, seeks to take valuable minerals from below the land; in many 
jurisdictions, minerals do not belong to a landowner, but are instead owned by the 
state.975 It is not surprising that CA-enabling laws of many jurisdictions, as seen from 
those of NSW and the USA, provide that a CA will or could be terminated if a mining 
licence is granted for that land. Such a legal provision has both strengths and 
weaknesses. On a positive side, it could be a possible way to balance economic 
development and environmental protection because securing the land by a CA should 
not prevent access to minerals underground. Apart from that, a CA is a private law 
instrument created by a landowner who is not the owner of minerals under the land. 
Hence, an instrument created by a person who is not entitled to excavate minerals 
should not affect the right to mine. However, another might view that this approach is 
human-centric and based on economic benefits. Mining operation involves land 
clearing, which constitutes the degradation of features on land. In the case of 
underground mining, conveying of minerals from a mining pit by heavy vehicles could 
affect the natural environment nearby a mining site. Hence, there is no compromise 
between economic development and environmental protection, where a CA is 
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terminated by mining approval. Some suggest that the bodies entitled to enter into a 
CA should make an assessment of the potential for the prospective land being granted 
mining licences before entering into a CA to limit this conflict.976 
 
Conclusion 
The examination in this chapter has highlighted various points about the design of laws 
establishing CAs which are useful when considering the development of proposed 
legal provisions for Thailand. This chapter studied thirteen elements of CA-enabling 
provisions by employing a comparative approach to compare the laws in place in 
Australia, the UK and the USA. It showed that those laws have many standard features, 
which can offer guidance in drafting the model for Thailand. The similarities and 
differences of those considerations uncover what can be the strengths, weaknesses or 
the points worth considering in the next chapter. Apart from that, this chapter revealed 
that, although being a voluntary tool in nature, it can function as a subsidiary tool of 
C&C regulation creating interaction between this tool and C&C regulation in many 
respects. Some functions of CA-enabling laws in the comparator jurisdictions, for 
example, the measures about public oversight and the enforcement for the breach of 
obligations and the designation of eligible holders, are the outcome of and influenced 
by the design choice for regulation illustrated in chapter 2 and 3. Hence, the 
development of new law for Thailand should consider how to make a proposed CA 
work alongside current direct regulation. 
 
  
                                                     
976 See the recommendation of EDO Tasmania, an environmental NGO in Australia, in EDO Tasmania, 
‘Conservation Covenants: Options to improve Security for the Protection of Private Land in Tasmania’ 





Chapter 6 The legal proposal for CA-enabling provisions for Thailand  
 
Introduction 
After the comparison of CA-enabling laws has been made in chapter 5, this chapter 
attempts to develop a legal proposal regarding CA creation for Thailand (the legal 
proposal). It comprises three main components embedded in the notion that this thesis 
supports the introduction of a set of provisions facilitating the creation of CAs as a 
subsidiary tool of C&C regulation977 under the existing laws in Thailand mentioned 
above.  
Based on the position set above, the first part entails the justifications for the legal 
proposal. It considers what the opportunities could be. Then, it will analyse whether 
the existing laws relating to land rights, land-use regulation and nature conservation, 
examined in chapter 4, are sufficient to create CAs; or if a new set of provisions should 
be made. The second part entails the elaboration of how the legal proposal should be 
developed. This development will consider the content, structures, similarities and 
differences of CA-enabling laws, as well as their strengths, weaknesses and legal 
implications of these features as discussed in chapter 5. It will examine the legal 
structure, content and the justifications for the establishment of such a legal proposal. 
The last part will analyse the overall strengths and weaknesses of the proposal for a 
CA-enabling law. The primary task of this part is to identify the points that should be 
taken into account to make it conform to a government’s policy and the environmental 
issues which the government seeks to solve.978  
 
1. The justifications for the introduction of a new legal scheme 
The examination of the available tools under the existing laws in Thailand and the 
application of CAs in the selected jurisdictions illustrated the room for the 
development of a new legal proposal. This part justifies the advantages of the legal 
proposal, and explores the limitations of the existing regime.  
 
                                                     
977 See further explanation of how these two legal approaches apply in the conclusion of chapter 2. 
978 This chapter considers the justifications for the introduction of a CA-enabling law in two stages. Part 
1 justifies why the legal concept of CA should be introduced into the Thai legal system. After the legal 
proposal has been developed, part 3 will exclusively explore the reasons why the legal proposal 





1.1 Opportunities arising from the introduction of the new legal proposal 
The first consideration worth considering here is ‘why could the legal proposal bring 
about positive change in the legal regimes of land conservation and environmental 
regulation in Thailand?’ Although this point is partly stated in chapter 1 regarding the 
research contribution,979 this section reaffirms and further explains that this proposal 
is a chance of initiating a voluntary scheme alongside direct regulation for the 
conservation of nature. This regulatory approach has never appeared in the legal 
regimes of land conservation and environmental regulation in Thailand before. This 
new legal proposal would open the door for the design of a legal tool for conservation 
practices operated on land and enabling a CA to operate with appropriate conditions. 
The current land-use regulatory framework runs on the ‘one size fits all’ model, under 
which landowners are obligated to comply with the same rules.980 CAs offer an 
additional tool with a chance of receiving financial incentives to do better than a 
minimum requirement.981 An authorised public body, as a qualified holder, and 
landowners are enabled to negotiate what good practice should be adopted, beyond 
compliance with the existing laws. They could also negotiate the proposed terms of a 
CA regarding the duration and other terms subject to a CA-enabling law. 
 
1.2 Limitations of the existing legal regime in supporting the creation of CAs 
The opportunities arising from the introduction of the new legal proposal explained 
above, are not alone sufficient to conclude that the new law should be introduced 
unless it is apparent that the existing laws are inappropriate or prohibit the creation of 
CAs. This section analyses whether the existing laws are sufficient to establish CAs or 
not.  
As observed in chapter 4, greenhouse gas emissions are a major cause of global 
warming and climate change, and land clearing and burning after monocrop harvesting 
are one of the environmental problems in Thailand.982 This might be worth taking as a 
starting point to explore what possible legal measures can be introduced if the Thai 
                                                     
979 See part 5, entitled ‘research originality and contributions,’ of chapter 1. 
980 Gunningham argues that this regulatory characteristic is undesirable and inappropriate for various 
reasons (Neil Gunningham, ‘Enforcing Environmental Regulation’ (2011) Journal of Environmental 
Law 23(2) 169, 194-7). 
981 Godden, Peel and McDonald (n 17) 255-6. 





government seeks a long-term solution. The possible legal approaches might be the 
use of direct regulation by imposing prohibitions for land clearing and open-burning 
on farmland or the initiation of an eco-friendly scheme running on voluntary efforts. 
Assume that the second choice is employed,983 the question might be whether the 
government can implement this policy option through the established legal tools of 
property law and the private law of contract to secure a long-term or perpetual 
conservation scheme. This thesis sees various limitations when the government 
employs the existing legal framework to implement a CA. The limitations can be 
threefold, comprising the limitations arising from the private law of contract and 
property law as well as those caused by the existing regulatory measures regarding 
land-use regulation and nature conservation.  
In the first place, as mentioned, there are some limits due to the very nature of contract 
law. Agreements made under the private law of contract are unable to impose 
obligations running with the land and bind a future landowner.984 Also it can be 
questioned whether some legal rules of contract law, for example, those regarding the 
revision and extinction of an agreement based on the free will of parties, are suitable 
or sufficient for accommodating the implementation of CAs designed to serve the 
public interest.985 Such limitations require the use of a legal instrument creating real 
rights (property rights), for instance, servitudes, for imposing such a non-possessory 
property right on land.  
Secondly, in relation to the limits of the law of property, although some real rights can 
be created to impose a specific burden running with the land, including servitudes,986 
this type of real right has some limitations affecting its use in establishing a CA. The 
existing rules of servitudes, for instance, require the existence of two parties owning 
two pieces of property.987 It means that the establishment of burdens running with the 
land with no benefited property (dominant property) is impossible. This characteristic 
                                                     
983 As mentioned in the introductory chapter, the use of a direct regulatory approach is beyond this 
study’s scope due to its limitations in various aspects, including political unpalatability. 
984 A traditional legal concept of the Thai law of contract is based upon the privity of contract coupled 
with an exception regarding the right of the third party articulated in s 374 of the Thai Civil and 
Commercial Code (CCC). See also Pattarapas Tudsri and Angkanawadee Pinkaew, ‘20: Third Party 
Beneficiaries in Thai Contract Law’ in Mindy Chen-Wishart, Alexander Loke and Stefan Vogenauer 
(eds), Formation and Third Party Beneficiaries (OUP 2018) 427-8. 
985 Reid and Nsoh (n 17) 191-2.  
986 See the explanation of servitudes in Thai law in sub-section 2.1.3.3 of chapter 4. 





implies that servitudes are an inappropriate tool for land conservation by conservation 
bodies who have no ownership on adjacent land. Additionally, it remains uncertain 
whether servitudes can be established in publicly-owned land. This is because there 
are various sub-types of publicly-owned land, and they are governed with different 
rules under different laws.988  To date, there is no case in the Thai Supreme Court 
deciding whether public bodies who own publicly-owned land are entitled to create a 
servitude or not. In practice, servitudes are a private-law instrument mainly used by 
private parties rather than used between public bodies and individuals. Apart from that, 
the burdens imposed by a servitude are limited to the negative ones. This means that 
the creation of positive burdens, for example, to plant trees on arable land for carbon 
sequestration989 instead of that of mono-crops, is impossible under the existing rules.990 
Some might point out that if the law were changed to allow the creation of a perpetual 
and ‘in gross’ servitude to impose positive obligations on servient landowners, there 
would be no need to establish CAs by a specific legal proposal.991 This thesis sees this 
approach as out of the scope of this study, and might be unwelcome as it could bring 
about significant change to the legal regime of servitudes, which is not a legal tool 
directly created to serve the fulfilment of the public interest. 
Thirdly, it is true that there are plenty of land-use control and nature conservation 
related-measures in place for the conservation of features on land;992 and the 
availability of these measures is worth considering to see whether they support or 
oppose the creation of CAs. As examined in chapter 4, the established legal measures 
do not oppose the creation of CAs working as an additional option. Nonetheless, due 
to the absence of statutory authorisation conferring power to create CAs, it remains 
questionable whether CAs created by those bodies are legally binding or not. This 
could make the creation of a CA with no legal authorisation an illegal administrative 
                                                     
988 See the explanation in this point in sub-section 2.1.4 of chapter 4. 
989 Ross W Gorte, ‘Carbon Sequestration in Forests’ (CRS Report for Congress, Order Code 
RL31432, 2007) 1-5. 
990 See the text of CCC, s 1387 which provides that an owner of servient property is under the burden 
to allow an owner of dominant property to do some activities on the servient property. This can be 
interpreted to mean that servitudes under the Thai law exclusively impose a negative burden.  
991 In a report studying the application of the concepts of CAs in European countries, the author 
suggested that the legal amendment of the nature of servitudes by adding specific features could be an 
alternative way enabling servitudes to act as a legal instrument to create CAs (Racinska and Vahtrus (n 
61) 31). 





act subject to the ultra vires principle under the Thai administrative law.993 
Additionally, the use of agreements by governmental bodies may be at risk of having 
no legally binding effect where there is no legal provision allowing this task.994  
Some might suggest that the introduction of a new land-use regulatory measure might 
be another alternative option. Nonetheless, as stated in chapter 1, it is out of the scope 
of this study and subject to political unpalatability. This makes the introduction of the 
legal proposal entitling specific bodies to make CAs appealing from the perspective of 
this study. Also, providing legal rules in creating CAs is attractive as it sweeps away 
the limitation regarding the absence of legal status and of the binding effect of 
voluntary agreements observed in chapter 3.995  
From the Thai property law perspective, the establishment of CA burdens running with 
the land is the creation of a new property right on land, and the Thai law requires that 
a new type of property right can be established only by legal authorisation. This means 
that the establishment of CAs needs a specific set of governing rules. The examinations 
in parts 2 and 3 below will illustrate how a specific legal scheme constituting the legal 
proposal can be formulated, and what can be its strengths and weaknesses.   
 
2. The possible legal provisions for Thailand 
In chapter 5, the thesis identified critical elements of CA-enabling laws compared 
between three jurisdictions and discussed some advantages and disadvantages found 
in those jurisdictions. This part seeks to develop a possible structure and normative 
content of CA-enabling provisions for Thailand. The provisions will be formulated by 
utilising legal arguments discussed in the previous chapter in combination with the 
legal background of the country examined in chapter 4. A primary point to be discussed 
in this section is how should the legal proposal for the creation of CAs be formulated? 
 
2.1 The strategies for the elaboration of the provisions in sections 2.2 – 2.14 
Proposal:  
                                                     
993 Peter Leyland, ‘Droit Administratif Thai Style: A Comparative Analysis of the Administrative Courts 
in Thailand’ (2010) 8 Australian Journal of Asian Law 121, 135-6. 
994 Moffet and Bregha (n 339) 26. 





The provisions constituting a CA-enabling framework in sections 2.2-2.14 will be 
based on two strategies, namely the simplicity of the proposed legal provisions and the 
attractiveness of the provisions encouraging the rate of CA uptake.  
 
It is essential to consider at the beginning what should be the overarching rules or 
strategies, which this thesis employs to develop the structures and legal content of the 
proposals in sections 2.2 –2.14. Two rules are set here. The first is the simplicity of 
the legal proposal, and the latter is the attractiveness of the provisions to support CA 
uptake. The employment of these rules is justified below. The primary justification for 
the establishment of these two strategies stems from the need to move a new legal 
proposal away from C&C regulation and the encouragement of the participation based 
on a voluntary basis.996 
2.1.1 The simplicity of the proposed legal provisions 
This thesis sees that the provisions being formulated in sections 2.2-2.14 below should 
be simple and flexible, allowing parties to draft different terms in different situations. 
This thesis sees the legal proposal as laying down the fundamental rules for CA 
governance. The legal matters which are not stated in the legal proposal, e.g. rules of 
contract interpretation and legal definition of real property, should be subject to those 
in place under the private law of property and contract.  
2.1.2 The attractiveness of the provisions encouraging the rate of CA uptake 
This thesis argues for the creation of attractive provisions through the formulation of 
features which are likely to induce landowner participation (e.g. by the offer of 
incentives), and do not impose burdensome provisions. The legal proposal should be 
drafted in light of the encouragement of agricultural landowners to conserve natural 
features on their land with both negative and positive burdens.997  Such a character 
argues against  complicated rules which could demotivate landowners against entering 
into a CA. A specific point on how to design the proposed provisions to meet this 
                                                     
996 As mentioned in sub-section 2.1.1 of chapter 2, setting a complicated rule can be seen as a downside 
of C&C regulation. See also Baldwin, Cave, and Lodge (n 95) 108; Gunningham, Grabosky and Sinclair 
(n 2) 46. 
997 The reason for this stems from the focus of this study which mainly seeks to deal with land 





requirement will be seen in each legal consideration.998 This requirement stems from 
the necessity to mitigate the weakness arising from a voluntary characteristic of 
voluntary agreement observed in chapter 3 regarding the difficulty in predicting the 
rate of uptake and success of CA implementation.999  
 
2.2 The purpose for which a CA can be created 
Proposal: 
The purposes and scope of the implementation of CAs should address the intention to 
use a CA for the conservation of natural features on land with the aim to serve the 
public interest. The definition of the term ‘conservation’ should be made by including 
‘the protection, restoration or enhancement of natural features’ on land. 
 
The first legal matter worth discussing for the proposal is the purpose for which a CA 
can be created. This legal matter can be sub-divided for the sake of discussion into 
three elements, comprising the actions sought to be captured, features to be conserved, 
and the achievement of the public interest. 
Regarding the actions sought to be captured, although the conclusion from the 
comparative chapter reveals the fragmentation of the group of actions used for 
fulfilling conservation purposes, this study considers that the term ‘conservation’ 
should be employed as an umbrella term for the actions to be fulfilled. As summarised 
in the previous chapter,1000 ‘conservation’ is a catch-all word for other eco-friendly 
actions,1001 entitling CA parties to decide which specific actions (e.g. to preserve, 
maintain or improve), are the most suitable ones. It is also attractive due to a dynamic 
meaning reflecting scientific discovery in each period.1002 This means that the tasks 
burdened landholder are obliged to do can be changed from time to time subject to the 
availability of features found on the burdened land. For instance, if a CA requires a 
landowner to conserve natural features on a burdened land, the landowner may fulfil 
                                                     
998 As will be seen in the following sections, this thesis does not deny the necessity of having a certain 
level of legal regulation in the proposed CA framework, but instead intends to develop one which avoids 
the creating of unnecessary governing rules. 
999 See sub-section 5.3.1 of chapter 3. 
1000 See sub-section 2.4.1 of chapter 5. 
1001 IUCN (n 562) pt 1, para 4. 





this obligation with several tasks, including refraining from changing land use, 
maintaining water quality, preserving wildlife habitats and avoiding the cutting down 
of trees on the land. These tasks fall under the umbrella of the obligation ‘to conserve 
natural features on land’. 
As observed in chapter 4, the meaning of conservation has never been defined under 
Thai environmental law, a legislative definition is necessary for assisting in 
interpreting a possible range of actions under the term conservation. However, there 
are different views on its meaning.1003 The elaboration of this meaning by referring to 
well-established words could be desirable.  This approach has been used in the 
Environment Bill discussed in chapter 5. It suggests the range of words ‘protect, 
restore and enhance’ as part of the meaning of conservation.1004 This could be an 
example of the words being employed in the legal proposal for Thailand.  
Regarding the features which should be conserved, the previous chapter categorises 
two main features and values can be conserved by CAs, comprising natural features 
and cultural heritage.1005 The question here is ‘should the proposed CA-enabling law 
use a CA to conserve both natural and cultural heritage?’ This thesis sees that two 
reasons can support the implementation of CAs to conserve natural features. First, as 
the critical environmental problems examined in chapter 41006 involve the degradation 
of environmental features from humans, CA implementation should serve this task. 
Second, in light of the capacity of an eligible holder1007 and a type of law authorising 
CA,1008 the legal proposal should be implemented as a legal tool under a specific nature 
conservation law and can be used by a specific public body due to various justifications 
as will be explained in the later sections.1009  Hence, the features eligible to be 
conserved are limited to natural features.1010  
                                                     
1003 See different views about the meaning of the term conservation in sub-section 2.4.1 of chapter 5. 
1004 See Environment Bill, cl 102(4). 
1005 See sub-section 2.4.2 of of chapter 5.  
1006 See the problems and the potential use of CAs in the context of Thailand in section 1.2 of chapter 
4. 
1007 See a body eligible to hold a CA in the next sub-section. 
1008 See the point on how a CA-enabling law can be formulated as part of environmental law in section 
2.14. 
1009 See the justification for this conclusion in sections 2.3 and 2.14 below. 
1010 As stated in sub-section 2.1.1 above, this thesis argues that the legal proposal should be simple and 
provide a broad rule, which enables a qualified holder to consider which conservation-related activities 
are suitable for the implementation by this tool. Hence, the term ‘natural features’ is appropriate as it 





The last point to be visited is a requirement of public interest. The previous chapters 
emphasise that CAs are a private-law instrument seeking to serve the public 
interest.1011 This character should be emphasised to demonstrate how CAs are different 
from servitudes under private law.  By setting a limited range of purposes for a CA 
and an eligible holder,1012 every CA should, by its very nature, be serving the public 
interest.1013 Yet it is desirable to reinforce this by adding an express qualification that 
the terms of the agreement should be in the public interest.   
 
2.3 Eligible holders 
Proposal: 
The legal proposal should initially vest the power to create a CA in a specified 
conservation body rather than setting a list of qualified holders or allow non-public 
organisations to play this task. 
 
After the purposes and scope of the implementation of CAs have been settled, another 
point to be made here is who should be set as a qualified holder. The examination in 
the previous chapter shows the different legal approaches dealing with this matter 
among the three jurisdictions.1014 The question here is ‘which way is the most 
appropriate for Thailand?’ 
Although the desirability of encouraging non-public bodies to participate in the 
conservation of biodiversity is important for the enhancement of environmental 
governance,1015 they may not be suitable to play the role of an eligible holder. This 
research considers that, at the initial stage of implementing CAs in the country, a 
proposed CA-enabling law should primarily vest the power to create a CA in a 
specified conservation body rather than setting a list of qualified holders to play this 
task. Admittedly, this approach has some disadvantages. For instance, it considers a 
                                                     
1011 See part 6 of chapter 1 and sub-section 2.4.3 of chapter 5. 
1012 See the consideration about eligible holder in section 2.3 below. 
1013 Above all, this thesis secures public interest achievement by requiring additional conditions to be 
discussed in the latter sections. These include the requirements of registration and conformity of the 
existing laws being examined in sections 2.11 and 2.14. 
1014 See the difference in this point in section 4.4 of chapter 5. 
1015 Anna Wesselink and others, ‘Rationales for Public Participation in Environmental Policy and 





CA as a formal governmental tool rather than making it a further step towards land-
use governance by multiple players. When the designated governmental bodies do not 
enter into a CA, this legal tool will not be implemented.  
Nonetheless, this research argues that those concerns are overwhelmed by the merits 
of the designation of certain public bodies as a qualified holder. First, it helps to avoid 
the complexity of a governing regime for CA holders. There is no need to consider 
who can create and hold the benefit arising from a CA as well as the need to create a 
holder of a last resort because it is clear who can be a holder and the continuity of 
operation of governmental bodies will cover future changes. At the same time, vesting 
the power to create a CA in a specific body is advantageous in that a specific public 
body has capacity to establish a system for the compilation of CA related-information, 
and make it available online easily.1016 Second, it can provide accountability and 
transparency in the work operated by a holder since agreeing and implementing a CA 
becomes a public task carried out by governmental bodies. This attribute enables non-
governmental bodies or the public to review the exercise of power in conserving the 
land through a CA. Apart from that, there are in Thailand few non-governmental 
bodies looking after natural features in the country.1017 Many of them are established 
to deal with environmental issues in general rather than being set for a land stewardship 
aim.1018 Hence, there is long way to go to encourage the establishment of non-
governmental conservation bodies aiming at looking after the land akin to land trusts 
in the USA and the range of bodies in the UK. For these reasons, the role in holding 
the benefit arising from a CA should vest in governmental bodies at the initial stage of 
this legal development.  
It is to be noted here that, although the role in governing a CA as a holder is designated 
to specific public bodies, it does not mean that non-governmental organisations and 
the public have no role in CA governance. These two actors can participate in 
overseeing a CA as will be discussed and suggested in sections 2.9 and 2.13 below.  
                                                     
1016 This consideration will be discussed and justified in section 2.11 below. 
1017 A prescriptive list of the Thai environmental NGOs registered under the requirement of the Law on 
Enhancement and Conservation of National Environmental Quality can be accessed from Department 
of Environmental Quality Promotion, ‘List of Accredited NGOs Registered for Environmental 
Protection and Natural Resource Conservation’ (Update 18 April 2017) <www.deqp.go.th> accessed 
14 May 2020.  
1018 See Srisuwan Chanya, ‘Development and Roles of Non-governmental Organisations in Thailand’ 






2.4 Eligible land 
Proposal: 
The legal proposal should provide a provision regarding the areas eligible. The area 
eligible for the creation of CAs should be the land rightfully possessed or owned by 
eligible persons, including those having the right to farm on publicly-owned land, 
regardless of the purposes of its use or its physical nature.   
 
The investigation in the previous chapter reveals that majority of CA-enabling laws do 
not contain any specific rules regarding the qualification of land to be conserved by 
CAs.1019 The point to be discussed here is whether a legal model for Thailand should 
follow those jurisdictions with no specific requirement, or develop its own unique 
provision. Legal consideration will be divided into three points, comprising those 
relating to: 1) the physical nature of eligible land; 2) purposes of the use of eligible 
land; 3) private and public ownership.  
Regarding the physical nature of eligible land, although maritime and water areas can 
be subject to CA conservation, the legal regime of property rights governing these 
areas is complicated.1020 The inclusion of these areas might constitute a difficulty in 
introducing a CA to Thailand. Also, it is inconsistent with the goals of simplicity and 
attractiveness set in section 2.1 above. Hence, the primary area to be conserved at an 
initial step of the implementation should be limited to the land where property rights 
remain defined. Setting land as an eligible area is desirable because it is easy to identify 
a burdened landholder. Additionally, clear identification of the eligible area makes the 
draft of the provision regarding the purpose of CA clearer since the natural features 
found on land and marine areas are different.1021  
Regarding the purposes of the use of eligible land, while the laws examined in chapter 
5 do not provide any specification of eligible land, the question here is whether the 
                                                     
1019 See this demonstration in sections 3.1 - 3.3 of chapter 5. 
1020 See this demonstration in sub-section 3.4.2 of chapter 5. 
1021 For example, the identification of which species are conserved on a particular piece of land seems 
to be easier than in marine areas, where many migratory species move from one area under a certain 
jurisdiction to another regardless whether it is under the jurisdictions of one state or not (Reid, 





legal proposal should be exclusively offered for agricultural land. This thesis observes 
that the specification of eligible areas from its current purpose might be problematic 
and give rise to the complexity of a proposed framework due to various reasons.1022 
First, it is ambiguous what falls within the definition of ‘agricultural land’. For 
instance, it might be questionable whether both pastureland and forestland are under 
the meaning of ‘agricultural land’. Second, making some specification about the 
purpose of land use might leave a landowner who seeks to change a land-use pattern 
from residential or industrial areas to be forestland unable to make a CA. There may 
be land used for other purposes, including those being used as woodland or public 
space that are appropriate to be conserved by a CA. Hence, setting a specific current 
use for the land could hinder the rate of uptake. For these reasons, this thesis suggests 
that the scope of eligible areas should be land but not include water or maritime areas 
where a land title remains undefined. Such eligible land could be private or publicly-
owned land where a burdened landholder can fulfil the obligation in conserving agreed 
features. This suggestion conforms to the need to introduce CAs to solve 
environmental problems on land as identified in chapter 4.1023 
Regarding the types of land considered from the perspective of private and public 
ownership, CAs in some jurisdictions can be created on both privately- or publicly-
owned land, but some intentionally used this legal tool to conserve private property. 
The question here is ‘should a proposed CA-enabling law in Thailand be used 
exclusively for privately-owned land?’ As discussed in chapter 4, around 12 percent 
of the country’s area is agricultural land owned by the Thai government, and the 
government grants the right to farm to farmers. This type of land is suffering from 
intensive monocrop farming and the lack of eco-friendly farming practices and is a 
target area to be conserved by a CA.1024 If a proposed legal framework is applied 
exclusively in privately-owned land, Thailand will miss a chance in encouraging those 
farming on publicly-owned land to conserve this type of land. This thesis sees that a 
proposed legal framework should be applied in both privately-owned land and that 
belonging to the state but in the management of farmers or individuals. As this 
                                                     
1022 See the justification explained in sub-section 2.1.2 above.  
1023 See the problems and the potential use of CAs in the context of Thailand in section 1.2 of chapter 
4. 





consideration is connected with the point concerning a burdened landholder, this thesis 
will consider this point in section 2.5 below.  
 
2.5 Burdened landholders 
Proposal: 
The legal proposal should provide that landowners and others having the right over a 
certain plot of land (e.g. tenants) are eligible to enter into CAs with a qualified holder 
subject to the binding periods stipulated in section 2.7. CAs made by landowners run 
with the land and bind successors in land title, but CAs made by others persons having 
the rights on the property of another do not bind a future owner and are subject to the 
period of the rights over the burdened land.  
 
The previous section laid down the rule that the qualified areas for the conservation 
can be either publicly-owned or privately-owned land. A further issue to be determined 
here entails the persons eligible to be bound in a CA (burdened landholders). This legal 
point entails the considerations about eligible persons entitled to enter into the 
agreement and the binding effect on successive landowners.   
2.5.1 Eligible persons entitled to enter into the agreement 
Persons who are eligible to make a CA with a qualified holder can be categorised into 
those who own or possess privately-owned land and those who have the right to farm 
on publicly-owned land.  
For the first category, similar to the rules implemented in the comparator jurisdictions, 
a landowner is in the most appropriate position to enter into a CA with a qualified 
holder. In light of this rule, CAs created under a new statute should be made between 
a qualified holder and landowners, so long as such a person is indicated as a landowner 
or possessor in a land title deed or other comparable documents.1025  
                                                     
1025 This requirement should be made because the Thai law recognises the acquisition of ownership by 
prescription and other factual circumstances. This includes the situation where the land adjacent to a 
waterway expands due to alluvion (see CCC, ss 1308 and 1382). These circumstances recognise the 
ownership on land, but a person who seeks to claim the right over the land must apply for the issuance 
of a land title deed for the benefit of the full legal recognition. A person who fails to do so is unable to 





Apart from that, since privately-owned land might be under the possession by those 
who are not a landowner under leases for an extended period, it is worth examining 
here whether tenants or those holding property rights in the property of another (jus in 
re aliena) should be eligible to enter into CAs or not, apart from the landowner. This 
thesis proposes that these types of persons should be eligible to create a CA if the 
landowner grants consent for such participation. Two reasons can be made for this 
proposal. In the first place, as will be seen in section 2.7 regarding the legally binding 
period, a legal proposal regarding binding periods sets two divisions of CAs; 
comprising those running with the land in perpetuity and those with a specific period. 
A tenant should be eligible to enter into the latter type of agreement.1026 The reason 
for this is because many agricultural land plots in the country are under both a short-
and long-term lease contract,1027 and the proportion of this type of land is considerably 
increasing. Without the legal provision enabling a land tenant to make a CA, this type 
of actor is unable to get involved directly. Also, without the provision allowing land 
tenants to enter into a CA with a qualified holder, landowners who have already leased 
their land may not want to enter into a CA for the land under the lease contract.1028 
Hence, a tenant should be entitled to make a CA with a holder with the permission of 
a landowner.1029  
Regarding the eligibility of farmers, who possess or farm on publicly-owned land, the 
database recognised by the Thai government reports that around 11 percent of the 
country’s area (approximately 14 million acres) is publicly-owned land designated as 
agricultural land owned by the Agricultural Land Reform Office (ALRO).1030 ALRO 
grants a right to farm on farmers holding their land without any limit in time, and this 
farming right can be transferred to their heirs who agree to farm on that land.1031 In 
reality, this type of agricultural land is possessed and used by farmers in a similar vein 
to the land under a lease contract. Therefore, the same reasoning should be applied in 
that a farmer who farms in this type of land should be eligible to enter into a CA. 
                                                     
1026 See the advantages of setting a limited-term CA in section 2.7 below. 
1027 According to the statistics of the Office of Agricultural Economics published in 2018, the percentage 
of an agricultural land area under a lease agreement accounts for 19 percent of the farmland in Thailand 
(Office of Agricultural Economics (n 368) 169). 
1028 In the case where landowners who leased their land desire to enter into a CA themselves, see the 
general rule proposed in the above paragraph.  
1029 See the discussion about the legal binding effect of CAs made by a tenant in sub-section 2.5.2 below.  
1030 This type of land is designated by virtue of Agricultural Land Reform Act BE 2518 (1975). 
1031 The right to farm is revoked where, among other grounds, the farmers who are granted the right to 





However, as the ownership of this type of land is vested in ALRO, two conditions 
should be provided. First, the obligations to be created by a CA must not contradict 
the rules in utilising that land subject to the regulation regarding the use of agricultural 
land stipulated by ALRO. Second, CAs can be made only with the approval of ALRO.  
2.5.2 Binding effect on successive landholders 
One of the standard features of CAs is the ability to bind successive landowners who 
are not thr ones who entered into the agreements. The point to be examined here is 
whether the legal proposal should provide this feature. This thesis considers this 
feature as an essential characteristic of CAs that needs to be emphasised by the 
authorising statute.  This is because a private-law agreement made under the existing 
Thai law does not bind a third person.1032 Hence, a statutory agreement which does not 
follow the rule of the privity of the contract should provide an explicit provision about 
this legal feature.1033 As seen from many CA-enabling laws in the UK and Australia, 
the provision establishing a CA commonly provides this feature, and this is also a key 
reason why a new mechanism is needed.  
Another issue that should be made here is about the legally binding effect of a CA 
created by those possessing or holding specific property rights over the land of another. 
The example of these type of right holders include land tenants and farmers who have 
a right to farm on publicly-owned land. As analysed above, these persons are eligible 
to enter into CAs, but this thesis sees the importance of providing a specific condition 
regarding the binding effect for CAs made by this type of CA. The maximum binding 
period for this latter type of CA should last up to the period of a lease agreement or 
the length of a period of the right to farm. It means that CAs in this category could run 
with the land, and bind those being in the same position of those made CAs with a 
holder, for a limited period, subject to the conditions of holding the rights over the 
eligible land. This condition implies that if a qualified holder seeks to make a perpetual 
CA on a specific land plot, the qualified holder must enter into the agreement with a 
landowner to secure long-term conservation.   
                                                     
1032 A possible way of making a specific obligation to run with the land is to agree on establishing a 
property right, including the creation of servitude by agreement. However, a mere simple contract does 
not create an obligation running with the land. 
1033 In sum, the general rule of privity of contract recognises the legally binding effect of a contract 
between persons who make a contract and agree to be bound therein. The obligation of a contract does 
not bind third parties who do not accept to perform an obligation (Mindy Chen-Wishart, Contract Law 








The legal proposal should provide a mere framework provision regarding CA 
obligations and leave room for prospective parties to consider what should be made as 
particular burdens. The provisional text should prescribe that CAs created between CA 
parties may impose both positive and negative burdens, e.g. obligations not to clear 
native vegetation and maintain the existing ones, subject to the conservation purposes 
stipulated by the law.  
 
Having  developed conclusions about burdened landholders, the nature and substantive 
content of CA obligations imposed on burdened landholders are discussed here. 
Obligations or burdens are an integral part of a private-law vehicle introduced to 
require specific persons to carry out activities on land. The examination in section 6.4 
of chapter 5 illustrated different styles in providing substantive content of CA 
obligations. This section considers whether setting a provision with a loose approach 
stating that  CA parties are free to set affirmative and negative obligations, subject to 
CA purpose set in section 2.3, is sufficient or not.  
For the jurisdictions where a CA remains unknown, setting an illustrative list of 
possible obligations in the legal provision, makes it clear which specific tasks a CA 
can be used to achieve. Also, it could prevent ambiguity as to whether or not the 
activities or tasks proposed are within the CA purposes and obligations set as a 
prescriptive list under the law. However, the dangers for this approach could be that a 
prescriptive list of obligations laid down in a legislative framework could be outdated 
as it remains unknown whether environmental impacts from climate change would 
affect a fixed and prescriptive list of obligation.1034 For these reasons, the normative 
content stipulated in a proposed CA-enabling law should not be too fixed or too broad. 
The provisional text found in various CA-enabling laws in chapter 5, which broadly 
prescribe that CAs may impose positive or negative burdens subject to the purposes of 
CA implementation stipulated under a CA-enabling law, looks desirable. This thesis 
                                                     





sees that the potential activities suitable for the conservation of natural features for 
Thailand can be both active and passive ones. Planting native trees for carbon 
sequestration and wildlife habitat is illustrative of the first, and refraining from the use 
of pesticides and agreeing not to change woodland to pastureland represent the latter. 
Many others also fall under these types of obligations.  
As CA obligations are closely linked to the purpose for which a CA can be created, 
discussed in section 2.2, it is necessary to show how CA obligations are interrelated to 
the purpose of implementation. This thesis proposes a provisional test that the positive 
or negative obligations created by an individual CA must be able to achieve the 
conservation of natural features on land subject to the agreement between the parties 




The legal proposal should provide a provision regarding a default rule of a binding 
period. The legal proposal should provide that a default binding period of CA is a 
perpetual term, but the parties could agree to make a time-limited CA subject to the 
type of burdened landholder, as discussed and elaborated in section 2.5 above.  
 
CA-enabling laws implemented in the comparator jurisdictions employ different 
approaches regarding the duration of CA. Although the majority of them set a default 
period to bind the land in perpetuity, some provide specific binding terms, and some 
do not set any specific provision about this legal matter.1035 This section investigates 
whether and how Thailand should set a provision for this legal matter.  
Although the duration should be subject to negotiation under a specific agreement, this 
thesis considers that providing a rule for a default period is necessary. This type of 
provision is advantageous for the interpretation where an individual CA has no clause 
about its binding period. From a law-maker’s perspective, setting a default period 
indicates the legislative intent in enacting a CA-enabling law on whether the legislature 
seeks to introduce CAs to secure short or long-term conservation. For instance, if this 
                                                     





provision sets a default binding term of CAs for five years, it is clear that a law-maker 
aims to use CAs for short-term conservation rather than long-term.  
As mentioned above, the next point is whether a permanent CA or a time-limited CA 
should be made. This thesis considers the characteristics of land and land possessors 
in Thailand as crucial factors influencing the design of a CA binding period.1036  
Time-limited CAs may be necessary and should be available in Thailand due to the 
character of land use and the interconnection between burdened landholders and 
binding periods. To begin with, as noted in chapter 4,1037 the average size of the parcel 
of land in Thailand per family is comparatively small compared with those in the 
comparator jurisdictions, and several parcels of land are under a lease between a 
landlord and farmer. Setting a default period of a CA to run in perpetuity may not be 
welcomed by all farmers or landowners in the country since they might be reluctant to 
become tied by or unable to enter into a permanent obligation, and this could exclude 
farmers who lease land from the participation in this legal scheme. For this reason, a 
time-limited CA similar to management agreements in the UK or wildlife refuge 
agreements in NSW should be available. Secondly, as discussed in section 2.5, persons 
who possess the land for a limited period, e.g. tenants, should be eligible to enter into 
CAs. The limited period of possessing the land of another means that the agreement 
they are entitled to make should be limited to the period of their right over such land 
with specific terms.1038  
Then, the point to be considered further would be the necessity of a perpetual CA. This 
thesis sees the necessity to introduce this type of CA alongside a fixed-term CA. As 
observed in chapters 4 and 5, a perpetual CA is advantageous in various respects and 
could conserve natural features for the common interest of people and nature in the 
long run. This type of CA might indeed look inflexible, but it is necessary for enabling 
some market-based instruments being implemented in the coming future, for instance, 
for the implementation of a carbon sequestration scheme under a REDD+ programme, 
                                                     
1036 This includes the linkage with the considerations about eligible land and burdened landholders in 
sections 2.4 and 2.5 above. 
1037 See section 1.1 of chapter 4. 





as suggested in chapter 41039 and discussed further in chapter 5.1040 Apart from that, a 
provision prescribing that a CA can be created to last in perpetuity could remain a 
common feature of this legal tool and help distinguish it from other agreements being 
created in the future. However, this type of agreement may be subject to conditions on 
modification and termination as will be examined in the next section.  
 
2.8 Variation and termination 
Proposal: 
A provision dealing with CA variation and termination should be made.  This provision 
should entitle CA parties to do this by agreement, and the court should have the power 
to decide the reasonable grounds of the modification and termination where 
disagreement on these grounds takes place. Bringing an action to the court by the 
public on such ground should be available for CAs subject to the conditions stipulated 
in 2.12.  
 
The study in chapter 5 illustrates the existence of legal clauses relating to the variation 
or termination of CAs in most CA-enabling laws, coupled with their different 
conditions. This part considers whether the proposed CA-enabling law should provide 
a provision enabling a certain actor to vary or terminate a CA, and if so, what the 
provision should be.  
This thesis considers that without this type of provision, CA parties are free to 
negotiate whether and how a CA should be varied or terminated.  As seen in part 11 
of chapter 5,1041 such a view might be inappropriate for a conservation tool seeking to 
serve the public interest, specifically where governments spend public funds to 
implement CAs. Lack of this kind of provision also constitutes a difficulty for a 
perpetual CA. In the case of a perpetual CA made to conserve wetlands, the possibility 
of drought resulting from climate change would make this implementation impossible. 
Setting the legal conditions on how this kind of CA can be varied or extinguished 
                                                     
1039 See the problems and the potential use of CAs in the context of Thailand in section 1.2 of chapter 
4. 
1040 See the summary on how the REDD+ scheme functions in Footnote 726 in section 7.4 of chapter 
5. 





would be more sensible, but the grounds for variation or termination should be further 
considered as seen below.   
Regarding the conditions for variation and termination, this thesis proposes a standard 
rule regarding the modification and termination of CAs based on the agreement 
between CA parties, but the court should be entitled to review such modification or 
termination where disagreement on these grounds takes place. This proposal does not 
follow the provisions established in some jurisdictions which confer on eligible 
holders the unilateral right to modify or terminate CAs. Such a unilateral right is 
disadvantageous as it makes a CA very similar to a direct regulatory tool, and this 
could demotivate a prospective landowner to enter into a CA with an unequal 
agreement. Thus, a possible way to balance the bargaining power between the parties 
is to entitle them to agree whether they want to change the condition or terminate the 
CA. 
Apart from the standard rule above, this thesis sees the importance of public 
involvement in overseeing a CA in some situations. Specifically speaking, the public, 
including neighbouring landowners, should be entitled to bring a case to the court 
where CA parties agree to modify or terminate a CA in question. However, they should 
be entitled to do this where it meets specific conditions as will be elaborated in section 
2.12 below. The justifications for this proposal are that in many cases, the variation or 
termination of CAs implemented by public money might be questioned by people or 
communities whether they serve the public interest.  Such variation or termination 
should be subject to review by a court where there is no consensus between holders 
and burdened owners in a similar vein as conservation burdens under the Scottish 
legislation. The role of the court in this instance should entail whether the variation or 
termination is reasonable or not. The process and grounds for the review by the court 
established in the Scottish legislation are illustrative as to how a specific regulation 
can be developed to fulfil this provision.1042 
 
2.9 Enforcement for the breach of obligation 
Proposal: 
                                                     





The legal proposal should prescribe a civil law remedy as a primary means for CA 
enforcement. Civil remedies for enforcement should be the same as those applied for 
civil disputes. The third-party right of enforcement should be applied subject to the 
conditions elaborated in section 2.12 below.  
 
It is also important to consider whether a CA-enabling law should provide a specific 
provision for enforcement where the breach of obligation arises. On the one hand, a 
CA is a private law instrument created by two parties. The private legal rules regarding 
the enforcement of obligations and the binding effect of property rights are already in 
place, and this seems sufficient to deal with the breach of obligations. On the other 
hand, a unique feature of CAs created to serve some public interest begs the question 
for Thailand whether a CA-enabling law developed for this country should provide 
any features to ensure their success in conserving natural features. This thesis sees that 
a CA-enabling law for Thailand should have a provision in this matter due to the nature 
of CAs which primarily seek to conserve features on land for the common benefit. This 
feature indicates the need to provide a specific enforcing measure to ensure the success 
of this aim and a specific measure for the enforcement as will be further elaborated 
below.  
To develop a provision for CA enforcement, it is worth considering two questions. The 
first is whether the legal proposal should employ criminal and administrative tools to 
strengthen the enforcement to ensure the achievement of the aim of public interest 
enforcement. The second is whether the legal proposal should provide any specific 
feature for a civil law remedy to ensure the effectiveness of the enforcement if it is 
sufficient, and if so, what any specific features should be.  
Regarding the necessity of criminal and administrative sanctions, the discussion in 
chapter 5 illustrates the use of these legal tools to enforce the breach of CA obligations. 
Although criminal offences and administrative sanctions have various strengths and 
play a vital part as the tools for environmental regulation,1043 they might be unsuitable 
and unnecessary to incorporate them as part of CA-enabling law for three reasons. 
First, they could detract from the voluntary nature of CAs, and make a CA-enabling 
                                                     
1043 See the strengths of the uses of criminal and administrative measures to regulate social behaviour 





law excessively complicated. Criminal and administrative sanctions could also 
engender the view towards this legal tool as a confrontational and bureaucratic 
instrument. Second, administrative and criminal sanctions are already in place as a 
default rule applied for the operation of public bodies under administrative and 
criminal laws where such bodies disobey to a specific criminal offence or fail to 
implement the law in accordance with administrative law. Assume that a certain public 
body entered into a CA with a landowner to devote the property as an open space, and 
this CA is supported in its implementation by public payments. Then, the public body 
and landowners dishonestly agree to terminate such a CA, leading to the loss of public 
payments and the extinguishment of the public space. Such a public body can be 
reviewed or prosecuted under the general rules of criminal law and administrative law.  
Third, a civil law remedy, as a default rule for the enforcement, can be sufficient where 
it is well-established as will be seen below.   
Regarding civil law remedies, there are various tools in place to enforce a person who 
violates obligations created by parties. This thesis considers that civil remedies 
available under the existing regime are sufficient to deal with the breach of obligation. 
For instance, where a burdened landholder failed to fulfil the tasks, a holder is entitled 
to bring an action to the court to seek for injunctions, damages or any other 
compensation. However, the suitability and practicability of existing of civil remedies 
and procedures for CA implementation and enforcement has not been fully studied, 
which means that they might be inefficient or ineffective in practice. This 
consideration should be one of the issues for further research.     
Another point worthy of discussion is whether non-parties should be entitled to bring 
an action to the court. As the consideration is closely linked to the point about public 




The legal proposal should prescribe the provision of incentives for entering into a CA 
with broad language. The provision could enunciate that a holder ‘may offer’ some 





The details in providing what incentives can be made available to landowners should 
be prescribed in a further regulation.   
 
The consideration of incentives used for attracting a prospective landowner to enter 
into a CA should be considered in two aspects. The first is whether a proposed 
framework should address this consideration as part of the legal proposal or not. The 
latter is in cases where it is to be included as a CA provision, what the legal content 
should be.  
As seen from the examination in chapter 5, a provision about incentives does not 
appear in all CA-enabling laws,1044 and the absence of this legal matter does not affect 
the validity of a CA created between two parties. These grounds could be used to 
exclude an unnecessary matter from the legal proposal to avoid the complexity of a 
new legal framework. However, including this legal matter may look more attractive 
than having no provision to induce participation by landowners1045 as justified below. 
This thesis sees that there are more advantages in providing this legal provision, but 
the language used to offer the incentive should be flexible. This type of provision 
makes the legal proposal attractive, increasing the motivation of landowners to enter 
into the agreement. In the first place, the legal proposal should be a legal innovation 
coming with an exciting option to encourage individuals to follow practices beyond 
the minimum requirements under the existing law. Thailand, as a developing country, 
is unlike the comparator countries in that its average parcel of land per family is 
relatively small as seen in chapter 4. It means that where a government seeks to restrict 
land use patterns or imposes new positive burdens, the yields from such land may 
substantially decrease. Without a provision about the incentives available in exchange 
for participation, a CA may not be an attractive choice. Secondly, incentives are one 
option in responding to the economic injustices that might be perceived when 
agreements are entered.1046 These can arise either because the owners entering 
agreements are no longer able to use their land to optimise their profit from it or 
                                                     
1044 The provision about incentives awarded for participating landowners mainly appears in Australian 
legislation and management agreement-authorising laws in the UK. See sections 9.1-9.3 of chapter 5. 
1045 The report studying the implementation of CAs in European countries emphasised that including a 
provision regarding the use of incentives in the law authorising the creation of CAs could be very 
important to encourage the use of this legal tool. See Racinska and Vahtrus (n 61) 35. 





because while some owners agree to limitations, others who are not subject to 
restrictions still benefit from the wider environmental improvements that flow from 
these agreements (the ‘free-rider’ problem).1047  
A possible way for elaborating this type of consideration could be that a CA-enabling 
law may offer some sorts of incentive for the participation to induce the entry into a 
CA by a landowner. This enables the governments to initiate a CA for conserving 
features on land where the funding is available. Apart from that, the phrase ‘may offer 
some sorts of incentive’ does not means that the government must provide incentives 
for every participating landowner, and the agreement can also be made without any 
incentives subject to the agreement between CA parties. 
Regarding a possible kind of incentive and granting conditions, a proposed provision 
may employ inclusive language by providing that a holder may offer a burdened 
landholder a financial benefit, including payments and tax benefits, or technical 
assistance subject to the availability of such assistance. The conditions for offering 
such technical or financial assistance may be subject to the details stipulated by 
specific regulations. For example, the regulations may prescribe that financial benefit 
supported by a specific scheme should be available for a perpetual agreement, which 
is registered, or be available where the government, as a qualified holder, has a specific 
scheme ready for giving payments for CA participators.  
 
2.11 Registration of CAs 
Proposal: 
The legal proposal should lay down the requirement of the registration of CAs. The law 
should provide that the creation of a CA will be valid where a landowner registers the 
acquisition of CA burdens in the land title document subject to the rules prescribed in a 
regulation. This provision is also required where the parties modify or terminate CAs.   
                                                     
1047 This problem could happen where the land in a particular area is under a CA implemented for 
conserving vegetation and native wildlife, and fulfilling this conservation obligation increases the 
population of bees which help all farmers in that area to pollinate crops and fruits on agricultural land. 
On how bees can help farmers in pollinating their crops (see Bee Farmers Association, ‘Improving 
Profits through Pollination: A guide for farmers and growers’ <www.nfuonline.com/bfa-pollination-
leaflet-bee-keepers-july-2016/ > accessed 14 May 2020). See the limitation of voluntary agreements in 






As mentioned in section 1.2 above, the legal mechanisms which create encumbrances 
running with the land are under the property law regime. This regime sets a 
fundamental rule regarding the acquisition of the real rights by requiring the 
registration of such acquisition on a land title document.1048 Based on this requirement, 
the registration of CAs becomes a precondition of making a CA burden run with the 
land.  
The first question to be discussed here is ‘should the proposal specify this requirement 
as a legal provision?’ This thesis sees that the proposal should explicitly state this 
requirement as one of its legal provisions. Without the requirement of the registration 
of CAs, it remains unclear and debatable whether and when a CA will become fully 
valid and bind the burdened land. Most, if not all, of the Thai laws creating a new 
property right set a provision requiring the registration when such a property right is 
acquired.1049  
Another point to be determined is who should be obligated to register a CA and how 
this process can be done. A general rule of land registration under the Thai law is that 
a person named as a landowner in a land deed is entitled to transfer the land or create 
encumbrances thereon. Hence, a landowner is in the position to be entitled to register 
the creation of CA on a land deed. This indicates that a landowner should be in a 
position to consent and be responsible for registering the creation of CAs.1050 This 
should be applied both where either a landowner or tenant makes a CA. 
It is possible that imposing this legal obligation on a landowner may create the 
opportunity for the owner to escape the long-term nature of the land (and its burden 
for successors) by not registering the agreement. Hence, a law-maker might induce 
landowners to register a CA by introducing the requirement that any incentives are 
available only once registered, as suggested in section 2.10 above. Apart from that, 
                                                     
1048 See ccc, s 1299, which stipulates the condition for the acquisition of any property rights in real 
property of registering such acquisition. The failure to register such acquisition results in the invalidity 
of the acquisition and merely creates a contractual obligation.  
1049 For example, Right Over Leasehold Asset Act BE 2562 (2019)- the recent legislation establishing 
a new property right on real property- requires that the acquisition of this right is valid where such 
acquisition has been registered on a title document (ss 4 and 5).  
1050 By considering this rule, if a qualified holder agrees on a CA with a tenant for the lifetime of the 






this thesis will discuss whether a holder should be eligible to register a CA in the 
following paragraph to fill the gap of such an undesired circumstance. 
The governing rule of publicly-owned land on which the law grants the right to farm 
to the individuals under the Agricultural Land Reform Act BE 2518 (1975) is similar 
to that of privately-owned land discussed above. This legislation treats the Agricultural 
Land Reform Office (ALRO) as an owner of this type of land, and ALRO is entitled 
to register the farmland being under a CA.1051 It means that ALRO should be involved 
in giving the consent where a farmer who has the right to farm seeks to enter into a 
CA with a qualified holder. This is similar to a case where a tenant wants to enter into 
a CA by the approval and consent of a landowner.    
Although the default duty in registering the land subject to a CA should be bestowed 
on a landowner, it might be possible that some landowners may be reluctant to register 
a CA, deliberately entered into by them.  Some might argue that a special rule entitling 
a holder to register a CA or to bring the case to the court to resolve this difficulty 
should be made. This thesis views that a default rule of private law is sufficient. This 
is because a contractual obligation arising from a CA, before it is registered, already 
arose. This obligation obligates a landowner, who agreed to bind in a CA, to register a 
CA. Where a landowner fails to fulfill this obligation, a holder is entitled to bring the 
case to the court for asking the permission to register a CA by a court verdict. 
Apart from that, it is worth examining what the legal effect of the registration is. Most 
CA-enabling laws examined in the previous chapter employ a similar provision that 
CA registration is a pre-condition enabling CAs to run with the land. It is interpreted 
that unregistered CAs merely constitute a contractual obligation. This thesis supports 
the provision requiring the registration of CAs and stipulating the legal effect of the 
registration as similar to those found in other jurisdictions. Above all, as the alterations 
of CA burdens by means of variation or termination affect the existence of burdens 
which run with the land, it is also necessary to provide that the change of conditions 
in implementing CAs should also be made by the same requirement for registration to 
enable the third parties to notice the change regarding the burdened property.  
A further consideration is about the necessity for the establishment of a system to make 
information available. Undeniably, this mechanism is crucial for supporting public 
                                                     





transparency and accountability of CAs created for serving the benefit for people in 
society. Nonetheless, at this stage of the development of this legal proposal, it remains 
unclear which public authority will take responsibility for the implementation. This 
would be problematic if a legal proposal required the establishment of a system for the 
compilation of CA related-information without knowing what might be the obstacles 
for the establishment of this system. Thus, this research considers whether and how 
the system for gathering CA-related information and making it available to the public 
should be an administrative matter. If this proposal is put forward, the government 
should decide the details on how this type of system should be established.   
 
2.12 Public oversight 
Proposal: 
Measures available for public oversight are in place under the established regime of 
administrative law. This legal regime entitles the public to file an administrative case 
to the court where the rights recognised for the public are violated. This thesis sees 
that this is sufficient to allow the public to participate in CA governance. Hence, it is 
unnecessary to provide an additional rule for public oversight. 
 
As mentioned at the beginning, since a CA is a private legal tool seeking to serve the 
public interest by conserving some features on land, this begs the question ‘should the 
proposal for Thailand provide any measures to oversee the implementation and 
enforcement of CAs?’ The examination in the previous chapter reveals the 
fragmentation of the employment of oversight measures by non-parties in the 
comparator jurisdictions.1052  
Public oversight1053 has both benefits and drawbacks. It can be an opportunity for the 
public to participate in the conservation of privately-owned land. At the same time, 
imposing an excessive level of the oversight by the public could detract the nature of 
                                                     
1052 See this characteristic in sections 12.1-12.3 of chapter 5. 
1053 As justified in part 12 of chapter 5, the term ‘public oversight’ is used in two respects. The one is 
used for the actions or processes where non-CA parties are required or empowered to get involved. It 
reflects public oversight in the sense of public participation in environmental matters.  Another respect 
covers the circumstances where burdened landholders or holders are supervised or controlled by public 






a private-law mechanism and demotivate prospective landowners to come into play. 
The view towards the question set above is that public oversight should be introduced 
if the public is unable to participate through the existing mechanisms.  
This thesis considers that the designation of a qualified holder from public bodies is 
sufficient to provide the oversight by governmental bodies. Additionally, the existing 
regime regarding the review of administrative action by the court is in place; and it 
supports oversight by the public. Setting an additional rule for oversight might be seen 
as overregulation, and brings complexity to CA governance.  
The designation of public bodies to be a qualified holder implies that the information 
in the hand of the holder is public information. This makes the public able to access 
such information subject to the law on public information. In Thailand, the right of 
access to information is expressly recognised under Official Information Act BE 2540 
(1997). The legislation requires state agencies to disclose any information considered 
as ‘official information’. If CAs were to be implemented in Thailand, information 
relating to each CA under the control or possession of a holder could be accessed by 
the public subject to the conditions under this Act. 1054 Apart from that, as the act of 
creating a CA by a designated public body (a qualified holder) under a new legal 
proposal is an administrative action per se, the Thai court can review it according to 
the condition under the Thai administrative legislation.1055 The public may be entitled 
to bring such a case against a holder to administrative courts for judicial review under 
the established regime of administrative law. According to the rules under the existing 
laws, administrative courts would be competent to adjudicate these following cases. 
The first can be those where a holder agrees to modify or terminate a CA without or 
beyond the scope of powers and duties or in a manner inconsistent with the law. The 
second can be those where a holder neglects its duty to enforce a burdened landholder 
where such a person breaches a CA obligation. However, persons seeking to file such 
a case must demonstrate whether and how they are affected by such unlawful action.  
This means that the measures allowing the public to participate in CA oversight are 
already in place, and there is no need to establish any additional rules for oversight by 
the public.  
                                                     
1054 Official Information Act BE 2540 (1997), ss 4, 9, 14 and 15.  
1055 See Act on Establishment of Administrative Courts and Administrative Court Procedure BE 2542 






2.13 Legal form, applicable term and means of creation 
Proposal: 
A proposed CA-enabling law should employ the term ‘conservation agreement’. 
 
The consideration of what specific name should be used for CAs in the context of 
Thailand is linked to its legal form and the means of creation. The examination in the 
previous chapter illustrated various conservation tools, which fall under the meaning 
of ‘conservation agreement’. Also, it indicates some linkage between the applicable 
terms used in each comparator jurisdictions and how CAs are made.1056 The question 
here is what term should be employed for the name of CAs under the legal proposal.  
This investigation could start from the determination of what legal vehicles are in place 
under the traditional rule of private law. The terms ‘agreement’ and ‘servitude’ are the 
most familiar words employed in the Thai legal system.1057 The first could reflect the 
legal method of creating this legal scheme while the second indicates the legal effect 
of this legal tool after it is created that it constitutes a new property right running with 
the land.  
The use of the term ‘conservation servitude’ looks appropriate, where it is considered 
from the property law perspective. It helps to emphasise the character of a legal tool 
creating burdens running with the land. This may seem more appropriate than the use 
of ‘agreement’ which could mislead Thai lawyers that it merely creates a contractual 
obligation.  
Nonetheless, this thesis argues that the word ‘agreement’ is more appropriate than the 
word ‘servitude’ in combining with the word ‘conservation’ for various reasons. First, 
the CAs being proposed for the Thai legal system have special features different from 
the traditional rules for servitudes, as explained in sub-section 1.1.1 above. These 
include the ability of CAs to impose both positive and negative burdens and with no 
requirement of having a benefited property. Using the term ‘servitude’ may not be fit 
                                                     
1056 See section 1.4 of chapter 5. 
1057 This study does not consider the appropriateness of the use of the term ‘covenant’ and ‘easement’ 
as these terms do not appear in the Thai legal system and the employment of either of them would give 





with the new features coming with this new legal tool. Second, the word ‘servitude’ 
may not reflect the legal character of a voluntary instrument, but the word ‘agreement’ 
serves this task. It is true that a general agreement merely creates a contractual 
obligation. This is not the case for ‘conservation agreement’, as a statutory vehicle in 
which the law authorising its creation may add a specific feature of the ability in 
imposing burdens running with the land similar to CAs in place in Australia which 
contain this legal feature. Third, Thai lawyers and courts are familiar with a legal tool 
developed from the law of contract rather than that of property law.1058 Naming a CA 
as a ‘conservation agreement,’ which refers to a contract creating restrictions or 
positive obligation over the land looks more appropriate.1059 Fourth, the use of the term 
‘conservation agreement’ indicates itself that a primary means of creation of CAs is 
by agreement between eligible parties. There is no need to provide additional provision 
regarding the means of creation as it can employ the default rules of contract law in 
formulating CAs. 
 
2.14 Compatibility with existing relevant conservation tools and laws 
Proposal: 
A proposed CA-enabling law should have a provision declaring that the 
implementation of a CA on certain land does not overrule or exclude the duties 
required under specific rules under existing laws. The new legal proposal should be 
annexed as part of nature conservation laws.  
 
As the coming of the new law entails restrictions on the use of land for conservation 
ends, the implementation of a new scheme brings some new features to the legal rules 
of land-use regulation and nature conservation law. Hence, consideration regarding the 
compatibility between the proposal of CA-provisions and the existing laws, based on 
                                                     
1058 For example, Thai lawyers prefers to sign a long-term lease contract rather than to establish 
superficies by a contract over the land.   
1059 Similar to the rationale for the use of the word ‘conservation easement’ in UCEA, the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws embraced the term ‘easement’ rather than that 
of ‘restrictive covenants’ and ‘equitable servitudes’ because the legal concept of easements was most 
comfortable for lawyers and courts in the USA (see National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 





C&C regulation, should be made to justify how the new proposal can be consistent 
with the established laws.  
This section discusses the considerations on how to provide for the new tool working 
along with the existing ones,1060 and to what type of law the CA-enabling provisions 
should be attached. For the first consideration, this study considers the primary 
intention of a new law as a tool to support landowners to perform conservation 
practices beyond minimum duties under the existing regime of land-use and nature 
conservation laws. Thus, the obligations created by CAs will not overrule the duties 
under the existing laws, but rather seek to introduce a subsidiary option working 
alongside the existing rules. The question to be examined is whether a new framework 
should set a provision recognising the interaction between the existing regulatory 
measures and a proposed legal framework or not.  
To date, there is no voluntary legal mechanism operating alongside land-use and nature 
conservation laws in Thailand. The introduction of this new legal instrument running 
with no provision identifying how the new tool will work along with the current ones 
could create ambiguity over how they interact with each other. Additionally, it could 
also give rise to the question of whether the implementation of obligations under the 
new legal tool overrides any existing legal rules or not. For these reasons, it is 
necessary to prescribe how the new CA-enabling framework could operate to avoid 
misunderstanding about the functionality of CAs in the legal regime of land-use and 
nature conservation.  
A further question is ‘what should be a provision recognising the compatibility of CAs 
and the existing regime?’ A possible provision could recognise that the purpose of the 
implementation of a CA is to impose burdens on a burdened landholder to carry out 
agreed activities beyond the minimum legal requirement of land-use and nature 
conservation laws. This notion implies that CAs impose additional duties on a 
voluntary basis on participants, and such duties are those unregulated by the existing 
regime. This means that where a specific piece of property is under a CA, and then it 
is granted a mining licence or designated as a nature reserved area, the implementation 
of CAs could be terminated.   
                                                     
1060 See the justification why a voluntary-based tool should not operate independently as a substitute 





As discussed in section 13.4 of the previous chapter, although the implementation of 
a CA cannot prevent the land from being exploited by a mining operation, it is because 
of its nature as a private legal tool and the fact that one property right is unable to 
overrule others recognised under other laws.1061 In reality, as observed by Reid, the 
conservation of nature is neither the only concern of the state nor necessarily high in 
the list of priorities.1062 It means that, for instance, if the governments prioritise the 
conservation of some feature on land over activities detrimental to ecological features 
on such land, e.g. mining operations, they should impose other stronger public 
regulatory tools instead of the use of CAs. These include the declaration of compulsory 
purchase of such land and designating it as a specific nature reserve area.1063  
Regarding the dependency of a proposed CA-enabling law, the examination in the 
previous chapter shows that all CA-enabling laws are not created as self-standing 
legislation, but rather attached as part of certain types of legislation, including land 
law and laws relating to nature conservation. This study considers that a proposed legal 
framework should be attached to the law of nature conservation rather than the law of 
property (land law) or introduced as independent legislation.  The reason against the 
establishment of this CA-enabling law as an independent regime is the need to avoid 
the complexity of the governing regime. If the legal proposal is enacted as an 
independent law, it is necessary to set a new governmental body to implement the law 
and designate a qualified holder which may require more public finance for this 
fulfilment than the attachment of the legal proposal to an existing law.  
Above all, at least two reasons support the appropriateness of incorporating the new 
law as part of the law of nature conservation. First, the aim of implementing this legal 
tool, as determined in section 2.2, is to encourage the conservation of natural features 
on land to promote biodiversity conservation. This primary objective provides a strong 
fit well with the attachment to the law of nature conservation rather than property law. 
Second, all nature conservation-related legislation in Thailand already provides a 
governing body and legal mechanisms for its implementation. The inclusion of this 
                                                     
1061 Unless the law authorising the creation of property rights expressly prescribes that one may prevails 
over another as seen from a servitude which could impose restrictions over ownership on certain 
property (servient property).  
1062 Reid, Nature Conservation Law (n 35) para 1.1.2. 
1063 As most of the land eligible to establish nature reserve areas in Thai laws must be publicly-owned 
land, compulsory purchase of the land on environmental grounds is required before the designation of 





legal scheme as part of the existing nature conservation laws has no need to establish 
a new governing body. Third, this approach could also help justify how the new legal 
tool can work alongside the existing rules of nature conservation law. This approach 
could also support the work of a new voluntary tool consistent and coherent with other 
C&C conservation measures in place.1064 
 
3. Overall strengths and weaknesses of the legal proposal for Thailand 
Although the previous part analysed and suggested what the legal provisions 
developed for Thailand should be, this study does not claim that the legal proposal is 
necessarily the most appropriate model for Thailand. In contrast, some weaknesses 
remain due to various factors, including the limited scope of this study1065 and the 
necessity to implement the proposal in practice to evaluate what the limitations could 
be.1066 As justified at the study aim, this thesis aims at being a pilot study examining 
and proposing a possible legal model developed upon a comparative analysis of law 
and doctrinal legal research. The overall strengths and weaknesses of this proposal 
considered from a legal aspect can be determined as explained below.  
 
3.1 Overall strengths 
The most crucial strength of the proposed CA-enabling law is the establishment of a 
legal vehicle recognising the legal status and binding effect of conservation 
agreements as the existing laws have several limitations in serving this task.1067 This 
proposed law also enables landowners and the public to play a part in the law relating 
to nature conservation based on a voluntary basis, which has never been established in 
nature conservation law in Thailand. This legal proposal which creates the framework 
provisions can also be implemented to solve critical environmental problems on land, 
as observed in section 1.2 of chapter 2, as well as to convey some specific market-
                                                     
1064 See the argument made in the last paragraph of sub-section 13.4.1 of chapter 5. See also Reid, ‘The 
Privatisation of Biodiversity?’ (n 493) 223-5. 
1065 The limits of this study include the length of a PhD thesis and the methodology employed for this 
study. See further illustration in part 2 of chapter 7. 
1066 See further explanation regarding this research limitation in part 2 of chapter 7.  
1067 For instance, Grinlinton argues that a traditional rule of property law merely provides the rule for 
recognising property rights and the exercising of such rights. This is different from environmental law 





based schemes for nature conservation.
1068
 These include the implementation of the 
REDD+ scheme which entails planting and retaining trees for carbon sequestration. 
The implementation of this proposal could also bring environmental governance with 
the public into play, which moves away from environmental governance by 
government.1069  
 
3.2 Overall weaknesses 
Although this conservation scheme could bring about several positive effects on the 
enhancement of environmental governance for the country, some limitations may exist 
and should be addressed here.  
From an environmental governance perspective, the legal model proposed has not 
substantially moved away from governmental regulation as the qualified holder is a 
designated governmental body as laid down in section 2.3 above, and the public has a 
limited role in participation under this legal proposal.1070 Arguably, the proposed CA 
framework provides more effective roles for landowners than the legal measures in the 
existing legal laws. 
From the equality of parties perspective, the government body is entitled to consider 
when this legal scheme should be implemented under specified conditions, and decide 
whether CAs supported by public funds should be modified and terminated, and thus 
there is some inequality of bargaining power between CA parties.  
Another limitation can be about the effectiveness of implementing this tool. This legal 
scheme is created to primarily for use on land where it is possible to identify an owner 
by a land title document. This prevents its implementation for the conservation of 
marine or water areas. The limitation arising from the nature of a private law 
                                                     
1068 See the problems and the potential use of CAs in the context of Thailand in section 1.2 of chapter 4. 
1069 Gunningham and Holley recently argued that the trend of environmental regulation is moving from 
a mere reliance on law and regulation, where state bodies are the central player, towards a new paradigm 
of environmental governance with multiple players (Gunningham and Holley (n 168) 2-3; Cameron 
Holley and Neil Gunningham, ‘Natural Resources, New Governance and Legal Regulation: When Does 
Collaboration Work?’ 2011) 24 New Zealand Universities Law Review 309, 335). 
1070 The example of CAs as a significant move away from environmental governance dominated by public 
bodies can be observed from the legal model implemented in the USA, where non-governmental bodies play 





instrument also hinders the use of this tool to overrule other public regulatory 
frameworks, which include the inability to prevent damage from mining projects. 
Apart from that, some might have a question about the risk that the voluntary approach 
suggested will be used as a means of avoiding more stringent command regulation. 
CAs might be, in practice, not only equally difficult to enforce, but also potentially an 
excuse for lack of further action.  
As observed in chapter 1, this thesis sets the scope of the study as arguing for the use 
of CAs alongside C&C regulation for two reasons. First, CAs should be an “alternative 
and subsidiary” tool of C&C regulation. This focus means that the thesis has no 
intention to discuss whether CAs will be better than the existing C&C regulation. 
Second, the focus mentioned in the first reason indicates that the thesis has no intention 
to compare the effectiveness or efficiency of these two regulatory techniques due to 
the limit of the research approach employed.  
Regarding the difficulty in enforcing CAs, this thesis takes the view that, from a 
theoretical and Thai-law perspective, the enforcement of CAs is less rigidly 
constrained and therefore potentially more effective than that of C&C for two reasons. 
First, as seen from the Thai legal proposal in sections 2.8 and 2.12 above, there could 
be various actors entitled to enforce CA obligations, not just a responsible 
governmental body. The sanctions for non-compliance with CAs involve a lower level 
of legal coercion than that of C&C because the primary sanction is civil remedies. This 
kind of sanction is more flexible in that although a landowner is failing to fulfil CA 
obligations, CA parties can negotiate on how to solve the problem. Apart from that, 
the very nature of a voluntary agreement means that a current burdened landowner 
enters into CA voluntarily. The landowner has a choice to decide during a negotiation 
process to choose a remedy for non-compliance and the binding duration. The future 
landowners may be bound involuntarily, but when they come to be bound, they can 
negotiate whether to vary or terminate the agreement. These features are different from 
those of C&C regulation where the law already provides the measures for enforcement, 






4. Conclusion  
The examination in this chapter demonstrates the possibility of introducting a new 
proposal for the establishment of a CA legal framework in Thailand. This chapter 
uncovers some opportunities in developing such the new legal proposal, as well as 
identifies the limitations of the use of the existing laws to create CAs. Then, this 
chapter elaborated the thirteen possible provisions necessary for the establishment of 
this legal tool by drawing from the comparative analysis study in chapter 5. Although 
a number of weaknesses remains, this study affirms that the proposal has various 
strengths, which prevail over those imperfect points, but further research to make it 
ready for the implementation is desirable. The points suggesting the limits of the whole 








Chapter 7 Conclusion 
 
Introduction 
This thesis mainly aimed to explore the room to develop a legal scheme enabling the 
implementation of CAs in Thailand. It explored the potential value and applicability 
of CAs implemented elsewhere by employing doctrinal and comparative analysis. 
Then, it has developed a legal proposal for the establishment of this conservation 
technique in Thailand.  
As observed in chapter 1, this thesis set the grounds for this study by reflecting that 
the existing environmental law of many jurisdictions globally is reliant on C&C 
regulation, which has some limitations. It subsequently set the scene for the 
examination of the use of CAs, a voluntary conservation tool, in combination with 
mainstream C&C regulation, as one of the policy options to conserve natural features 
on land. Also, it made an argument that it is worth considering whether and how this 
conservation option can be established in Thailand.  
This thesis developed the main research question by posing ‘whether a legal 
framework for the establishment of conservation agreements should be made for the 
conservation of natural features on land? And if it should, what provisions should be 
made for the establishment of CAs to work alongside existing laws for nature 
conservation on land?’ 
The hypothes was that it is possible to establish a legal model for the creation of CAs 
to work alongside the existing legal measures. The provisions constituting such a legal 
framework can be developed by means of comparative analysis of the legal features of 
CA-enabling laws implemented in the comparator jurisdictions and formulating a legal 
framework for Thailand. However, some further studies would be needed to move 
from a general idea to work out the precise details of a fully worked up proposal and 
assess its value in specific contexts. 
The comparative and doctrinal analysis methods were used to examine the sufficiency 
of Thai laws and compare CA-enabling laws of the comparator jurisdictions. The 
choice of comparator jurisdictions was justified and focused on the laws implemented 





for decades, and there is an abundance of information and analysis useful for 
discussion in this comparative study.  
The thesis is divided into seven chapters. The theoretical concepts of environmental 
regulation and voluntary agreements were studied in chapters 2 and 3. The legal aspect 
of Thai laws was examined in chapter 4. A comparative study was elaborated in 
chapter 5. Then, chapter 6 took the findings drawn from the previous chapters to 
formulate the legal proposal for a CA-enabling law for Thailand and noted some 
strengths and weaknesses. The research findings of each chapter are summarised 
below.  
  
1. Thesis findings 
In light of the research questions set at the beginning,1071 findings are summarised into 
four aspects. They comprise 1) the theoretical concepts of environmental regulation 
and voluntary agreements; 2) the factual situation and relevant laws in Thailand; 3) the 
application of CAs in the comparator jurisdictions, and 4) the legal proposal for a CA-
enabling law for Thailand.   
 
1.1 The theoretical concepts of environmental regulation and voluntary 
agreements 
The investigation in chapters 2 and 3 provided conceptual ideas on how the concepts 
of environmental regulation and voluntary agreements underpin the relevant laws of 
Thailand and those authorising the creation of CAs in the comparator jurisdictions. 
Such conceptual ideas enabled this thesis to consider the laws to be compared and 
developed in chapters 4 to 6 from the theoretical and regulatory points of view.  
The investigation in chapter 2 revealed that the use of law to intervene in social 
behaviour could be regarded as a form of regulation. Such legal intervention may be 
rooted in various grounds, including regulating social activities for the public interest 
based on economic, social or environmental rationales. It highlighted that the law 
should be implemented to serve the public interest. Another important point 
highlighted in this chapter is about the styles and tools for environmental regulation. 
                                                     





C&C and self-regulation are the regulatory styles representing the regulatory character 
of the laws regarding land-use control, nature conservation and those enabling the 
creation of CAs. This chapter revealed that the initiation of regulatory tools based on 
a voluntary basis (self-regulation) is an option allowing firms and individuals to 
participate in a regulatory scheme. Various tools exemplified in this chapter are 
influenced or based on C&C regulation and self-regulation. They present different 
roles, levels of legal intrusion and governmental intervention, according to the laws 
establishing them. Those tools illustrated the diversity of options that can be 
implemented to work together, and voluntary agreements are one of the tools operating 
as part of the regulatory landscape. Chapter 2 argued that the understanding of the 
above concepts helps understand the application of voluntary agreements. It 
demonstrated how the concepts of regulation, specifically environmental regulation, 
lie behind and take part in shaping the current laws in Thailand and those of the 
comparator jurisdictions. Beyond that, the last section of this chapter argued that 
voluntary environmental agreements are desirable where law-makers seek to introduce 
a low coercive tool to encourage the conservation of features on land. This point was 
subsequently elaborated in chapter 3. 
Further regulatory and theoretical aspects were investigated in chapter 3. This chapter 
narrowed down the discussion to examine the concept of voluntary environmental 
agreements (VEAs). This chapter set a starting point by arguing that CAs are a subset 
of voluntary environmental agreements. Hence, there is room to observe CAs from 
theoretical and regulatory perspectives through the examination of voluntary 
environmental agreements. 
The observation from this chapter revealed various aspects of VEAs, including their 
definition, origination, typology, potential use, matters to be taken into account where 
VEAs are to be introduced. The investigation in these points led to the conclusion that 
the study of VEAs is advantageous in various aspects, but careful considerations of 
how a particular VEA can be implemented, and what their limitations can be, are vital. 
This chapter illustrated various connections, differences and similarities between the 






1.2 The factual situation and relevant laws in Thailand 
Chapter 4 illustrated key existing problems and gaps, motivations for reform, and legal 
principles, which are relevant or support the creation of CAs in the Thai context. It 
revealed the shortcomings of the existing relevant laws in dealing with environmental 
problems arising from human activities on land. It also made a core argument that the 
understanding of factual and legal backgrounds is fundamental to the development of 
new legal innovation to tackle the problems which are happening.  
Regarding the factual aspects of land use and environmental issues arising thereon, 
this thesis uncovered how land-use activities are interrelated to some environmental 
problems. The diversity and complexity of environmental problems posed by human 
activities on land indicate the room to improve agricultural practices to serve the 
conservation of nature. There is a need to regulate conservation practices on privately-
owned land by a less intrusive legal tool. This part also exemplified the situations 
where CAs could be made to deal with those environmental problems.  
The findings from the legal aspect indicate what relevant laws are in place. It showed 
that several laws in Thailand provide rules about land status, land rights, and providing 
rules regarding land-use regulation and nature conservation. However, none of them 
authorises the creation of CAs, which impose burdens running with the land.  The 
majority of relevant laws are reliant on C&C regulation, which reflects the absence of 
the use of a voluntary approach to conserve natural features on land. The examination 
of these two aspects indicates the possibility of developing a new legal tool to work 
alongside the established laws.  
 
1.3 The application of CAs in the comparator jurisdictions 
The comparative study, which was conducted in chapter 5, provided comprehensive 
work comparing the features, strengths and weaknesses of CAs used in the UK, USA 
and Australia. It showed that the theoretical concepts of regulation and voluntary 
agreements examined in chapters 2 and 3 are an integral part of CA-enabling laws in 
those jurisdictions. 
The comparative study uncovered the standard features of the law across different 
jurisdictions and identified key strengths and weaknesses or legal implications of each 





Thailand should develop its legal model by drawing the legal features from the 
comparison in this chapter.  
This thesis separated thirteen critical elements regarding CA provisions to explore 
similarities and differences of the CA-enabling laws. This chapter established three 
grounds justifying why those elements should be investigated and discussed. The first 
is the categorisation in light of the definition of CAs given by the Law Commission, 
summarised in chapter 1, as well as the matters to be taken into account in creating 
VEAs, investigated in chapter 3.1072 The second comes from considering the aim of 
this study, which seeks to introduce CAs to work alongside C&C regulatory measures 
and the existing legal tools in place in Thailand, as examined in chapters 2, 3 and 4. 
The last one is by taking the common elements in place in the comparator jurisdictions 
into account. 
The examination of each element revealed various issues vital to the development of 
the legal proposal for Thailand in chapter 6. For example, it illustrated that CAs in 
place in the USA could be used to conserve or manage both natural and cultural 
heritage. However, those implemented in Australia are exclusively used to conserve 
natural features. Such differences expose the strengths and weaknesses of each legal 
model, and what should be followed by Thailand. 
Apart from that, this chapter revealed that, although being a voluntary tool in nature, 
its function as a subsidiary regulatory tool makes this tool interact with C&C 
regulation in many respects. Hence, chapter 5 noted that the development of new law 
for Thailand should consider how to make a proposed CA work alongside conventional 
direct regulation. 
 
1.4 The legal proposal of CA-enabling law for Thailand 
Chapter 6 made a contribution to this thesis by proposing a new legal framework 
operating on a voluntary basis of private law. The earlier part of this chapter revealed 
some opportunities in introducing CA-enabling laws, as well as demonstrated what the 
shortcoming of the existing laws in enabling the creation of a voluntary tool.  
                                                     





In light of the legal considerations and detailed discussions made in chapter 5, these 
following concluding remarks were elaborated as the legal proposals for the 
recognition of CAs in the Thai legal system.1073  
1) The purpose for which a CA can be created:  
CAs should be used for the conservation of natural features on land with the 
aim to serve the public interest. A definition of the term ‘conservation’ 
should be made by including ‘the protection, restoration or enhancement’ of 
natural features on land. 
2) An eligible holder:  
The legal proposal should vest the power to create a CA in a specified 
governmental conservation body. 
3) Land eligible to be subject to CAs:  
The area eligible for the creation of CAs should be land rightfully possessed 
or owned by eligible persons regardless of its purposes for use or physical 
nature. 
4) Burdened landholders:  
The legal proposal should provide that landowners and others having the 
right over a certain plot of land (e.g. tenants) are eligible to enter into CAs 
with a qualified holder subject to the durations stipulated in (6) below.  
5) Obligations:  
The provisional text should prescribe that CAs created between CA parties 
may impose both positive or negative burdens subject to the conservation 
purposes stipulated in (1). 
6) Binding duration:  
The legal proposal should provide that the default binding period of CA is a 
perpetual term, but the parties could agree to make a time-limited CA 
subject to the type of burdened landholders. CAs made by landowners run 
with the land and bind successors in a land title, but those made by others 
persons having the rights on the property of another do not bind a future 
owner1074 and are subject to the period of the rights over the burdened land. 
                                                     
1073 The following suggestions are refined from the concluding remarks summarised at the end of each 
section in part 2 of chapter 6. 
1074 As noted in sub-section 2.5.2 of chapter 6, although CAs made by others persons having the rights 
on the property of another do not bind future landowners, they bind successors in the same position, e.g. 





7) CA variation and termination:  
The provision should entitle CA parties to modify or terminate CA made by 
them by agreement. The court should have the power to decide the 
reasonable grounds of modification and termination where disagreement on 
these grounds takes place.  
8) Enforcement for the breach of obligations:  
The legal proposal should prescribe a civil law remedy as a means for CA 
enforcement. Civil remedies for enforcement should be the same as those 
applied for civil disputes.  
9) Incentives:  
A provision about incentives should be included, to the effect that a holder 
‘may offer’ some incentives in exchange with the entry into a CA subject to 
the conditions under this law. The details providing what incentives can be 
made available to landowners should be prescribed in a regulation. 
10) CA registration:  
The law should provide that the creation of a CA will be valid where a 
landowner registers the acquisition of CA burdens in the land title document 
subject to the rules prescribed in a regulation. This provision is also required 
where the parties modify or terminate CAs.   
11) Public oversight:  
Since the qualified holder will be a governmental body, public oversight of 
CAs’ implementation can be done in the same manner as other kinds of 
administrative operations. Hence, it is unnecessary to provide an additional 
rule for public oversight. 
12) Applicable term 
A proposed CA-enabling law should employ the term ‘conservation 
agreement.’ 
13) Compatibility with the existing laws:  
The provision should state that the implementation of a CA on certain land 
does not overrule or exclude the duties required under specific rules under 
existing laws. The new legal proposal should be annexed as part of nature 
conservation laws. 
The last part of chapter 6 noted that although the legal proposal proposed by this thesis 





application, this study affirms that the legal proposal has various strengths, which 
prevail over those imperfect points. Such strengths include the introduction of a legal 
innovation based on the combination of C&C regulation and self-regulation, which 
offers an option to develop further market-based instruments and encourages new 
environmental governance by multiple players. However, this part noted that further 
research to make it ready for implementation should be conducted.1075   
In brief, it can be summarised that the legal proposal elaborated in chapter 6 is an 
option to conserve natural features on land and diminish the environmental problems 
noted in chapter 4. This thesis claims that it creates two original contributions to 
academia. The first is the concluding remarks on how the application of CA laws can 
be analysed from regulatory and legal perspectives. The second is the creation of a 
legal proposal for the implementation of CAs in Thailand.     
 
2. Limitations of this research  
Although arguing that this thesis made some original contribution, some limitations of 
this research remain and should be discussed here.  
First, the very nature of the comparative analysis of law means that the research 
outcome is dependent on, among other things, the jurisdictions selected to compare 
and relevant information available at the time of conducting this research. The 
comparison of the laws of Australia, the UK and the USA, where their socio-economic 
conditions and legal systems are distinctive from Thailand, might be criticised that it 
leads to a research outcome similar to the legal model of western countries. Perhaps, 
the selection of some developing countries as the comparators might look more 
appropriate, and lead to an outcome that is suitable for Thailand. Nonetheless, as 
justified in section 4.3 of chapter 1, this thesis adopted some criteria for justifying this 
selection, and one of these is sufficient supporting information. Hence, this thesis sees 
that this selection is justifiable but there remain some limits.  
Second, although the use of comparative study based on documentary research offers 
an opportunity to view a specific problem or issue from a theoretical perspective, it 
might be seen that the result uncovered by this type of research method is unrealistic. 
                                                     





It means that this research may not be able to find the most effective way to solve a 
problem unless empirical research in that topic is conducted. This assertion may be 
partly true, but this thesis affirmed at the outset that it sought to develop a possible 
proposal of law based on a theoretical and doctrinal study. Hence, this thesis does not 
claim that the legal proposal made is necessarily the most appropriate or effective 
model. It merely established a possible and credible legal model which merits further 
elaboration by an empirical method.  
Third, this thesis noted in many parts that some legal considerations remain unsolved, 
and this made this thesis unable to elaborate on all aspects comprehensively. For 
example, this thesis did not examine all dimensions of the consideration of public 
interest CAs might seek to serve.1076 Also, it did not examine whether the proposed 
model should apply in water areas where the entitlement of property rights thereon 
remain unclear.1077 Further research on what type of rights the law allows for 
individuals in such areas could help clarify this point. However, as mentioned in 
chapter 4, the legal concepts of public ownership1078 and regulatory property rights1079 
in Thailand are not clarified well. This thesis, therefore, is unable to consider whether 
water areas should be conserved by CAs or not. Another aspect worthy for further 
study is about the efficiency and effectiveness of civil remedies used for the 
enforcement of CAs. This thesis is unable to thoroughly examine this due to its study 
scope and the research method employed. Further study might be based on a socio-
economic or empirical approach. 
 
3. The potential for further research  
Although on the one hand, limitations of this research may exist, and make the 
conclusion in this thesis imperfect, on another, these suggest some avenues for further 
research to fulfil such imperfections. First, there is the opportunity to have further 
research in searching for the detailed answers through other research methods. The 
limits of this research which merely provide a preliminary answer by employing 
comparative analysis and documentary research indicate that there is the room to 
                                                     
1076 See this acknowledgement in sub-section 2.4.3 of chapter 5. 
1077 See the identification of this point at section 2.4 of chapter 6. 
1078 See the difficulty in determining the concept of public ownership in Thailand in sub-section 2.1.4.2. 
See also Resta (n 434) ch 10. 





further investigate by considering actual practice in other jurisdictions coupled with 
refinement of the legal proposal by an empirical method, e.g. by consulting experts 
and stakeholders.1080 Such further study might be useful in that it is an opportunity to 
find what the challenging issues hindering the implementation of CAs can be.  
Second, if the legal proposal is carried forward, there will be room to consider the 
potential in applying CAs to deliver market instruments for environmental protection 
which require further detailed provisions. For instance, if a government adopts a policy 
to introduce payments for ecosystem services (PES), this research will become a 
pioneering paper in many aspects. It could provide a preliminary study showing how 
CAs can work alongside or as an independent tool to serve, what provisions should be 
made and whether and to what extent the legal rules creating a CA can be applied to 
convey PES.1081 
Third, there is the room to investigate some legal issues regarded as research 
limitations in the above part. They include the investigations of all dimensions of 
public interest in the context of CAs, the effectiveness of CA enforcement as well as 
that relating to the application of CAs in water areas.   
 
                                                     
1080 For example, in other jurisdictions, some empirical studies examined the willingness and ability of 
burdened landholders to continue the implementation of CAs to understand the perceptions of 
participating landowners in Australia (see Julie Elizabeth Groce, ‘Private Land Initiatives for 
Biodiversity Conservation: The Case of Conservation Covenants’ (PhD Thesis, Monash University 
2018)).  
1081 See the example of the guidelines in establishing PES, which are closely similar to CAs at Thomas 
Greiber (Ed), ‘Payments for Ecosystem Services: Legal and Institutional Frameworks’ (IUCN 






The statutory provisions authorising the creation conservation easements in the USA 
are found in the following statutory compilations. 
States Names of conservation easement-enabling statute 
States adopting UCEA 
Alabama  Code of Alabama 
Alaska Alaska Statutes 
Arizona Arizona Revised Statutes 
Arkansas Arkansas Code 
Delaware Delaware Code 
Florida  Florida Statutes 
Georgia Georgia Code 
Idaho Idaho Statutes 
Indiana Indiana Code 
Kansas Kansas Statutes 
Kentucky Kentucky Revised Statutes 
Louisiana Louisiana Revised Statutes 
Maine  Maine Revised Statutes 
Minnesota Minnesota Statutes 
Mississippi Mississippi Code 
Missouri Missouri Revised Statutes 
Nevada Nevada Revised Statutes 
New Hampshire New Hampshire Revised Statutes 
New Mexico New Mexico Statutes 
Oklahoma Oklahoma Statutes 
Oregon Oregon Revised Statutes 
Pennsylvania Pennsylvania Statutes and Consolidated Statutes 
South Carolina South Carolina Code of Laws 
South Dakota South Dakota Codified Laws 
Texas Texas Statutes 
Virginia Code of Virginia 
West Virginia West Virginia Code 
Wisconsin Wisconsin Statutes & Annotations 






States Names of conservation easement-enabling statute 
California California Civil Code 
Colorado Colorado Revised Statutes 
Connecticut Connecticut General Statutes 
Hawaii Hawaii Revised Statutes 
Illinois Illinois Compiled Statutes 
Iowa Iowa Code 
Maryland Maryland Code 
Massachusetts  Massachusetts General Laws 
Michigan  Michigan Compiled Laws 
Montana  Montana Code Annotated 
Nebraska Nebraska Revised Statutes 
New Jersey New Jersey Revised Statute 
New York New York Laws 
North Carolina North Carolina General Statutes 
Ohio Ohio Revised Code 
Rhode Island Rhode Island General Laws 
Tennessee Tennessee Code 
Utah Utah Code 
Vermont Vermont Statutes 
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